On Paranoid Pakistanis

Given half an opportunity, Pakistanis can be some of the most paranoid people on the planet. They tend to fear that India -- or sometimes the United States -- is behind every single bad thing that happens to them. If a Pakistani stubs his toe it was probably an Indian spy who snuck in and made that crack in the sidewalk. Lou Dobbs would be a big hit in Pakistan; maybe he should do a show there rather than running for president in 2012. Ahmed Rashid has a good article up on the BBC News website on conspiracy theories in Pakistan.

Some people in Pakistan probably should be paranoid. President Zardari should be paranoid; people really are plotting against him, which is understandable given the job he is doing.

I've heard other crazy theories from Pakistanis ranging from the idea that all U.S. technology, especially nuclear technology, contains a secret "off" switch, so that when our Indian overlords give the order we can secretly send out a radio signal and make all Pakistani military equipment cease to work. Or that the militant bombings in Peshawar and elsewhere are not the work of the Taliban, but instead are the work of Blackwater.

The last thing you would want to do is give any kind of credibility to those rumors, right? Imagine how crazy Dobbs and the FreeRepublic folks would go if President Obama accidentally mentioned something about going "home" to Kenya, or said something about going to a mosque.

So who's bright idea was it to hire Blackwater Xe Total Intelligence Solutions (TIS) to work doing "snatch-and-grabs" based in Karachi, Pakistan? Apparently since we officially can't have our military operating in Pakistan, we'll just outsource it to civilians. Let's just hope none of them are of Indian descent.

Categorize this one as "stupid power."

The Eminently Bloggable Tony Zinni

I wish all speakers at DC think tank events could be as candid, dynamic, and entertaining as General (ret.) Tony Zinni. While his main point (as chronicled by Jamie Morgan, and, oddly enough, The American Conservative, as well as organizer Steve Clemons) was that the U.S. government should go about "civil affairs" or "smart power" in a totally different way, by creating a separate command committed to it (since the military "will get stuck with it anyway"). (Zinni was also promoting his new book.) It would be interesting to get Zinni and O'Hanlon in a room to discuss their visions for civil affairs.

Along the way Zinni touched on quite a few other interesting subjects, including strategy. He agreed with me that we need to actually outline a strategy for Afghanistan, but went further in stating that it should flow from and be consistent with President Obama's National Security Strategy, which has yet to be released. (Apparently an NSS is due within the first 150 days of an administration, which never happens. The Bush Administration's NSS wasn't released until2002; one small section talked about preemption, yet that became the centerpiece of the "Bush Doctrine.") That's certainly true, and a point I hadn't fully considered.

Other "Zinni Zingers:"

• Zinni wondered what someone would think if they had been put in a coma right after 9/11, woke up yesterday, and you had to explain our response. (I'm paraphrasing here): "We were attacked by al Qaeda. We're in Iraq? And we're in Afghanistan, but fighting the Taliban? Al Qaeda is in Pakistan? We're helping Pakistan, but they're fighting the Taliban too? ...?"
• "We shouldn't talk about 'smart power' as if we have it."
• "Special envoys are useless!" (Zinni was the Bush Administration's special envoy to Israel and Palestine).
• "You know where Osama bin Ladin is? Great! I don't know where bin Ladin is. He's on K Street, he's a lobbyist!"
• "Shock and awe turned into aw, shucks."
• "I'm tired of all this 'graveyard of empires' nonsense. The difference is we want to leave Afghanistan, we don't want it as part of an empire."

Aaaaand, We’re Going With the 80% Solution. Again.

Editor's Note: The following is a guest post by Jamie Morgan. The views expressed are her own.

“Smart power,” “the 3Ds”: Everyone seems to have an answer to the national security crisis facing our country. How do we realign our governmental infrastructure to address new and non-traditional security threats? General (ret.) Tony Zinni took a good stab at it today with a funny, thoughtful presentation at the New America Foundation. Yet despite a brilliant analysis of the problem, General Zinni stopped short of pushing the 100% solution. And I don’t think one can approach such sweeping problems with 80% solutions.

General Zinni suggested building a Civil Affairs Command, run by DOD, which would house the requisite capabilities for addressing the social, economic, political, and security efforts involved in post-conflict reconstruction.

With all due respect to General Zinni’s analysis and expertise, here are my problems with his proposed solution:

Low likelihood of full State and USAID participation. The likelihood of getting full participation, cooperation, and integration of personnel from State and USAID is unlikely if a new Civil Affairs Command is under DoD. Look at AFRICOM: The Command had the initial goal of upwards of 100 personnel from State, and after nearly a full year since being stood up, it currently houses 4. The reasons State officials cite for this range from a lack of available personnel to not wanting to send personnel over to make a DoD agency look good (this is of course, not the publically given answer). Regardless, State and AID are not going to come running with personnel and resources for a DoD run venture.

Leaves organizational culture issues unaddressed. While many elements of the culture of DoD are valuable and worth carrying into future organizations (such as the tireless determination to plan), some elements of DoD culture* would not be ideal for post-conflict reconstruction (such as the rigid adherence to organizational rules and models). Building a Civil Affairs Command under DoD rather than an inter-agency organization would not build on the positive cultural elements that State and AID have to offer, and would retain some of the organizational modus operandi that hinder it from being truly effective in post-conflict reconstruction.

Just is not the sweeping reform that is needed. Such an organization would not impart the message of sweeping reform among personnel – which is at the heart of the issue. In order for State, AID, and DoD personnel to really begin to consider the security, developmental, and political issues involved in post-conflict reconstruction, they will need to change the way they think and operate on a day-to-day basis. That type of change is hard for people to make. It takes pushing from on top, and pulling from a few determined soles within. Moving a few boxes on the organizational chart is not going to do that.

Eikenberry Throws Stones From His Glass House

Karl Eikenberry, the current U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan and former military commander there, has an op-ed in today's Washington Post arguing that Afghanis have a choice coming up about the future direction of their country in the August 20th election. No doubt that's true. As he says,

"Five years ago, with guidance from the international community, Afghanistan held its first elections and began the process of building a new state -- a complex and difficult effort following 25 years of invasion, civil war, oppression and foreign-inspired terrorism. This time, Afghan authorities bear the full responsibility for fulfilling their people's right to choose their leaders, with the international community assisting, not leading. But none of this will matter unless the voters have a real choice and know what each candidate stands for. There must be a serious debate among the candidates and by the Afghan people."

But equally important is the debate, or lack of debate, here in the United States about what to do in Afghanistan. We don't have a real strategy, for staying or going, in Afghanistan. We don't know how long we plan to be there. We don't know if the Afghani government will survive without massive support from U.S. and NATO troops and civilians; almost certainly it and the Afghan National Army cannot survive without continuing massive amounts of foreign aid. All the reviews in the world haven't given us answers or even multiple possible solutions or futures to choose from. General McCrystal's review seems unlikely to change that, especially since his team contained no experts on Afghanistan or Pakistan, just military historians and strategists (Exum did serve in Afghanistan, but his academic work is on counterinsurgency elsewhere).

Equally disturbing to me is Eikenberry's between-the-lines endorsement of re-election for Karzai. Despite his talk of "We stand with absolute impartiality regarding who should be president of Afghanistan" parts of his article sound almost like a politician on the stump, talking about the future versus the past, progress or stagnation, and reforming society. All this while Karzai's brother has become the richest man in Afghanistan. I wish viable alternatives existed in the presidential election in Afghanistan, if only to strengthen the debate and force the candidates to be more honest.

U.S. policy makers need to be equally honest with themselves and with the American public. We need actual strategic options and policy decisions in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Until then progress will be impossible.

Drinking From the Fire Hose: U.S.-India 3.0

Secretary of State Clinton is in India this week and announced, as expected, that relations with India are a priority and are going to be ramped up and become less formal; "U.S-India 3.0" is how Clinton described it.

MORE attention? That's great, but U.S. policymakers need to move more slowly. Perhaps the less formal relations will improve the process, but India, despite a huge population, has a limited number of bureaucrats and can make progress on only so many issues at a time. The agenda for Clinton's trip included everything from climate change (where India pushed back), education, food security, nuclear energy, and space cooperation. Wow. No wonder a deal on end-use monitoring is still being negotiated at the last minute--South Block (the equivalent of India's State Department/Foggy Bottom) must have been working day and night just to read the briefings and proposals on all the other issues. The trip and the deals have barely made news here in the States, whereas in India they are front page news. The United States needs a little patience. It's not easy to drink from the Foggy Bottom fire hose.

123 AND 126? Mrs. Clinton Goes to Delhi

As I've acknowledged before, one of the few major foreign policy successes the Bush Administration can be given credit for is having taken the ball they were given by President Clinton's visit to India in 2000 and running with it, fast. The Bush Administration pushed the U.S.-India relationship far and fast, and now Secretary of State Clinton is headed to India to put the cherry on top of potentially two big agreements.

One of the key quotes from a participant at my 2007 U.S.-India track-two dialogue was "after 123 comes 126," meaning after the 123 nuclear waiver would come the potential sale of 126 F-16's to India. Now the Obama Administration is in a place to push both pieces over the goal line. The 123 waiver actually passed last year, but rumor has it that during this visit India will announce at least two nuclear power plant sites reserved for U.S. energy companies. That is big news, since both French and Russian companies already have deals in place.

The second big piece is the possible announcement of an end-use monitoring agreement, allowing the United States to start selling higher technology military equipment, like F-16's, to India. If they have come up with an agreement that would be quite a coup.

Work remains to be done. The United States and India need to get closer together on climate change, the Proliferation Security Initiative, potentially Kashmir, and nonproliferation discussions for next year. The Obama Administration should be thankful it was set up for success, proud of itself for completing the agreements, and not rest on its laurels.

Catch-Up Thoughts

Those of you following me on Twitter will know I was out in California for a few days and not posting, so here are my brief thoughts on some of the recent events. I know you all missed my commentary.

• The CIA developed an assassination squad to go after al-Qaeda leadership... and it failed to have any successes that we know about and proved far more difficult than in James Bond movies. Neither of those facts is surprising. In fact I would be shocked if the CIA didn't still have a similar squad with similar goals. As other commenters have pointed out, the difference between firing missiles from drones and potentially firing bullets from sniper teams is mostly semantic, except that the drones seem to have a lot more collateral damage--that and the drones have actually been used. Nor is it shocking that Darth Cheney kept the program a secret from Congress. That fact bothers me more. Congress, or the Intelligence committees or the Gang of Eight at a bare minimum, should be kept appraised of all programs, especially the controversial ones. That's why we have checks and balances in our government.
• Secretary of State Clinton has ordered the first Quadrennial Development and Diplomacy Review (QDDR). Great! We need to know what we are doing, and giving, have a better idea of what is going where and why, and hopefully some oversight. I'll give you a preview of the report: 1) we need a director for USAID, 2) we don't have enough civilian experts on hand to plan much less execute a "civilian surge" in a place like Afghanistan. In the Pentagon the QDR sets the tone and direction for the Department of Defense; we'll see if the QDDR has the same weight and budget power for State and the other agencies involved with foreign aid and development.
• President Obama and Russian President Medvedev signed a Joint Understanding to a new START arms control treaty. The Joint Understanding is good progress, but it is really laying a foundation for more hard work to be done between now and December. By then hopefully the Nuclear Posture Review will be complete, satisfying certain Republican Senators, and real arms reductions can be made, hopefully down to the 1000-1200 range, although I would like to see us get even lower.

Guest Post: Double-Dutch Diplomacy

Ed. Note: The following is another guest post by Michael Rohrs. The views expressed are his own.

President Obama and his administration have heretofore taken a double-dutch approach to diplomacy; that is to stand just outside the turbine and gauge the tempo; pick a calculated spot and jump in; do work, jump out, and circle back for another pass. For the most part, they have done so adeptly and eloquently. Three weeks following his address in Cairo, however, the President seems to have gotten a little tripped and tangled.

• 24 June- President Obama reinstates the U.S. Ambassador to Syria—A post that has been strategically vacant for four years.
• 25 June- The White House rescinds its invitation to Iranian diplomats to attend Fourth of July celebrations worldwide (presumably held at American Embassies).
• 26 June- Ahmadinejad publicly demands an apology from President Obama for interfering in Iranian affairs of state.

The United States is in a heated diplomatic playoff with Iran. We know this. President Obama’s strategic reinstatement of the American Ambassador to Syria on Wednesday was a straight-steal. As the Post reported, “The loss of U.S. diplomatic leverage in the region,” caused by the American response to the Syrian government’s complicity in the 2005 assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, “has left a vacuum filled in large part by Iran.” It is no coincidence that because politics has forced President Obama to be careful regarding the contentious Iranian election, we’re trying to regain some diplomatic high-ground by climbing up the backside of the hill. The problem is we’re doing so clumsily.

Yesterday, the State department “disinvited” Iranian envoys from partaking in its Independence Day dissipation—a diplomatic disaster akin to taking your baseball and going home because they made you play right field. A tantrum only amplified by the White House’s self-deprecating quip, "July 4th allows us to celebrate the freedom and the liberty we enjoy…Freedom of speech. Freedom of religion. Freedom to assemble peacefully. Freedom of the press. So I don't think it's surprising that nobody's signed up to come."

Even if extending invitations to celebrate our (and the rest of the world’s) freedom is standard diplomatic practice, American diplomacy operates best when we’re calling the pitches. As George Orwell espoused as his sixth and final rule of writing, we should have broken any of these rules before doing anything outright barbarous. By offering up our most sacred regalia to a base body politic, we undercut our axiomatic authority. Remember, we’re dealing with no less than half of the official state sponsors of terrorism. I’m all for extending an open hand, but you don’t invite vegans to a bull roast.

Let’s hope the President regains his diplomatic rhythm and finds his double-dutch dexterity. We need to be playing by American league rules; especially on Independence Day.

Now Get to Work!

After a lengthy delay (thanks Senate):

Obama's nominee to be under secretary of state for arms control and international security, Rep. Ellen Tauscher (D-CA), and his pick to be assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, Kurt Campbell, were confirmed tonight in a unanimous consent motion, a congressional source relays.

Hopefully now they can get to work on nonproliferation treaties and taking care of East Asia. Not that those areas have had any difficulties while the posts were on hold!

Additional note: now that Tausher has been confirmed a primary date should be set for the CA-10 special election. That means Tony Woods' campaign is ramping up to full speed. Check out his website and do whatever you can to support him.

Is India Really Unhappy with Obama?

An Op-Ed in the New York Times declares that India is "Wary on Obama." Really? Yes, the U.S.-India "strategic partnership" could be considered George W. Bush's one foreign policy success, but to achieve that he had to punch large holes in some of the key nonproliferation agreements.

President Obama has gotten on India's bad side by talking about pushing for a permanent settlement on the Kashmir issue. He appointed a special envoy to South Asia, and India lobbied hard--and successfully--to not be under his jurisdiction with the "bad" countries of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Secretary of State Clinton talked extensively about the importance of China, but has barely mentioned India, and has not yet visited. Apparently India also felt snubbed that it was not one of the first congratulatory calls Obama returned.

The main area of dispute is that India fears that the Obama administration is returning to a regional South Asia policy rather than the "de-hyphenated" separate India and Pakistan policies Bush introduced. While I strongly support the de-hyphenation, the countries in the region do obviously have a major impact on each other, and to pretend otherwise would be naive. The Pakistani military is unwilling or unable to fight a successful counterinsurgency campaign against the militants threatening the country because it is designed to fight against India. Additionally Pakistan feels threatened by Indian involvement in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. India needs to act like the great power it aspires to be and recognize that its actions have both negative and positive effects in the region. Unfortunately whenever the subject of Pakistan comes up India goes back to its petty, juvenile posturing.

The first of India's five rounds of national elections started this week, and unlike in recent events such as the no-confidence vote that forced the ruling Congress party to scramble to retain its control, the U.S.-India nuclear deal--and by proxy the relationship with the United States--is not a major campaign issue. Obama does need to pay more attention to building the relationship with India, but no matter whether the Congress party retains the majority or the BJP takes over India is unlikely to turn sharply away from its closer ties with the United States.

How Relevant is Diplomacy Anymore?

New York Times columnist Tom Friedman normally has approximately four ideas that he rotates through for his columns (the Middle East is a complicated place; the world is flat/globalization is good; green energy is good/let me tell you about this cool invention I saw; buy my latest book), but occasionally he actually takes the time to write a thought provoking column, in this case "In the Age of Pirates" on the role and success of formal diplomacy in an age of non-state actors.

I agree with his main point, that a more realist approach is needed, that countries like Iran and North Korea, as well as groups like pirates and terrorists, will primarily respond to hard power inducements. As he puts it,

The only thing that could change this is a greater exercise of U.S. and allied power. In the case of Afghanistan and Pakistan, that power would have to be used to actually rebuild these states from the inside into modern nations. We would literally have to build the institutions — the pulleys and wheels — so that when the leaders of these states pulled a lever something actually happened, and the lever wouldn’t just break off in their hands.

And in the case of the strong states — Iran and North Korea — we would have to generate much more effective leverage from the outside to get them to change their behavior along the lines we seek. In both cases, though, success surely would require a bigger and longer U.S. investment of money and power, not to mention allies.

However, I disagree with him that diplomacy is no longer useful or effective. Unilateral solutions will not work for any of the cases he mentioned. Strong diplomacy is needed to build coalitions of reluctant allies in order to solve those world-threatening problems. Furthermore, great and emerging powers, including Russia, China, India, and Brazil still need the high-level engagement Friedman dismisses as a Cold War relic. Big issues like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 2010 review conference require multilateral diplomacy of the highest order.

The problem is not the inefficacy of diplomacy in the modern era, the problem is not enough diplomacy and not enough cooperation.

Why Not Pressure India?

Special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke stopped by New Delhi, India this week after visits to Afghanistan and Pakistan, but said he was not pressuring India to resume talks over longer-term peace with Pakistan. The question is, why not? As Holbrooke stated, Islamic extremists threaten all three countries. One of the biggest problems is that Pakistan's military and leadership remains focused on preparing to fight India rather than on fighting the militants threatening its own stability. Only a settlement that makes Pakistan feel secure will allow it to refocus on the militants. Why not at least try for a settlement on Kashmir?

India is heavily involved in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, building infrastructure and numerous consulates. Pakistan feels threatened by this involvement, since it fears encirclement and has traditionally relied on Afghanistan for strategic depth. That's one reason why India's embassy in Kabul was bombed in July 2008 by a militant group linked to Pakistani intelligence.

When Holbrooke was named special envoy to the region, India lobbied hard to not be included under his jurisdiction, not wanting to be seen in the same boat as those troubled and militant-plagued countries. But really the lack of a Kashmir solution is hindering solutions. India and Pakistan came close to reaching an accord on their own. Why not at least get the two sides in a room again for a discussion?

Certainly India has valid concerns. Pakistani leadership is weak, and they may want to wait until a stronger leader comes into power before negotiating (although if Nawaz Sharif takes office it would almost certainly kill any deal). But a long-term solution on Kashmir is in everyone's interest. Why not at least try?

Another Fizzle: Best Possible Outcome on North Korea?

Yes, North Korea defied United Nations regulations and test-fired a multi-stage Taepodong-2 missile over the weekend. Yes, North Korea has some nuclear weapons capability. Yes, if the missile test had been successful it could potentially have reached Alaska or Hawaii. But it wasn't successful; the second stage didn't fire fully and the third stage not at all, leaving the hyped satellite in "subaquatic orbit" as a commenter from the wonderful geeks at Arms Control Wonk put it (the image is also from ACW).

Before the launch the debate ran rampant among the nonproliferation policy community about how to respond to the launch. Some advocated using either U.S. or Japanese resources to shoot it down in midflight, to the point that Kim Jong-Il stated that such actions would lead to war. South Korea shouted about how scared they were, but an ICBM isn't at all necessary to hit South Korea, so the test shouldn't seem any more threatening.

The failed launch can be considered the best possible outcome. Since 2006 North Korea now has two highly-publicized missile launch failures (the 2006 test after only 35 seconds) and a largely failed nuclear test. Why should that scare anyone, particularly the United States (Joseph Cirincione argues this at length)? Miniaturizing a nuclear device to fit on a warhead is quite difficult, and North Korea would be hard pressed to do it in a decade. Even then, given their track record, what are the odds that all three stages of an ICBM and a miniaturized warhead would work?

As Fred Kaplan argues, making a big deal about a missile launch that ultimately failed was the action of a weak state, not a strong one, and President Obama should not play North Korea's game. Frankie Sturm agrees, calling for managing North Korea's brinksmanship. John Bolton calls the launch a win for North Korea and says Obama is weak, but considering he worked for an administration with the least diplomatic success in the past 50 years, whose actions (or lack thereof) allowed North Korea to reprocess plutonium and test a nuclear device I take that as a good sign.

President Obama has demonstrated his leadership by not spending too much energy on a UN resolution, and instead focusing on the larger real nonproliferation issues, including a call for global nuclear disarmament in Sunday's speech. As the New York Times stated, again echoing me,

It is a strategy based on the idea that if the United States shows it is willing to greatly shrink the size of its atomic arsenal, ban nuclear testing and cut off the worldwide production of bomb material, reluctant allies and partners around the world will be more likely to rewrite nuclear treaties and enforce sanctions against North Korea and Iran.

Obama's Pro-War advisors

John Mearsheimer--guest posting for Stephen Walt--makes an interesting point: none of President Obama's senior foreign policy advisors publicly opposed the Iraq War at the time.

The Bush administration is principally responsible for these twin disasters, but the fact is that most of the Democratic Party's foreign policy experts -- certainly the more senior ones -- supported President Bush's decision to invade Iraq and to do massive social engineering across the Middle East. Consider, for example, Hillary Clinton, Richard Holbrooke, and Dennis Ross -- three key players on the Obama team. They were all strong supporters of the Iraq war, and they had little inkling that we would end up getting bogged down in Iraq or that we would squander our initial success in Afghanistan. In fact, not one of Obama's principal foreign policy advisors opposed the Iraq war, although the president did. It seems that almost all of the senior foreign policy experts in the Democratic Party have been "marinated in the [same] inside culture" as their Republican Party counterparts. What this effectively means is that Obama and the country will have to depend on a group of individuals who helped create the Afghanistan and Iraq disasters -- albeit in a small way -- to get us out of them. That is not a reassuring thought.

Ah yes, the one dissenter, the President himself. I certainly applaud him for his opposition to the Iraq War, and think it may have been the biggest factor in helping him win the Democratic primary, I wonder why Obama hasn't been able to surround himself with more people who shared his foresight/concerns about the war. The President has so far largely left foreign policy to his admittedly capable senior advisors while he attempts to deal with the global financial crisis, but the fact that alternative voices have not been included on a senior level (see the Chas Freeman affair) is somewhat disturbing.

One reason I became interested in national security during my undergraduate days is that during the discussion prior to the Iraq War most Democrats either rolled over and agreed with the Republicans, or disagreed simply based on party without offering alternative policies or explanations. I'm proud to be a part of the growing group of younger progressive national security experts.

Steinberg Discusses U.S.-India Nuclear Deal

Yesterday at Brookings Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg discussed the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal and the future of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), saying:

"Both the United States and India have the responsibility to help to craft a strengthened NPT regime to foster safe, affordable nuclear power to help the globe's energy and environment needs, while assuring against the spread of nuclear weapons."

No, it's nothing earth shattering and in fact is pretty standard language, but it's the first major comments on the Deal from the new administration. As senators both President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton voted for the deal last September with little comment, but since then little progress has been made. Both Russia and France--taking advantage of last year's waiver for India by the Nuclear Suppliers' Group--already have designated sites in India where they will build nuclear power plants. No U.S. companies currently have been assigned sites for a plant. I don't expect any action on that front until after the Indian elections, since any interaction with the U.S. government makes political headlines in India, but we should note that France and Russia are getting a head start.

Steinberg's comment itself is of course right on point. It will be interesting to see if the Administration starts dropping more comments to try to smooth the way for progress in the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference.