A Tale of Two Speeches

President Obama gave two important foreign policy speeches recently, and the opinion pages and blogosphere can't seem to stop talking about them. I didn't want to have my voice be lost in the immediate aftermath, but now that much of the dust has settled I thought I'd add a few thoughts.

The President's long-awaited speech rolling out his new Afghanistan strategy pleased almost no one who chose to examine it closely. It took too long, it wasn't detailed enough, it was too specific, some of the details were wrong, he didn't focus on Pakistan enough, he focused too much on Pakistan... Jon Stewart made fun of it for being too much like a speech President Bush could have given. Some bloggers complained that he had conflated the Afghanistan and Pakistani Taliban, and that anyone who doesn't understand the difference couldn't possibly come up with a good strategy. The West Point cadets watching the speech didn't seem to know how to respond until the speech stopped being specific and started going in to broad, soaring generalities and hopeful themes - Obama's specialty. In the days following the speech it turned out that few of the specifics were actually totally true. The troop "surge" may not take place until Fall 2010, and they will only "start" to be pulled out in Summer 2011. The speech failed to be all things to all people, and thus was not well received.

President Obama's Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech made up for it in a big way. It was masterfully written and beautifully delivered. Critics called it the best of Obama's career, and certainly the best of his Presidency so far. It spoke truth to the power of the Nobel committee, addressed the oddity of winning a peace prize while leading a nation engaged in two wars, acknowledged previous winners, and defended the use of military force while advancing progressive ideals. It was a perfect encapsulation of the Truman Project worldview - which makes sense since it was written by someone affiliated with the Truman Project. Writers from the progressive side to at least the conservative moderation of David Brooks loved the speech. About all critics of the speech could say was that it was rambling and disjointed. I loved the speech, but the critics are right. Everyone was happy with it because they could read what they wanted into the speech. Dan Drezner made an attempt to map out the various international relations theories referred to in the speech. It was another classic piece of Obama magic: choosing the middle path and creating buy-in from all sides by incorporating their arguments. It made for a powerful speech, but it will be hard to predict his future foreign policy moves based on a speech that left almost every door open.

On Paranoid Pakistanis

Given half an opportunity, Pakistanis can be some of the most paranoid people on the planet. They tend to fear that India -- or sometimes the United States -- is behind every single bad thing that happens to them. If a Pakistani stubs his toe it was probably an Indian spy who snuck in and made that crack in the sidewalk. Lou Dobbs would be a big hit in Pakistan; maybe he should do a show there rather than running for president in 2012. Ahmed Rashid has a good article up on the BBC News website on conspiracy theories in Pakistan.

Some people in Pakistan probably should be paranoid. President Zardari should be paranoid; people really are plotting against him, which is understandable given the job he is doing.

I've heard other crazy theories from Pakistanis ranging from the idea that all U.S. technology, especially nuclear technology, contains a secret "off" switch, so that when our Indian overlords give the order we can secretly send out a radio signal and make all Pakistani military equipment cease to work. Or that the militant bombings in Peshawar and elsewhere are not the work of the Taliban, but instead are the work of Blackwater.

The last thing you would want to do is give any kind of credibility to those rumors, right? Imagine how crazy Dobbs and the FreeRepublic folks would go if President Obama accidentally mentioned something about going "home" to Kenya, or said something about going to a mosque.

So who's bright idea was it to hire Blackwater Xe Total Intelligence Solutions (TIS) to work doing "snatch-and-grabs" based in Karachi, Pakistan? Apparently since we officially can't have our military operating in Pakistan, we'll just outsource it to civilians. Let's just hope none of them are of Indian descent.

Categorize this one as "stupid power."

Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Haven't I Refuted This Before?

Seymour Hersh has an article in The New Yorker asking the tired questions of whether Pakistan's nuclear weapons are safe from capture by al-Qaeda or the Taliban. He asserts that because militants have attacked well-defended Pakistani military facilities, other well-defended facilities, including nuclear locations, could be in danger.

If I'm not mistaken a well-defended U.S. military facility, Fort Hood, was just attacked by someone with insider knowledge of security and facilities, but that doesn't mean that anyone outside of Hollywood screenwriters think U.S. nuclear facilities are likely to be attacked or captured by militants. Indian Maoist naxalite militants have attacked government facilities, but no one worries publicly about the security of India's nuclear weapons. Hersh argues that components are most vulnerable when they are being moved. Hmm, you mean like when nuclear parts are accidentally flown across the country, or mistakenly delivered to Taiwan? Didn't the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force get fired for those mistakes not too long ago? Let's discuss reality here.

Once again, yes, Pakistan's government is unstable. President "Mr. Ten Percent" Zardari may well be forced out of office in the next six months, but that may well lead to increased stability in Pakistan, not less. The Pakistani military is considered a common player in Pakistani society and politics, and is perhaps the most stable element. The nuclear warheads are stored and secured separately from the triggers and the delivery systems, and the Pakistanis have developed extensive nuclear security systems.

If anything Pakistan seemed more unstable back in May, when the Taliban had famously crept within 90 miles of the capital, Islamabad. The New York Times ran a piece quoting various experts as saying the nuclear stockpile was safe. What has changed since then other than Sy Hersh decided this was a good sensational story to write? He dismisses all the expert opinions he finds that run contrary to his view, because "are Pakistan's nuclear weapons safe? Yes" would be a pretty boring article.

I imagine I or someone like me will have to refute some sensationalist account about terrorists and Pakistan's nuclear weapons every six months or so for at least several years to come. Of course it's a valid concern and one that should not be ignored, but it is also unlikely, and Pakistan should be given credit for protecting its arsenal.

Soon is the Winter of Our Afghanistan Discontent

The three main stories about South Asia in the recent news all focus on waiting: for President Obama to make a decision on a strategy and troop levels, for the official results of the Afghanistan election, and for the Pakistani Army to finally begin its offensive into South Waziristan. Waiting is not the worst thing in the world; no matter what is decided on any of those matters the fighting will likely slow to a trickle soon, since Afghanistan becomes even more inhospitable and difficult to fight in every winter.

President Obama is right to take his time discussing his South Asian strategy with as many advisers as he needs and for as long as it takes. With every passing day the critics and think tankers here inside the Beltway pace across their offices and write more and more op-eds bravely criticizing a war many of them once supported and then argued should be left alone in favor of invading Iraq, but it is worth the time needed to come up with a functional strategy. As Truman Fellow Alex Rossmiller points out, the current situation in Afghanistan is not the cliched do-or-die crossroads/critical juncture; we could sustain the current stalemate for many years to come without "losing" or "winning" any more than we currently are. General McChrystal's suspected request of 40,000 additional troops, if approved, would not arrive until around a year from now, and would still fall far, far short of the number needed for a "true" counterinsurgency campaign. Even then, as McChrystal admits, if we don't have an effective partner in the Afghan government even hundreds of thousands of troops spending another decade in Afghanistan would likely do little good.

The much-delayed results of the Afghanistan election were supposed to finally be announced this weekend, but have been delayed yet again. Enough fraudulent ballots are expected to be thrown out that Karzai will fall short of the 50 percent needed to avoid a run-off. The ideal situation would be for Karzai to accept some sort of power-sharing arrangement situation, but that looks unlikely. Since he has proved to be at best a reluctant partner in actually governing his country, many U.S. leaders would prefer to work around him, but as the recognized leader of Afghanistan that is proving quite difficult. The necessity of propping up and empowering a corrupt, incompetent leader who will only inevitably collapse when we leave is not much incentive for committing more time, money, and personnel.

After over a month of buildup (both actual military buildup and media hype) this weekend the Pakistan Army finally began its offensive into South Waziristan, the home of the Mehsud clan. Since everyone knew the offensive was coming everyone has had a chance to prepare themselves to flee (an estimated 100,000 people have been displaced so far) or fight.

The looming winter will allow all parties time to sit around and think. I think the Pakistani military timed their offensive when they did in order to accomplish just enough that the Pakistani Taliban wouldn't be able to regroup and mount a major counter-offensive and to ensure that the military would not be able to overcommit. President Obama's Afghanistan strategy group will not make a decision before the results of the election are clear. The winter lull is a mixed blessing for the Administration, since no major action will be possible. The President's team should avoid getting distracted by the sniping attacks from neoconservatives all winter and focus on determining the best course of action in a region with no good options.

Twisted Logic on Pakistan's Nukes

Someone help me understand this: the biggest danger in South/Central Asia is al Qaeda getting its hands on one or more of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. Al Qaeda's leadership and many of their fighters are currently in Pakistan. Therefore the argument is we should send 40,000 more troops to Afghanistan? I'm not sure I follow the logic chain. Assuming we failed and largely pulled out of Afghanistan, and assuming the Taliban (whose leaders are also primarily in Pakistan) re-take control of much of Afghanistan, and assuming the Taliban welcome al Qaeda back and provide them the oft-mentioned "safe haven" (and none of those assumptions are sure things by the way), they would then be MORE likely to attack Pakistan's nuclear facilities?

When the Taliban famously advanced into the Swat valley, within 90 miles of the capital Islamabad, I argued against the doom sayers, saying Pakistan was not about to collapse. Now the Pakistani military has largely driven the Taliban from Swat and is preparing for an offensive in South Waziristan, home to much of the Taliban leadership. Drone strikes have successfully taken out many leaders, including Baitullah Mehsud (leading to this lovely ditty). Pakistan was not about to collapse then, and is not about to collapse or give up its nuclear weapons now. Pakistan's nuclear weapons are safe, and should not be used as a bureaucratic pawn in the strategic debate. I'm all for a vigorous debate on goals and strategies, but let's apply a few sober standards of logic to this strategic conversation.

The Time Has Come, the Walrus Said, to Talk of Many Things

Editor's Note: the following is a guest post from, Haley Gallagher. The views expressed are her own.

I doubt Lewis Carroll predicted when he published Through the Looking- Glass and What Alice Found There that it would have lessons as applicable today as they were to the late 1800’s. The message that resonated yesterday from Brian Katulis at the Center for American Progress (CAP) was that it’s time to move beyond the rhetorical debate about U.S. foreign policy in Afghanistan and seize the opportunity to engage in a broad and serious discussion.

CAP hosted an event, “Assessing the Afghan Election” yesterday and had a panel of experts (Jackie Northam, Eric Bjornlund and Brian Katulis) analyze the current situation in Afghanistan as well as suggest recommendations moving forward. Sadly, positive accolades given by the Obama Administration for the success of the elections in Afghanistan on August 20^th are not being echoed in other news publications. Turnout was not as high as expected due to various reasons highlighted by the panel including voter intimidation by the Taliban specifically in the South, heightened security, general apathy, and a sense of defeatism that neither candidate was a good option. Ms. Northam informed the audience that there was hope turnout would increase over the course of the day, but this was not the case. She never saw lines of more than 6-8 people coming out to vote in the streets of Kabul, one of the more heavily protected areas.

Mr. Bjornlund, with Democracy International, admitted that the security situation in Afghanistan made the elections very difficult to observe. Additionally, while this was the first time observers joined provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), it was extremely challenging to observe in rural areas. He echoed Ms. Northam’s sentiment that the climate influenced a lack of voter turnout. Furthermore, gauging an accurate percentage of voter turnout is nearly impossible to measure given that the amount of voters is uncertain. While an independent election commission exists to deal with allegations of voter fraud and electoral complaints, there is speculation over what the commission expects to do—or can do— with complaints once they’re registered.

Katulis painted an even grimmer picture stating that we can expect more violence to ensure in the days to come with potential increases in Taliban threats as well as candidates refusing to accept results. However, the time is crucial and the U.S. should seize the moment to engage in a serious policy debate about Afghanistan and determine how to ensure cooperation moving forward. He outlined three points: 1) It’s not too early to think about how to advance power sharing, 2) It’s extremely important for the U.S. to put pressure on Afghan leaders, who emerge from the election, to focus on anti-corruption, counter-narcotics and governance, and 3) The U.S. should be concerned about the lack of clear goals and objectives in Afghanistan.

The U.S. should demand a commitment from Afghan leaders to agree to power-sharing and working from the ground up to uproot the systems that have plagued Afghanistan for years. Moreover, we’ve been hearing the same thing about Afghanistan over the past two years which is endemic of a Groundhog Day effect. Katulis cautioned against using misleading words such as victory, win and success to describe the situation in Afghanistan. He also claimed that he has yet to hear a cogent case for more troops.

Another great point from the panel was that if the U.S. starts to look like an occupation, Afghanistan will reassert its sovereignty. Currently we lack a strong U.S. framework for a strategy in Afghanistan. While General Stanley McChrystal is expected to deliver this soon, there are questions regarding strength of the strategy. We cannot insert a U.S. model into Afghanistan and expect it to be a recipe for success. The U.S. tried before to impose the idea of a strong central government in Afghanistan and given the complexity of the society this will not work. Government must come from the ground up and include all of the right players in order to establish credibility and legitimacy. The dialogue needs to continue on a more serious level before opportunities are lost.

The Eminently Bloggable Tony Zinni

I wish all speakers at DC think tank events could be as candid, dynamic, and entertaining as General (ret.) Tony Zinni. While his main point (as chronicled by Jamie Morgan, and, oddly enough, The American Conservative, as well as organizer Steve Clemons) was that the U.S. government should go about "civil affairs" or "smart power" in a totally different way, by creating a separate command committed to it (since the military "will get stuck with it anyway"). (Zinni was also promoting his new book.) It would be interesting to get Zinni and O'Hanlon in a room to discuss their visions for civil affairs.

Along the way Zinni touched on quite a few other interesting subjects, including strategy. He agreed with me that we need to actually outline a strategy for Afghanistan, but went further in stating that it should flow from and be consistent with President Obama's National Security Strategy, which has yet to be released. (Apparently an NSS is due within the first 150 days of an administration, which never happens. The Bush Administration's NSS wasn't released until2002; one small section talked about preemption, yet that became the centerpiece of the "Bush Doctrine.") That's certainly true, and a point I hadn't fully considered.

Other "Zinni Zingers:"

• Zinni wondered what someone would think if they had been put in a coma right after 9/11, woke up yesterday, and you had to explain our response. (I'm paraphrasing here): "We were attacked by al Qaeda. We're in Iraq? And we're in Afghanistan, but fighting the Taliban? Al Qaeda is in Pakistan? We're helping Pakistan, but they're fighting the Taliban too? ...?"
• "We shouldn't talk about 'smart power' as if we have it."
• "Special envoys are useless!" (Zinni was the Bush Administration's special envoy to Israel and Palestine).
• "You know where Osama bin Ladin is? Great! I don't know where bin Ladin is. He's on K Street, he's a lobbyist!"
• "Shock and awe turned into aw, shucks."
• "I'm tired of all this 'graveyard of empires' nonsense. The difference is we want to leave Afghanistan, we don't want it as part of an empire."

Wading into the "Safe Haven" Debate

I am not a part of the 51 percent of Americans who apparently no longer think the war in Afghanistan is not worth fighting. Then again the public also approves of President Obama's handling of the war to date; I find myself in the minority of both groups. I believe that we should be in Afghanistan, but only if we develop a realistic and achievable desired end state and a strategy to accomplish that mission.

Over the last few days several foreign policy blogs have been discussing a line from President Obama's speech to the VFW, “If left unchecked, the Taliban insurgency will mean an even larger safe haven from which al Qaeda would plot to kill more Americans." Realist scholar Stephen Walt argued in six points that leaving Afghanistan (presumably immediately) would not create more of a safe haven for terrorists bent on attacking the United States, that it is not fundamental to our survival as a nation, and thus that Afghanistan is not a "war of necessity." He was then "slammed" by, among others, Peter Bergen, Paul Cruickshank, and Spencer Ackerman.

The thing is, while I don't agree with everything he is saying, Walt has a valid point. Would leaving Afghanistan create a safe haven for al-Qaeda? Probably, because either the Taliban would take over or Afghanistan would be come what is referred to as an "ungoverned space."

The first problem is, al-Qaeda already have a safe haven: the ungoverned space on the Pakistan side of the border. Has any analyst or policymaker been so bold as to propose that either the United States or Pakistan will be able to tame and rule the mountainous tribal areas? No power in history has been up to the task. Functioning countries on both sides of the border along with continued drone flights would contain the problem, and that is a valid, and hopefully achievable, goal, but totally eliminating a mountainous maze as a safe haven won't happen. Bergen points out that the 2005 London subway bombings, the 2006 liquid bombs on planes plot, and others were plotted in Pakistan, all while surrounded by thousands of U.S. and allied troops. Eliminating every nook and cranny along the Durand Line is just as difficult as eliminating every nook where a cockroach could be hiding in your house.

A second problem, which some of the commenters acknowledge and then ignore, is that many other ungoverned spaces exist, including Somalia and Yemen, that can and do serve just as well as terrorist bases and training areas. And in a modern, globalized, interconnected world safe havens in ungoverned or welcoming countries aren't necessary. Sure several of the 9/11 hijackers trained in Afghanistan, but they also spent significant time plotting, training, and waiting in Hamburg, Cairo, and Florida (is Florida an ungoverned space? It's easy to get and practice with guns and other weapons there, and parts of it certainly have religious fanatics...).

I don't believe we should withdraw from Afghanistan, although without a real strategy we are simply treading water. We need to set a realistic and achievable goal and figure out a plan to achieve it. The President is right, leaving now would result in an "even larger safe haven" (italics mine), but staying won't eliminate one completely, nor should that be the goal. I don't agree with Walt that we should leave, but he should not be attacked for pointing out that the idea of "safe havens" is not enough of a reason to stay.

Picking Up Bits of Baitullah

Ask and ye shall receive. I wondered how we would a) gain enough material from the Baitullah Mehsud hit to do a DNA study and become more than 90 percent sure we killed him, and b) how we had other DNA of his to compare it to, and BBC News answered at least part b: Pakistani intelligence services apparently have a sample from his brother.

Of course now we (or more likely the Pakistani services) still have to send someone into the lovely neighborhood of South Waziristan to scrape some charred remains off of the rocks around where the house used to be and hope it was from Mehsud and not one of the other people killed in the attack. Easier said than done. But at least I got my question answered!

Notes on a Post-Mehsud Afghanistan and Pakistan

After a weekend of thinking about it, it looks like we really did get Baitullah Mehsud. Hurray! And now his deputies are fighting each other over who gets to be leader of the club now. Double hurray! That saves us the trouble. Various analysts have speculated that whereas Mehsud focused his attacks more on Pakistan, which ever deputy ends up leading his group is likely to focus more on attacking U.S. forces in Afghanistan. That's both good news and bad news. Our troops will get attacked more, but they will be in Afghanistan, where we can fight back, not across the invisible line into Pakistan where we can only use drones.

The "successful" drone strike (it took us many attempts, and the strike that killed Mehsud may not have even been targeting him) means we will likely use drones even more readily. That's not necessarily a good thing, as we have a poor track record of killing the people we want to (terrorists and insurgents) and not the ones we don't (civilians).

On the drug front, we have decided to spend time and energy hunting down drug lords in Afghanistan. I wonder if we're going to include the drug lords who are some of Karzai's biggest supporters. Sure, extra heroin in the world is a bad thing, but we didn't invade Afghanistan to control drugs. Michael Cohen has been keeping an "Afghanistan Mission Creep Watch" going for awhile. Looks like he has some job security!

We are currently spending at least $60 billion per year in Afghanistan. That's roughly six times more (conservatively) than if we simply decided to buy everything Afghanistan produced (drugs included) every year. We're likely committed to spending at least $4 billion a year for quite a few years after we leave (whenever that may be) just to pay for the Afghan army and police forces, since their tax base cannot support it. What are we getting? Is this really the best strategy? Is there a strategy?

Another Afghanistan Review? Let's Make a Decision, People

We are in the midst of, by my count, the fifth review of our Afghanistan (or Afghanistan and Pakistan) strategy this year alone, this one directed by General McChrystal, and featuring some of the top counterinsurgency experts from inside the Beltway. Have any of them resulted in an actual new strategy? Not killing civilians is a good idea, but it's not a strategy. Counterinsurgency isn't even a strategy, it's an approach to accomplishing a strategy.

The problem with all these reviews is that they don't start in the right place: the top. The president, with the help of his top advisers needs to articulate a vision for Afghanistan, and then his advisers can decide how best to accomplish that goal. Is the goal killing or capturing al-Qaeda's top leaders? Preventing the Taliban from regaining control of the country? Establishing Afghanistan as a market-driven democracy?

Many of the advisers who participated in the most recent review are fairly pessimistic. Andrew Exum states that "winning in Afghanistan will be really, really difficult." No doubt that's true, but it become a lot easier if we define winning first. Stephen Biddle asks if the whole endeavor is worth it. Judah Grunstein (who was not involved in the review) does him one better, asking if we would enter Afghanistan now to accomplish those goals if we were not already there. Anthony Cordesman was one of the first to report that McChrystal needs more troops in Afghanistan. That may be the case, but what will he do with them, and what will they be trying to accomplish?

The President has a lot on his plate right now, but Afghanistan is a situation where leadership is desperately needed from the top. As the many reviews and many reviewers have shown and argued, we can go in several different directions. The President needs to pick one before any of the reviews will mean anything, otherwise we're all just treading water.

Predator Drone Groundhog Day

Just once I'd like to wake up, open the Washington Post, and read "Predator drone hits what it was aiming at in Pakistan." Today a drone fired six missiles into a South Waziristan militant training camp in an effort to kill Baitullah Mehsud, but killing six militants. Yesterday a drone fired two missiles and killed 12-16 militants in a training camp in South Waziristan in an effort to kill Mehsud. Sound familiar? For those keeping score at home, that's three drone strikes in four days, and at least the 26th of the year. Who taught us how to shoot, the evil henchmen from a James Bond movie?

Not that I'm at all arguing against striking terrorist camps. But the Pakistani military is doing just fine with both its air and ground campaigns. Training camps are fairly stationary and provide good targets for the Pakistani Air Force. We should be far more selective with our drone strikes in order to actually hit high value targets like Mehsud, not places where he might be or just was.

Sherman's March to the Durand Line

As the Pakistani military blasts away the last few objects in Swat and heavily bombs South Waziristan in order to soften it up for an invasion designed to capture or kill Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud, some experts are questioning Pakistan's blunt object approach to countering the Taliban. The debate also goes on as to how aggressive the United States should be with its drones, particularly following the strike--intended for Mehsud--that killed scores of people at a funeral last week.

Friend of the Blog Chris Fair writes in the Wall Street Journal Asia that more counter-Taliban aid should be spent on Pakistan's police force and less on its military. While I agree that the police would be very appropriate as a bigger player and a worthy recipient of more aid, I think this one is on the shoulders of the military. But they, like the United States, need to keep in mind that the goal is to protect the population and prevent them from opposing our actions rather than simply leaving a trail of scorched earth hopefully leading to Mehsud.

Despite reports that the Taliban in Swat are shaving their beards and playing possum, I continue to thing that the recent attacks on both military/government targets and on civilians are signs of an increasingly desperate Taliban. Mehsud's followers are killing anyone suspected of cooperating with the government in South Waziristan. That's not likely to make people more willing to come forward, but it's not likely to win him any friends among the local population either. Mao said a revolutionary should move among the people like a fish in water. Increased violence against the population does not do that. A recent poll supports my idea, showing that most Pakistanis oppose the Taliban and al-Qaeda and support the governments efforts to fight the "miscreants."

As for drone attacks, I think they should continue, but only for high value targets likely to be driven out by the Pakistani offensive. Killing Mehsud would be a remarkable success, bu the consequences of missing--especially when 65 other people are collateral damage--need to be taken into account as well.

What on Earth is Bruce Riedel Thinking?

Bruce Riedel is, by all accounts, a pretty smart guy. He's been a South Asia hand for the CIA, is a Senior Fellow at Brookings, and led one of President Obama's multiple Afghanistan-Pakistan reviews this past spring. Hopefully he gives better advice to the President, because the article he wrote for The National Interest is useless at best, damaging at worst.

In short he describes what would happen if the Taliban or other Islamic extremists took over Pakistan. He paints a grim scenario: Pakistan's embassies around the world used as terrorist bases, nuclear launches on Israel, Pakistan's Shia minority turning to Iran for help, war with India, etc.

It would be bad, no doubt. The statement is about as surprising as the recent pronouncementt that al-Qaeda would use nuclear weapons if it obtained them (a subject Riedel somehow barely addresses). Yet Riedel dangerously and surprisingly (for a former CIA analyst) devotes little attention to the probability of such an event occurring, stating only that,

A jihadist victory is neither imminent nor inevitable, but it is now a real possibility in the foreseeable future. This essay presumes (though does not predict) an Islamic-militant victory in Pakistan, examining how the country’s creation of and collusion with extremist groups has left Islamabad vulnerable to an Islamist coup.

It would be pretty bad if the Taliban took over North Dakota (home to quite a few nuclear weapons) too, but I don't see it as very likely.

Riedel then outlines quite a few events that would have to occur for the Taliban to take control: aligning with Kasmiri militant groups, defeating the MQM (moderate Muslim party based in the Sindh province), defeating the military (!), the Pashtun Taliban taking over the populous Punjabi region of the country, kicking out the military's current leadership, etc. None of those scenarios (with the possible exception of the first) is remotely likely.

In fact, I see the opposite happening. The Pakistani military is going after the Pakistani Taliban hard, and the Taliban is getting even more frustrated. Various leaders of the Taliban are disagreeing with each other, to the point of assassination. No matter how unpopular the United States is, will bombing Pakistani civilians make them more likely to support the Taliban? Will bombing mosques make Pakistanis more likely to attend?

The vast majority of Pakistanis are moderate and fairly modern, and becoming more so every year. They go to the mosque, but also enjoy a little Johnny Walker Black Label in the privacy of their own homes (political and military leaders included). The country is in a tough place, no doubt, but I believe the trend lines go in the right direction. Mr. Riedel should be more careful what he says and writes.

Another CNAS Policy Win

The Center for a New American Security released a report on Pakistan and Afghanistan in advance of their conference two weeks ago in which they recommended, among other things, a drastic reduction in missile strikes from drones along in Pakistan, and a renewed focus on protecting the populations.

Now, predictably, new Afghanistan commander General Stanley McChrystal's first order was to restrict air strikes into Pakistan in order to protect the population. Of course that was followed by the news today that an air strike in South Waziristan killed two more people at the funeral of militants killed by a previous air strike, so we'll see how the policy plays out.

McChrystal also stated that air support would be limited even when directly fighting the Taliban if the fighting is taking place near populated areas. That's great, because civilian deaths are certainly counterproductive, but if American forces are pinned down in fighting near a town will he be willing to take the heat for American lives lost due to the policy? We shall see.

Update (6/23/09 14:04 ET): News reports are now saying the drone strike killed 40-80 people at the funeral. I assume that's the same strike mentioned earlier. That's what reducing strikes and minimizing damage to civilians looks like? Wow.

News Flash: Zardari Blames Others; Asks for (More) Money

It is hard to know what to mock first in Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari's op-ed in the Washington Post:

• The Taliban and al-Qaeda are a threat to the entire world and indeed civilization itself! -- a threat it took Pakistan years to take seriously and even now has not fully committed to fighting (and expects someone else to pay for, while financing the build-up of equipment aimed at fighting India as well).
• Benazir Bhutto (his wife) is by far the best leader Pakistan has ever had, perhaps one of the best the world has ever known -- one who was removed from power twice for corruption.
• Democracy MUST succeed in Paksitan -- as long as "Mr. 10%" is re-elected.
• The United States committed $1.5 billion per year to Pakistan for at least five years (on top of significant aid to the military) -- and Pakistan is holding out its other hand and saying "where's the rest?"

I don't envy Zardari's position. Pakistan is clearly not an easy place to govern, especially not now. But he continues the far-too-frequent Pakistani mindset of blaming others, refusing to take any responsibility, and expecting a physical and monetary bail-out.

If Zardari had written an op-ed with the message of "we are in a tough spot and could use some help" I think the "West" would be a lot more receptive. Instead his attitude is "you broke it, we did nothing wrong, give us money and come in and fix it yourselves." Not very constructive Mr. Zardari.

Taliban's Questionable Tactics

I am of course encouraged by the news that in parts of Pakistan, such as Dir, people are standing up to the Taliban (although I suspect a little wishful thinking by the reporter is also involved). I also applaud the Pakistani military's efforts to back up those home-grown uprisings against the Taliban (though they need to improve their aim to the point that they are helping, not killing, the population). 

But what are the Taliban thinking? Bombing a mosque won't encourage the population to side with you. How does that encourage people to be more observant and go to the mosque more often? Is their argument "the government can't protect you from us, so you should side with us?" A weak argument at best. The larger bombing of a hotel popular among foreigners I can understand on the premise that it might discourage foreigners from coming and providing aid, but a mosque? Just who is providing the strategic thinking for the Taliban?

Onward Pakistan

For all their faults, South Asians in general and Pakistanis in particular are steadfast. I've been pretty harsh on the Pakistani mindset of refusing to take responsibility or action for the problems facing their country. I'm not convinced that they are now taking responsibility, but at least the Army and the general population have recognized the threat the Taliban poses. They should, and I predict will, continue their actions in Swat and the NWFP, despite the increased bombings, kidnappings, and whatever else the Taliban can dream up. If they're shooting at you, you know you're touching a nerve. 

Yes, the Pakistani Army's tactics have been heavy handed, displacing 2.5 million people in order to chase several thousand. That's far from ideal, and I would certainly encourage restraint (shelling a town doesn't usually encourage your enemy to come out and fight, it only enrages and kills the local population), but the signs are encouraging. Pakistan moved several thousand troops from the Indian border, as many people around the world have urged them to do. So don't stop now because of some bombings and kidnappings.

All due respect to the very smart Amed Rashid, but Pakistan is not "on the brink" of collapse. The central government has never had much control over the NWFP, much less the FATA. The population, and perhaps just as important the Pakistani press, seem to have recognized the danger the Taliban pose and have embraced the offensive as an action that is good for Pakistan rather than doing the bidding of the evil Americans. 

Pakistan has plenty of problems, primarily the lack of good governance and the terrible economy, but the country working together against the Taliban could be a turning point. Perhaps this is what the army meant when it kept saying it could take on the Taliban whenever it felt the need. 

I will keep up the pressure on Pakistan, but they also deserve credit when they do a good job.

(image from Dawn.com, "Locals walk past an army check point, lifting up their shirts to show they are not wearing suicide jackets.") 

Bhutto's Niece on Zardari

Fatima Bhutto, Benazir's niece, has a nice article over at The Argument. She too believes that President Zardari's government is playing a dangerous game in order to milk the United States for more money (and further enrich himself, assuming Mr. Ten Percent is skimming his usual amount). 

With one hand, Zardari gave the militants what they wanted -- no vote or referendum was held -- and Taliban law was imposed on the Swat Valley by force. With the other, Zardari pointed a crooked finger at the rise of fundamentalism and capitalized on a golden opportunity to bring the nation’s elite back into the government’s obsequiously pro-American fold.

It's nice to have a Pakistani willing to admit that Pakistan deserves some of the blame for what has happened to their country (although she blames one man exclusively), but it is still a woe-is-me, look what my evil uncle has done to the country reaction. It would be very interesting to hear Ms. Bhutto's proposed solutions from either a Pakistani or a U.S. perspective.

Thoughts on Gen. McKiernan's Ouster

The news came down the pipe today that the top officer in Afghanistan, General McKiernan, is being replaced for what "defense officials" described as "a conventional approach to an unconventional war." 

My initial response is sympathy for McKiernan. I've never met the man, but from what I've heard and read he seemed to be a fairly well-respected leader. The man has been pulled in many different directions by many different plans and sub-plans, none any clearer than the next. Like Gumby, he is stretched in too many directions, in this case by constantly changing leaders, plans, and instructions. Perhaps the Pentagon brass think they can replace have the top guy be a scapegoat and hope the next guy magically brings one with him.

All that being said, his replacement will be Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, a former commander of the Joint Special Operations Command, and someone with special ops experience is exactly what we need in a difficult situation like Afghanistan. Hopefully McChrystal will be able to work more closely with the Afghani population while also focusing much more careful attacks on true al Qaeda targets and minimizing civilian casualties. 

Likewise the civilian leadership has an obligation to McChrystal not to hang him out to dry, stretch him in too many directions, or constantly change plans from under his feet. 

(photo from http://billandbobsadventure.blogspot.com/)