A Tale of Two Speeches

President Obama gave two important foreign policy speeches recently, and the opinion pages and blogosphere can't seem to stop talking about them. I didn't want to have my voice be lost in the immediate aftermath, but now that much of the dust has settled I thought I'd add a few thoughts.

The President's long-awaited speech rolling out his new Afghanistan strategy pleased almost no one who chose to examine it closely. It took too long, it wasn't detailed enough, it was too specific, some of the details were wrong, he didn't focus on Pakistan enough, he focused too much on Pakistan... Jon Stewart made fun of it for being too much like a speech President Bush could have given. Some bloggers complained that he had conflated the Afghanistan and Pakistani Taliban, and that anyone who doesn't understand the difference couldn't possibly come up with a good strategy. The West Point cadets watching the speech didn't seem to know how to respond until the speech stopped being specific and started going in to broad, soaring generalities and hopeful themes - Obama's specialty. In the days following the speech it turned out that few of the specifics were actually totally true. The troop "surge" may not take place until Fall 2010, and they will only "start" to be pulled out in Summer 2011. The speech failed to be all things to all people, and thus was not well received.

President Obama's Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech made up for it in a big way. It was masterfully written and beautifully delivered. Critics called it the best of Obama's career, and certainly the best of his Presidency so far. It spoke truth to the power of the Nobel committee, addressed the oddity of winning a peace prize while leading a nation engaged in two wars, acknowledged previous winners, and defended the use of military force while advancing progressive ideals. It was a perfect encapsulation of the Truman Project worldview - which makes sense since it was written by someone affiliated with the Truman Project. Writers from the progressive side to at least the conservative moderation of David Brooks loved the speech. About all critics of the speech could say was that it was rambling and disjointed. I loved the speech, but the critics are right. Everyone was happy with it because they could read what they wanted into the speech. Dan Drezner made an attempt to map out the various international relations theories referred to in the speech. It was another classic piece of Obama magic: choosing the middle path and creating buy-in from all sides by incorporating their arguments. It made for a powerful speech, but it will be hard to predict his future foreign policy moves based on a speech that left almost every door open.

On Paranoid Pakistanis

Given half an opportunity, Pakistanis can be some of the most paranoid people on the planet. They tend to fear that India -- or sometimes the United States -- is behind every single bad thing that happens to them. If a Pakistani stubs his toe it was probably an Indian spy who snuck in and made that crack in the sidewalk. Lou Dobbs would be a big hit in Pakistan; maybe he should do a show there rather than running for president in 2012. Ahmed Rashid has a good article up on the BBC News website on conspiracy theories in Pakistan.

Some people in Pakistan probably should be paranoid. President Zardari should be paranoid; people really are plotting against him, which is understandable given the job he is doing.

I've heard other crazy theories from Pakistanis ranging from the idea that all U.S. technology, especially nuclear technology, contains a secret "off" switch, so that when our Indian overlords give the order we can secretly send out a radio signal and make all Pakistani military equipment cease to work. Or that the militant bombings in Peshawar and elsewhere are not the work of the Taliban, but instead are the work of Blackwater.

The last thing you would want to do is give any kind of credibility to those rumors, right? Imagine how crazy Dobbs and the FreeRepublic folks would go if President Obama accidentally mentioned something about going "home" to Kenya, or said something about going to a mosque.

So who's bright idea was it to hire Blackwater Xe Total Intelligence Solutions (TIS) to work doing "snatch-and-grabs" based in Karachi, Pakistan? Apparently since we officially can't have our military operating in Pakistan, we'll just outsource it to civilians. Let's just hope none of them are of Indian descent.

Categorize this one as "stupid power."

Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Haven't I Refuted This Before?

Seymour Hersh has an article in The New Yorker asking the tired questions of whether Pakistan's nuclear weapons are safe from capture by al-Qaeda or the Taliban. He asserts that because militants have attacked well-defended Pakistani military facilities, other well-defended facilities, including nuclear locations, could be in danger.

If I'm not mistaken a well-defended U.S. military facility, Fort Hood, was just attacked by someone with insider knowledge of security and facilities, but that doesn't mean that anyone outside of Hollywood screenwriters think U.S. nuclear facilities are likely to be attacked or captured by militants. Indian Maoist naxalite militants have attacked government facilities, but no one worries publicly about the security of India's nuclear weapons. Hersh argues that components are most vulnerable when they are being moved. Hmm, you mean like when nuclear parts are accidentally flown across the country, or mistakenly delivered to Taiwan? Didn't the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force get fired for those mistakes not too long ago? Let's discuss reality here.

Once again, yes, Pakistan's government is unstable. President "Mr. Ten Percent" Zardari may well be forced out of office in the next six months, but that may well lead to increased stability in Pakistan, not less. The Pakistani military is considered a common player in Pakistani society and politics, and is perhaps the most stable element. The nuclear warheads are stored and secured separately from the triggers and the delivery systems, and the Pakistanis have developed extensive nuclear security systems.

If anything Pakistan seemed more unstable back in May, when the Taliban had famously crept within 90 miles of the capital, Islamabad. The New York Times ran a piece quoting various experts as saying the nuclear stockpile was safe. What has changed since then other than Sy Hersh decided this was a good sensational story to write? He dismisses all the expert opinions he finds that run contrary to his view, because "are Pakistan's nuclear weapons safe? Yes" would be a pretty boring article.

I imagine I or someone like me will have to refute some sensationalist account about terrorists and Pakistan's nuclear weapons every six months or so for at least several years to come. Of course it's a valid concern and one that should not be ignored, but it is also unlikely, and Pakistan should be given credit for protecting its arsenal.

Soon is the Winter of Our Afghanistan Discontent

The three main stories about South Asia in the recent news all focus on waiting: for President Obama to make a decision on a strategy and troop levels, for the official results of the Afghanistan election, and for the Pakistani Army to finally begin its offensive into South Waziristan. Waiting is not the worst thing in the world; no matter what is decided on any of those matters the fighting will likely slow to a trickle soon, since Afghanistan becomes even more inhospitable and difficult to fight in every winter.

President Obama is right to take his time discussing his South Asian strategy with as many advisers as he needs and for as long as it takes. With every passing day the critics and think tankers here inside the Beltway pace across their offices and write more and more op-eds bravely criticizing a war many of them once supported and then argued should be left alone in favor of invading Iraq, but it is worth the time needed to come up with a functional strategy. As Truman Fellow Alex Rossmiller points out, the current situation in Afghanistan is not the cliched do-or-die crossroads/critical juncture; we could sustain the current stalemate for many years to come without "losing" or "winning" any more than we currently are. General McChrystal's suspected request of 40,000 additional troops, if approved, would not arrive until around a year from now, and would still fall far, far short of the number needed for a "true" counterinsurgency campaign. Even then, as McChrystal admits, if we don't have an effective partner in the Afghan government even hundreds of thousands of troops spending another decade in Afghanistan would likely do little good.

The much-delayed results of the Afghanistan election were supposed to finally be announced this weekend, but have been delayed yet again. Enough fraudulent ballots are expected to be thrown out that Karzai will fall short of the 50 percent needed to avoid a run-off. The ideal situation would be for Karzai to accept some sort of power-sharing arrangement situation, but that looks unlikely. Since he has proved to be at best a reluctant partner in actually governing his country, many U.S. leaders would prefer to work around him, but as the recognized leader of Afghanistan that is proving quite difficult. The necessity of propping up and empowering a corrupt, incompetent leader who will only inevitably collapse when we leave is not much incentive for committing more time, money, and personnel.

After over a month of buildup (both actual military buildup and media hype) this weekend the Pakistan Army finally began its offensive into South Waziristan, the home of the Mehsud clan. Since everyone knew the offensive was coming everyone has had a chance to prepare themselves to flee (an estimated 100,000 people have been displaced so far) or fight.

The looming winter will allow all parties time to sit around and think. I think the Pakistani military timed their offensive when they did in order to accomplish just enough that the Pakistani Taliban wouldn't be able to regroup and mount a major counter-offensive and to ensure that the military would not be able to overcommit. President Obama's Afghanistan strategy group will not make a decision before the results of the election are clear. The winter lull is a mixed blessing for the Administration, since no major action will be possible. The President's team should avoid getting distracted by the sniping attacks from neoconservatives all winter and focus on determining the best course of action in a region with no good options.

Twisted Logic on Pakistan's Nukes

Someone help me understand this: the biggest danger in South/Central Asia is al Qaeda getting its hands on one or more of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. Al Qaeda's leadership and many of their fighters are currently in Pakistan. Therefore the argument is we should send 40,000 more troops to Afghanistan? I'm not sure I follow the logic chain. Assuming we failed and largely pulled out of Afghanistan, and assuming the Taliban (whose leaders are also primarily in Pakistan) re-take control of much of Afghanistan, and assuming the Taliban welcome al Qaeda back and provide them the oft-mentioned "safe haven" (and none of those assumptions are sure things by the way), they would then be MORE likely to attack Pakistan's nuclear facilities?

When the Taliban famously advanced into the Swat valley, within 90 miles of the capital Islamabad, I argued against the doom sayers, saying Pakistan was not about to collapse. Now the Pakistani military has largely driven the Taliban from Swat and is preparing for an offensive in South Waziristan, home to much of the Taliban leadership. Drone strikes have successfully taken out many leaders, including Baitullah Mehsud (leading to this lovely ditty). Pakistan was not about to collapse then, and is not about to collapse or give up its nuclear weapons now. Pakistan's nuclear weapons are safe, and should not be used as a bureaucratic pawn in the strategic debate. I'm all for a vigorous debate on goals and strategies, but let's apply a few sober standards of logic to this strategic conversation.

Recycled Afghanistan Stories and Ideas

I haven't written much not because I had nothing to say, but rather to avoid getting caught up in the tornado of voices, especially on Afghanistan. The news all seems recycled, and so do the ideas.

• Afghanistan is corrupt and the election was likely stolen. We knew that was the case, and we knew the elections would probably be stolen.
• Both Fareed Zakaria and Fred Kaplan had the same brilliant idea that we should simply throw money at the problem by bribing everyone and their brother in Afghanistan.
• Paul Pillar sums up the "safe haven" debate nicely, but it's nothing I, or others didn't say.
• Another smart, young officer, Joseph Kerns Goodwin, returned from Afghanistan to tell us how bad the situation is on the ground, which we will likely ignore.
• A draft of the metrics was released today, and while it appears to be thoughtful and contain a list of good things to measure, it lacks any actual numbers. Don't worry, apparently Afghanistan is like kindergarten, we can keep trying as many reviews and metrics as it takes to get it right. For as long as I've waited for the metrics you might think they would get me excited, but nope, nothing.
• The COIN crowd keeps arguing that COIN is awesome and the solution to everything and ignoring the lack of a strategy that COIN is supposed to help implement. They are even having a big COIN conference to talk about how important COIN is. Fun! (would they seem even nerdier if we called them numismatists?)
• Even Osama bin Ladin's message seemed phoned in. "Death to America and Israel, blah blah blah." (although at least one blogger has promised to Auto-Tune the tape; maybe that can spice it up.)

Is it the economy? Is there a down market for ideas right now? Even I feel repetitive: Pakistan is not going to collapse despite the heavy-handed Pakistani military; we need an actual strategy in Afghanistan; we need to work on our smart power; etc, etc.

I'm all for recycling, but this is ridiculous. Wake me up when you're ready to have a non-circular debate.

India Wants Attention!

What with the elections, violence, reviews, and strategic discussions in Afghanistan, drone and ground attacks in Pakistan, visits by senators to Burma, and even remembrances of how Ted Kennedy helped found Bangladesh, India is the odd South Asian country out in terms of news coverage lately.

What's a poor second-largest-country-on-Earth to do to get back in the headlines?

You could try having a well-respected former External Afairs minister, Jaswant Singh, get kicked out of his party for simply suggesting in a book that Pakistan's founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, wasn't the worst person ever. The BJP party, India's leading opposition, is now in turmoil as different factions support or oppose Singh.

If that's not enough, try scrambling a fighter jet to intercept a civilian airliner that had the wrong radio identifier.

Or you could make everyone nervous by re-hashing old battles about nuclear weapons tests, including having hard-liners suggest that more nuclear tests are necessary. Those always help with regional stability. Indian nuclear scientist K. Santhanam declared that India's 1998 nuclear tests were intended to have a much larger yield. The H-bomb test especially, was a "fizzle." He was, of course, refuted by former President A. P. J. Abdul Kalam, of the BJP, as well as the current defense ministry. As Arms Control Wonk points out, it's pretty common knowledge among the nuclear nerd community that the H-bomb test fizzled, so why bring it up again now? Apparently Santhanam is worried that India might sign the Comprehensive nuclear Test Ban Treaty and didn't want that to happen.

Of course Pakistan didn't want to be outdone in the nuclear crazy department, so they responded by releasing nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan, who ran a nuclear smuggling ring selling Pakistani knowledge and technology all over the world, from even his previous minimal house arrest.

South Asia has plenty of problems folks. Is a little restraint and common sense on nuclear issues really too much to ask?

Walt's "Safe Haven" Update

Professor Walt nicely posted his own response to Bergen's critique just a few minutes after my own. He reiterates his scepticism that the Taliban would actually regain control of Afghanistan, and discusses how useful a base Afghanistan actually would make for al-Qaeda. I still think he should discuss the existing safe haven in the tribal areas along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, but no matter, he makes similar points as I do. I think the questions deserve to be asked, but the answer is not a cut-and-dry "withdraw" as Walt seems to be arguing.

Wading into the "Safe Haven" Debate

I am not a part of the 51 percent of Americans who apparently no longer think the war in Afghanistan is not worth fighting. Then again the public also approves of President Obama's handling of the war to date; I find myself in the minority of both groups. I believe that we should be in Afghanistan, but only if we develop a realistic and achievable desired end state and a strategy to accomplish that mission.

Over the last few days several foreign policy blogs have been discussing a line from President Obama's speech to the VFW, “If left unchecked, the Taliban insurgency will mean an even larger safe haven from which al Qaeda would plot to kill more Americans." Realist scholar Stephen Walt argued in six points that leaving Afghanistan (presumably immediately) would not create more of a safe haven for terrorists bent on attacking the United States, that it is not fundamental to our survival as a nation, and thus that Afghanistan is not a "war of necessity." He was then "slammed" by, among others, Peter Bergen, Paul Cruickshank, and Spencer Ackerman.

The thing is, while I don't agree with everything he is saying, Walt has a valid point. Would leaving Afghanistan create a safe haven for al-Qaeda? Probably, because either the Taliban would take over or Afghanistan would be come what is referred to as an "ungoverned space."

The first problem is, al-Qaeda already have a safe haven: the ungoverned space on the Pakistan side of the border. Has any analyst or policymaker been so bold as to propose that either the United States or Pakistan will be able to tame and rule the mountainous tribal areas? No power in history has been up to the task. Functioning countries on both sides of the border along with continued drone flights would contain the problem, and that is a valid, and hopefully achievable, goal, but totally eliminating a mountainous maze as a safe haven won't happen. Bergen points out that the 2005 London subway bombings, the 2006 liquid bombs on planes plot, and others were plotted in Pakistan, all while surrounded by thousands of U.S. and allied troops. Eliminating every nook and cranny along the Durand Line is just as difficult as eliminating every nook where a cockroach could be hiding in your house.

A second problem, which some of the commenters acknowledge and then ignore, is that many other ungoverned spaces exist, including Somalia and Yemen, that can and do serve just as well as terrorist bases and training areas. And in a modern, globalized, interconnected world safe havens in ungoverned or welcoming countries aren't necessary. Sure several of the 9/11 hijackers trained in Afghanistan, but they also spent significant time plotting, training, and waiting in Hamburg, Cairo, and Florida (is Florida an ungoverned space? It's easy to get and practice with guns and other weapons there, and parts of it certainly have religious fanatics...).

I don't believe we should withdraw from Afghanistan, although without a real strategy we are simply treading water. We need to set a realistic and achievable goal and figure out a plan to achieve it. The President is right, leaving now would result in an "even larger safe haven" (italics mine), but staying won't eliminate one completely, nor should that be the goal. I don't agree with Walt that we should leave, but he should not be attacked for pointing out that the idea of "safe havens" is not enough of a reason to stay.

Getting Schooled on Afghanistan

I sometimes feel like a school teacher handing out homework when writing this blog. As you sit around waiting for results from Thursday's election, here are some reading suggestions. We can discuss them in tomorrow's class.

Read yesterday's Washington Post article about how General McKiernan got fired in large part because he didn't know Washington or play politics well enough (while at the same time not being offered the same power or resources as McChrystal already enjoys). Read Andrew Exum's post where he finally (almost) admits to being too close to a tactic (counterinsurgency) and unable to objectively examine the strategic realities in Afghanistan (if you have a hammer every problem looks like a nail). Read the Times op-ed talking about how ethnic divisions in Afghanistan (like almost everywhere) complicate the process of creating a government. As always, read Steve Coll's take on the strategic debate over Afghanistan, which he says will heat up even more. And if you haven't yet done so read Rory Stewart's lengthy skeptical article in the London Review of Books asking, just as I have been for some time, what our strategic objectives are and taking specific umbrage with the tautological idea of counterinsurgency as a one-size-fits-all solution.

Some of my favorite Stewart quotes:

Policymakers perceive Afghanistan through the categories of counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, state-building and economic development. These categories are so closely linked that you can put them in almost any sequence or combination. You need to defeat the Taliban to build a state and you need to build a state to defeat the Taliban. There cannot be security without development, or development without security. If you have the Taliban you have terrorists, if you don’t have development you have terrorists, and as Obama informed the New Yorker, ‘If you have ungoverned spaces, they become havens for terrorists.’

....

The Afghan national army is reasonably effective. Pakistan is not in a position to support the Taliban as it did before. It would require far fewer international troops and planes than we have today to make it very difficult for the Taliban to gather a conventional army as they did in 1996 and drive tanks and artillery up the main road to Kabul.

....

Counter-insurgency is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for state-building. You could create a stable legitimate state without winning a counter-insurgency campaign (India, which is far more stable and legitimate than Afghanistan, is still fighting several long counter-insurgency campaigns from Assam to Kashmir). You could win a counter-insurgency campaign without creating a stable state (if such a state also required the rule of law and a legitimate domestic economy).

....

But Osama bin Laden is still in Pakistan, not Afghanistan. He chooses to be there precisely because Pakistan can be more assertive in its state sovereignty than Afghanistan and restricts US operations. From a narrow (and harsh) US national security perspective, a poor failed state could be easier to handle than a more developed one: Yemen is less threatening than Iran, Somalia than Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan than Pakistan.

....

This is not a plan: it is a description of what we have not got. Our approach is short-term; it has struggled to develop Afghan capacity, resolve regional issues or overcome civilian-military divisions; it has struggled to respect Afghan sovereignty or local values; it has failed to implement international standards of democracy, government and human rights; and it has failed to set clear and realistic objectives with clear metrics of success. Why do we believe that describing what we do not have should constitute a plan on how to get it? (Similarly, we do not notice the tautology in claiming to ‘overcome corruption through transparent, predictable and accountable financial processes’.)

Holbrooke on Success in Afghanistan: Like Pornography "We'll Know It When We See It"

At a Center for American Progress event today with almost his whole barrel-of-monkeys interagency team, Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke had the astounding quote regarding success in Afghanistan that "We'll know it when we see it." Wow. That's almost certain to be the quote of the event. No wonder we can't come up with metrics. These are the supposed experts? It's an impressive list of names, but between them they can't come up with a strategy or a way to gauge success?

We shall see if anything useful comes out of this event. But gatherings like these seem to show that rather than "Rumsfelding" Afghanistan we are taking the opposite approach: over thinking everything and not coming to any decisions. I'm glad discussions are going on now, but the experts on Holbrooke's team so far are just increasing my pessimism about the mission in Afghanistan.

Picking Up Bits of Baitullah

Ask and ye shall receive. I wondered how we would a) gain enough material from the Baitullah Mehsud hit to do a DNA study and become more than 90 percent sure we killed him, and b) how we had other DNA of his to compare it to, and BBC News answered at least part b: Pakistani intelligence services apparently have a sample from his brother.

Of course now we (or more likely the Pakistani services) still have to send someone into the lovely neighborhood of South Waziristan to scrape some charred remains off of the rocks around where the house used to be and hope it was from Mehsud and not one of the other people killed in the attack. Easier said than done. But at least I got my question answered!

Notes on a Post-Mehsud Afghanistan and Pakistan

After a weekend of thinking about it, it looks like we really did get Baitullah Mehsud. Hurray! And now his deputies are fighting each other over who gets to be leader of the club now. Double hurray! That saves us the trouble. Various analysts have speculated that whereas Mehsud focused his attacks more on Pakistan, which ever deputy ends up leading his group is likely to focus more on attacking U.S. forces in Afghanistan. That's both good news and bad news. Our troops will get attacked more, but they will be in Afghanistan, where we can fight back, not across the invisible line into Pakistan where we can only use drones.

The "successful" drone strike (it took us many attempts, and the strike that killed Mehsud may not have even been targeting him) means we will likely use drones even more readily. That's not necessarily a good thing, as we have a poor track record of killing the people we want to (terrorists and insurgents) and not the ones we don't (civilians).

On the drug front, we have decided to spend time and energy hunting down drug lords in Afghanistan. I wonder if we're going to include the drug lords who are some of Karzai's biggest supporters. Sure, extra heroin in the world is a bad thing, but we didn't invade Afghanistan to control drugs. Michael Cohen has been keeping an "Afghanistan Mission Creep Watch" going for awhile. Looks like he has some job security!

We are currently spending at least $60 billion per year in Afghanistan. That's roughly six times more (conservatively) than if we simply decided to buy everything Afghanistan produced (drugs included) every year. We're likely committed to spending at least $4 billion a year for quite a few years after we leave (whenever that may be) just to pay for the Afghan army and police forces, since their tax base cannot support it. What are we getting? Is this really the best strategy? Is there a strategy?

Baitullah Mehsud Dead? Now For My Second Wish... Actual Afghanistan Metrics!

I recently wished I would wake up and find out we had hit our exact target with a drone-fired missile in Pakistan. This evening I "awoke" from a Twitter slumber (a cybersecurity warning sign?) to find we actually did kill Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud with a drone strike yesterday--maybe. It seems we won't know for sure until we get in to South Waziristan to collect a DNA sample (quick side note: how do we possibly have another DNA sample to compare it to?), far easier said than done, since we can't do it by drone.

If we did get Mehsud that's great news of course, but before we get too cocky we should take note that militant groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and Mehsud's in particular, are like the hydra, and Mehsud apparently has several able deputies willing to step up and take his place.

So for my second wish, I'd like the Obama Administration to come up with actual metrics for success in Afghanistan (and Pakistan). Apparently Congress wants the same thing. After the first (or was it third) "AfPak" review the White House released a white paper promising metrics for success--and has failed not only to announce how we're doing, but what the metrics are. As I've argued repeatedly, you can't measure progress toward a goal you haven't established.

So far the White House has been better at determining what metrics not to use: enemy killed, miles of roads built, bombs defused, tips gathered, etc. Those are helpful steps, but if, according to the Times, we already have "nine broad objectives for metrics to guide the administration’s policy on Afghanistan and Pakistan" why can't we develop metrics now? We need another month or two to continue studying them? Is this a cooking-the-books plan where by the time the actual metrics are up it will be winter and things will look good because fighting is difficult for the militants?

We do need to get the metrics right, but metrics should measure progress toward a goal. Firmly and clearly state the goal, and and tell the social scientist metric creation team to get their academic butts in gear. We've wasted enough time.

On the Brink of Becoming a Failed State (On the Eve of its 62nd Birthday)

Editor's Note: the following is a guest post from Haley Gallagher, who served in the Peace Corps in Bangladesh. The views expressed are her own.

Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the “father of Pakistan” had a vision that his country would be that of a modern, moderate, secular society. Much has changed since August 14, 1947. There is a growing force of Islam-loving people throughout Pakistan yearning for the implementation of Islamic law. Rather than fighting the Taliban, this group of people believes the current military operation is counter-productive and that the state should be engaging the Taliban.

While the debate continues, many agree that Pakistan consistently fails to provide sufficient resources to its citizens. Under already inadequate education and infrastructure systems, the poor suffer the most during wartime conditions. Moreover and somewhat disconcerting, the country has a moderate youth bulge; the average age is 21 and over 37% of Pakistanis are under the age of 15. Given the current economic downturn and rising unemployment rate, many of these youths sit idle with nothing to do. This presents opportunities for the Taliban to recruit and train, yes, even children to be suicide bombers. As Pakistanis’ patience wanes the risk of violence increases and everyday access to social services such as education suffer (six Christians were burnt to death this week following allegations that they had desecrated a Koran).

Pakistan is currently a very volatile society and its citizens are stuck between a rock and a hard place in terms of whom to trust, be it Americans or the Taliban. Given their vulnerability, America should seize this opportunity to increase development aid and resources to Pakistan in an effort to regain their loyalty. The Peace Corps is the most powerful symbol of non-military service in our history. Both President Obama and former Republican President George W. Bush called for expanding the Peace Corps and their funding was increased to $373.4M this year, the largest percentage increase since 1993. While many would argue against sending the Peace Corps back into Pakistan, especially now, there are those willing to serve for a greater collective good.

Every overseas assignment presents risks and perhaps tapping into the Peace Corps’ Crisis Corps would be a better option. When John F. Kennedy called on young Americans to serve, it wasn’t during times of peace. The ‘60s were tumultuous and those willing to volunteer embraced the responsibility. Re-entering Pakistan in this capacity could present challenges. However, this is not a new endeavor for the United States. Navigating the political system is clearly the biggest obstacle. In the meantime, as the Peace Corps continues to double its efforts globally, Pakistan will have to rely on those local organizations that focus their efforts on bringing good governance and sustainable development to the people directly. There is a sense of urgency, however, to partner with those on the right side of governance and honor the vision that Jinnah worked so hard to create.

Lords and Vassals in Modern Pakistan

Nicholas Kristof has one of the best, and shortest, summaries of one of the major problems facing Pakistan today: feudal lords. I recommend reading it in its entirety, and even some of the comments (especially those from Pakistanis) if you have time. Of the three power centers in the country--the government, the military, and feudal lords--the government has the least influence. Both major political parties, the PPP and the PML-N, are linked to feudal lords and families. Pakistan's leadership has mostly been alternating between members of the Bhutto clan (Zulfikar Ali, Benazir, and now her husband Zardari holding the position until the chosen one, their son Bilawal, is ready) alternating with military dictators, with a few other random leaders thrown in just to shake things up.

I've met some of these feudal lords at various events around the world. Some are truly Falstafian characters, quaffing whole bottles of Johnny Walker Black (for some reason South Asians tend to prefer blended whisky to single malt), devouring large quantities of meat, telling loud and crazy stories, and enjoying literally and figuratively throwing their weight around. They are great people to know and have as your friends, but I would hate to have one as a boss or landlord. We in the West are used to a strong central government, but in places like Pakistan the politics of any given region are much more complicated, with each area also belonging to a lord or tribe.

Kristof wonders if land reform is the solution. In an ideal world yes; India had fairly successful land reforms in the 1950s and '60s that created much of the middle class today (though of course poverty is still rampant). I have a hard time envisioning a process that would get us to land reform from the current situation, especially given Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and the need to avoid even more chaos. Care should be taken to prevent aid from further enriching these feudal lords and making sure it actually gets to the population, but confronting the feudal system directly would be doomed to failure.

Clarification on India's Nuclear Submarine

I've received comments from both friends and strangers about my post on India's new nuclear submarine, so allow me to clarify a few points.

First, I am totally in favor of India's right to defend itself. Whether this third leg of its nuclear triad is aimed at deterring Pakistan or China, it is clearly intended as a second-strike capability, especially given India's proclaimed no-first-use nuclear doctrine.

My argument is that launching its nuclear submarine now, with great fanfare, has the potential to make India less secure, since Pakistan will clearly become even more nervous and paranoid (Pakistan said the Indian sub is "detrimental to regional peace and security" you say?) and be less likely to focus on the biggest threat to both Pakistan and India at the moment, the militants. If any bystander were asked to come up with India's enemy she would name Pakistan, so how is calling a submarine the "destroyer of enemies" supposed to sound to Pakistan? Why not the INS Peacemaker? The INS Gandhi? Although it is intended as a second strike, it can hit from 700 km away with either conventional or nuclear K-15 missiles. It's not a zero-sum game; Indians need to think how they would react if they were Pakistan, and make decisions accordingly.

Second, I too applaud India's restraint in (not) responding to the Mumbai attacks. Previous Indian administrations would have had, at a minimum, massive military build-ups, and some of my friends and colleagues could have written a trilogy of books on India-Pakistan crises (together with the 1999 Kargil crisis and the 2001-2 standoff). Again, my point was to call for more restraint, and the wisdom that should help facilitate a peaceful rise to India's place as a great regional and someday world power. Acting like an 800-pound gorilla, as some previous U.S. administrations have demonstrated, only makes everyone go bananas. Far better to remain wise, prudent, and restrained, and increase your power and capabilities softly, humbly, and with carefully calculated timing.

India Launches a "Non-Aggressive" Nuclear Submarine

Over the weekend India launched its first domestically-built nuclear-powered submarine, one capable of carrying K-15 ballistic missiles with a range of at least 700km.

Certainly the INS Arihant (or "Destroyer of Enemies") represents a technological breakthrough for India, but why launch it now, just as peace talks with Pakistan are resuming over Kashmir? Pakistanis are paranoid enough about India; one Pakistani journalist, Ahmed Quraishi, commented on one of my posts that India was paying Baitullah Mehsud to attack Pakistani nuclear facilities so that they would look vulnerable and the United States would pressure Pakistan to get rid of them. Following the old rule that if you go out of your way to say what something is not, it usually is that ("it's not your father's Oldsmobile"), Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated that "We don't have any aggressive designs nor do we seek to threaten anyone."

India needs to be smart as it seeks to become a great power. The capability to build nuclear-powered submarines puts it in a league with the United States, Russia, France, Great Britain, and China. It is a rising power both in the region and the world, but its inferiority complex regarding Pakistan is holding it back and making it look petty. Just as Pakistan needs to acknowledge that its biggest threat is the militants, India needs to recognize that the only thing it has to fear from Pakistan are Mumbai-style attacks from militants, and the more it threatens Pakistan the less resources Pakistan will be willing to spend on fighting those same militants, be they LeT or Taliban.

Part of being a great power is showing restraint, wisdom, and timing. Those are lessons India has yet to learn.

Too Dumb to Quit Reading Tom Friedman

Long-time readers will know I don't habitually read Thomas Friedman's columns, but enough Twitter comments ("@joshuafoust Is Tom Friedman contractually obligated to write like a 6 year old?") convinced me it was not one of his five normal recycled subjects and made me go read it. He does use the usual Friedman literary device of taking one snapshot event and extrapolating broadly about the world based on that. In this case, he sucks up to the troops in Afghanistan (commandment 7 of Walt's ten commandments for policy wonks) and talks about how much combat experience they have and expertise in the Middle East (I guess Afghanistan is the Middle East now in Friedman's eyes) they have. Despite all this he says we are overextended in Afghanistan and the mission may ultimately be unachievable.

This comes on the same day the Times has a front page article "Pakistan Objects to U.S. Plan for Afghan War." This is not the usual objections Pakistan raises in public after drone attacks to placate their people while secretly asking the United States for more drone strikes, but rather concerns that an increased level of U.S. and NATO troops and actions in Afghanistan will drive more Taliban and other militants into Pakistan, especially Baluchistan, and that Pakistan won't have enough troops to fight the militants in multiple locations and deal with their "main" threat, India.

Which brings us to the Times' recent glowing review of Seth Jones' new book In the Graveyard of Empires. (note, I haven't read the book yet, but will be attending a book release event tomorrow. I'll provide an update if my opinion changes). Jones is a good scholar who has always made good points and interesting presentations at conferences I've attended, but I wouldn't classify the recommendations in the book the way the Times does as "useful." Our window for success was 2006? So what do we do now? We have to persuade Pakistan that the militants are a bigger threat to them than India? Wow, thanks. We should fight corruption in Afghanistan and learn to understand the decentralized nature of Afghani government, politics, and culture? You don't say.

Which brings us full circle to Friedman. He says our military is experienced, but overstretched; the column was published the same week as Secretary Gates announced he was further increasing the size of the Army. Some of our officers may have done six deployments, and therefore presumably know both Jones' lessons and Friedman's extrapolated tactical maxims, but I quickly learned at the Naval Postgraduate School that when a student started off a question with "When I was leading a company of Marines in Fallujah..." it meant he hadn't done the reading for the class. The real questions are strategic, and our civilian leaders have decided on a full counterinsurgency campaign. Time and effort continue to be needed for success, but our top decision makers do need to make the strategic decisions on how long to stay.