Analyzing Underpants: On Intelligence Sharing Problems and Solutions

A lot of articles, columns, blogs, and other material is out there analyzing what happened and why the intelligence community was not able to do its job and stop the Christmas Day "underpants bomber." Of course anyone looking for information should read the White House's own report (I've heard the classified version is much harsher). The Washington Post's infographic is quite good in showing how the system was supposed to work.

For a good insider account of the difficulties involved, especially with different spellings of non-English names, from former intelligence and friend-of-the-blog Jim Arkaedis read his latest post. (Jim's post on AQAP is also quite good, though I disagree with him regarding terrorist safe-havens).

If you want to follow the finger pointing, Josh Rogin is all over it.

If you want to talk about solutions Jennifer Sims and Bob Gallucci have a very sharp piece in the Post today, which echoes some of Malcolm Gladwell's ideas from Blink.

To win against a networked adversary, the intelligence community must share critical information with decision makers but not always with every element of its own community first. Assembling "puzzles" from many pieces is often necessary for planning and strategy; it takes time and the meticulous management of databases by analytical experts. But for day-to-day operations, decision makers often hold as many or more pieces than intelligence agencies do and certainly know better from moment to moment what knowledge they need to act. In terms of tactical decisions, sharing among intelligence agencies so that an "all source" product can be generated can be a form of hoarding. It can result in finished analyses that are irrelevant, unhelpful or even harmful to national security. [Italics mine]

People: the Best Homeland Security

I imagine someone might be reading this on a mobile device as they are in an interminable security line at the airport waiting to go on spring break (they wisely got there early). But know this: the most draconian security measures we are proposing - full-body scans and extensive pat downs/strip searches - still would not have caught the Christmas day "Underpants Bomber" Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab.

I was going to write that because he flew from Nigeria Abdulmutallab wouldn't have gone through a full-body scanner, but it turns out that Nigeria's international airport already has scanners. It doesn't seem Abdulmutallab was scanned, since as the Truman Project's Melissa Skorka points out, the workers in many developing countries' airports are often concerned with things other than safety. But the real story, as Marc Sageman discussed at a Middle East Policy Council event today, is that Abdulmutallab carried only about three ounces of explosive, the equivalent of three packets of sugar, and it is extremely unlikely that either a body scan or a pat down would have discovered the packets. As another panelist today mentioned, Yemen now has a very creative bomb maker, and though both the butt bomb and the underpants bomb have failed, he will keep trying. Three sugar packets worth of powder makes me think he could hide it in actual sugar packets, or as tooth powder, or really just about anywhere.

We'll know more about what exactly led to the breakdown of intelligence in the case of the underpants bomber when the unclassified version of the report is released later today, but we do know this: our best defense is alert, smart people talking to each other. We need our intelligence community to do its job. The National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) is designed to bring representatives from the various agencies to share information with each other and put their heads together. One person should poke their head up over the cubicle and say "hey, this guy in Nigeria says his son is becoming radical" and another says "hey, I know of a Nigerian posting some radical thoughts online" and a third could say "hmm, the British just revoked a Nigerian's visa. Maybe we should do the same thing." But it didn't seem to work. No wonder people are clamoring for NCTC director Michael Leiter's head. Of course the NCTC has bigger problems, but Leiter has had plenty of time to work on them.

We also need as much interaction between governments and people in other countries. As much as an Obama Doctrine currently exists, it is based on the idea of smart power, and that means we need to keep our foot on the gas with diplomacy, exchanges, and training. DHS' Office of International Affairs needs to be fully staffed and step up its mission working on training, cooperation, and increasing security practices around the world. And people need to keep traveling the world and showing the good and productive side of Americans.

Finally, homeland security is everyone's responsibility. Who became suspicious and subdued Abdulmutallab? Not an air marshall (there wasn't one): other passengers. Same thing for Richard Reid, the shoe bomber. The DC Metro system constantly has announcements to report suspicious packages and the like. An alert and educated public can be our best weapon, since even DHS can hire only so many people.

DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano said "the system worked" in the aftermath of the attempted bombing, a quote she clearly regrets. Parts of the system didn't work, the parts we pay billions of dollars a year for, and clearly those parts need to work better. But if you include everyone in the system, than the system did work. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks everyone wanted to help, and many did by donating blood or needed materials. President Bush had an opportunity to tell everyone that they were part of the solution, and that their role was to always be vigilant. Instead he told them to go shopping. Luckily for us many got the message anyway. People are the most important defense against terror.

On Paranoid Pakistanis

Given half an opportunity, Pakistanis can be some of the most paranoid people on the planet. They tend to fear that India -- or sometimes the United States -- is behind every single bad thing that happens to them. If a Pakistani stubs his toe it was probably an Indian spy who snuck in and made that crack in the sidewalk. Lou Dobbs would be a big hit in Pakistan; maybe he should do a show there rather than running for president in 2012. Ahmed Rashid has a good article up on the BBC News website on conspiracy theories in Pakistan.

Some people in Pakistan probably should be paranoid. President Zardari should be paranoid; people really are plotting against him, which is understandable given the job he is doing.

I've heard other crazy theories from Pakistanis ranging from the idea that all U.S. technology, especially nuclear technology, contains a secret "off" switch, so that when our Indian overlords give the order we can secretly send out a radio signal and make all Pakistani military equipment cease to work. Or that the militant bombings in Peshawar and elsewhere are not the work of the Taliban, but instead are the work of Blackwater.

The last thing you would want to do is give any kind of credibility to those rumors, right? Imagine how crazy Dobbs and the FreeRepublic folks would go if President Obama accidentally mentioned something about going "home" to Kenya, or said something about going to a mosque.

So who's bright idea was it to hire Blackwater Xe Total Intelligence Solutions (TIS) to work doing "snatch-and-grabs" based in Karachi, Pakistan? Apparently since we officially can't have our military operating in Pakistan, we'll just outsource it to civilians. Let's just hope none of them are of Indian descent.

Categorize this one as "stupid power."

The Big Afghanistan Strategy Rendezvous

I was at East Potomac Golf Course yesterday afternoon when a bunch of military helicopters flew by overhead. I remarked to my playing companions that it was probably Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen headed to the White House for the afternoon Afghanistan discussion. They looked at me like I was sharing top secret information rather than readily available news, but it goes to show that even in DC, where "everyone" is enthralled with the ongoing Afghanistan strategy debate, "everyone" is really just a few of the wonkiest of us.

To recap, so far General McChrystal is arguing for an intensive population-centric counterinsurgency strategy, including an increase of probably 40,000 U.S. troops. Vice President Joe Biden continues to advocate for a troop draw down and a focus on counter terrorism and targeting al Qaeda leadership. President Obama has gathered the usual suspects for regular discussions in hopes of coming up with a coherent strategy. While I have been calling for a defined and articulated end goal and strategy since at least several things we introduced as strategies ago, I applaud the effort now as better late than never, assuming in the end we come up with an actual strategy. So what if it took the farce of an Afghan election to cast doubt on the idea of the Afghanistan government taking over smoothly in a few years and keeping Afghanistan stable, at least we're now discussing it.

Last week Fred Kaplan brought up two key questions the strategy team should answer:

First, is Afghan President Hamid Karzai likely to rally the support of his own people, especially given the massive fraud in the recent election? (If he doesn't rally this support, counterinsurgency is doomed to fail; this, the top U.S. military leaders acknowledge.)

Second, given the vast amount of blood, treasure, and time that a COIN campaign requires under the best of circumstances, are the prospective benefits worth the cost?

And today Marc Lynch countered with five questions of his own. I think all of those questions are important, and I hope they are being discussed in the room, but my big concern is what the end goal is for Afghanistan. The major difference I see between us and the British and Soviets - and hopefully the reason we can succeed where they failed - is that we do not want to occupy Afghanistan any longer than necessary. The goal is for us to withdraw from an Afghanistan that no longer harbors a threat to the world, and I hope the team takes that long term a view of the problem.

It only added to the turmoil when General McChrystal mentioned that he had only ever talked to President Obama once since taking over, and has advocated for his counterinsurgency campaign (which he falsely calls a strategy) in recent talks and media interviews he has done. This has led to debates about whether the field commander should be playing politics and pushing his agenda through the media rather than going through the chain of command. Some have interpreted this as pulling a MacArthur, others have defended him. Obama has yet to pull a Truman in '51 - though he would be justified since McChrystal to me is undermining his Commander in Chief and clearly has said his piece - but was smacked down by Secretary Gates. McChrystal was put in place over General McKiernan because he could supposedly think in bigger and more flexible ways, but so far only seems to follow the COIN orthodoxy.

I'm glad the Afghanistan strategy debate is happening, both behind closed doors and out in the public. It's about bloody time, and by that I mean it's about eight years too late. But McChrystal needs to contribute through the chain of command, the way he has his entire career. I know he's an unconventional warrior, but he can't ambush the President. The principals need to go into the room and spend as much time as necessary, but when they come out they need to speak with one voice, believe it, and execute it. If McChrystal can't get on board if the decision doesn't go his way he will need to be sent home.

New Thinkers Needed for Afghanistan

Let me get this straight: what we're doing in Afghanistan is not working; the President has been presented with options, basically double down or go for a minimalist approach; the leading commander in Afghanistan says we could be there for 100 years and still fail; we're promising continued support for Karzai even though the main problem is that Afghanistan's central government is corrupt, incompetent, and generally refuses to pull any weight; and the main argument for adding additional troops is that we tried the alternative (a "counter terrorism" approach) under Bush and it didn't work. Really? Only two options exist? The President is right to think about this one long and hard.

Where are the real alternative ideas? Better yet, where are the alternative thinkers, preferably someone under 50 who has actually been on the ground in Afghanistan without a huge protective escort. Gates, Jones, Petraeus, McChrystal, Holbrooke, Clinton, Riedel... all over 50. Is it any wonder that all of their reviews said basically the same thing -- Afghanistan is critical, but we can still win -- without offering a real strategy or real solutions?

Give me someone really outside the box. How about we make Joshua Foust think of solutions instead of criticizing others. Let's get Fred Kaplan in the room. Why isn't someone asking Katherine Tiedemann for new ideas? Ask Craig Mullaney what he would do. Maybe Greg Mortenson could add an outsider's opinion of what to do. For all the talk about how the Obama Administration is full of young go-getters his Afghanistan team is full of old retreads with the same old ideas. I'm far from the first person to say we aren't fighting an eight-year war in Afghanistan, we're fighting a one-year war eight times in a row. You think going back to the same ideas is going to break that cycle?

Fighting in Afghanistan will die down in a few weeks, as it does every winter. That gives us the luxury of a real debate for new ideas. We don't need another strategic review, we need a real strategy, and we should include new thinkers and new ideas in the debate.

Worse Decision Making: Redskins or the Afghanistan Team?

The Washington Post headline this morning blared out: "McChrystal: More Forces or 'Mission Failure;'" I wished they had used the headline from below the fold (about the Redskins): "First and Unsure of the Goal."

It was inevitable that General McChrystal's classified review of the situation in Afghanistan would be leaked. It was almost as inevitable that the review, as Joshua Foust put it, contains "absolutely nothing new." The most disturbing aspect of the review is that it talks about the "counterinsurgency strategy." Our commander in Afghanistan thinks that counterinsurgency IS the strategy. Shouldn't that be a red flag? McChrystal's expertise is supposedly thinking unconventionally, but his review is extremely inside the (counterinsurgency) box in its thinking: more troops, more resources, more time, full speed ahead.

At last week's excellent Foreign Policy and New America Foundation event "Covering Afghanistan:A Conversation On How It Looks From the Ground" Steve Coll expressed optimism that President Obama's team was taking a full and deep assessment of the strategic rationale for being in Afghanistan (look for my question and his answer near the end of the video). I'm still more skeptical that new thinking will emerge, though I'm slightly more hopeful after reading the Post's other article today. The key quote is:

The president, one adviser said, is "taking a very deliberate, rational approach, starting at the top" of what he called a "logic chain" that begins with setting objectives, followed by determining a methodology to achieve them. Only when the first two steps are completed, he said, can the third step -- a determination of resources -- be taken.

And he should work in that order. It's good to hear that starting to happen, although perhaps it would have been nice to start the process four or five "strategic reviews" ago, or during the transition, or in 2002. It remains to be seen who has a plan to score a touchdown first, the national security team or the Redskins. Better late than never?

Overstating my Power? bin Laden, You're On Notice!

Apparently expressing my frustration that we have yet to catch or kill a given terrorist is enough to get said terrorist killed. Do the world's terrorist-hunting teams all read Smart Influence and get motivated when they see me write about their prey? First I expressed my frustration that we had shot at Baitullah Mehsud repeatedly without hitting him and lo and behold we hit him. Last week Jamie Morgan's guest post talked about the right and wrong ways to fight Noordin M. Top's terrorist group in Indonesia; I'm pretty sure killing Top is part of the right way!

So who's left? Lots of people, for sure, but for now, Osama bin Laden, you're on notice (copyright Stephen Colbert)! I'm officially sick of our inability to capture or kill you. Can't we just look where they are sending his record label checks from his new Auto-Tuned album?

Wrong Answer for Indonesian Terror

Editor's Note: The following is a guest post by Jamie Morgan. The views expressed are her own.

Indonesian officials announced a plan to tighten anti-terrorist laws, which would allow the government to detain suspects for up to two years. The government claims this will allow them to get more in line with the laws of Western nations. (Are two year detention allowances standard in Western nations now?) Additionally, several of the senior-level government Ministers are seeking an amendment to a terrorism investigation law that would allow non-police forces, including the Indonesian Military (TNI), to conduct anti-terror investigations.

All of this is disconcerting for two reasons. First, we are talking about a country that just emerged from a brutal dictatorship 11 years ago. The military was the major instrument of former President Suharto to control the population during his rule, and expanding the military’s powers such a short time after his fall does not send a good message to the population, nor is it a good idea for the fledgling democracy.

Second, and possibly more importantly for the rest of the world, expanding the amount of time the Indonesian government can legally hold terrorism suspects without charge is not going to do anything for its fight against Noordin M. Top’s terrorist group. It actually might harm it. The government needs to focus on identifying the root causes of support for Top’s group among certain areas of the Indonesian population, rather than inflame public opinion against it. The International Crisis Group reports that support among the local population, and even among the less militant terrorist group Jemmah Islamiyah (JI), is not high for Top’s extremist faction. However, if Top’s faction is allowed to continue to infiltrate Islamic boarding schools, it will continue to find the few supporters it needs to plan operations like the July 17 hotel bombing in Jakarta.

Recent revelations connecting Top’s group and various extremist groups in the Middle East and South Asia make all of this even more alarming. Unfortunately, given the lack of general media attention on this issue, I am not hopeful for improvement anytime soon.

Post Op-Eds on Afghanistan

As the debate over Afghanistan heats up inside the Beltway and around the country the Washington Post has had four significant op-eds on Afghanistan this week, two terrible, one merely repetitive, and one very good.

Let's start with the good. Everyone should read former Senator Chuck Hagel's piece from today, in which he argues that,

Our greatest threats today come from the regions left behind after World War II. Addressing these threats will require a foreign policy underpinned by engagement -- in other words, active diplomacy but not appeasement. We need a clearly defined strategy that accounts for the interconnectedness and the shared interests of all nations. Every great threat to the United States -- whether economic, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, health pandemics, environmental degradation, energy, or water and food shortages -- also threatens our global partners and rivals. Accordingly, we cannot view U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan through a lens that sees only "winning" or "losing." Iraq and Afghanistan are not America's to win or lose. Win what? We can help them buy time or develop, but we cannot control their fates.

Meanwhile David Ignatius' column yesterday was virtually identical to any number of stories from February, March, and April on the President deciding between counterinsurgency and counter terrorism options, the only difference being the substitution of McChrystal for McKiernan. That's not Ignatius' fault, it is simply a good indicator that we are still treading water in Afghanistan.

George Will's column arguing for a withdrawal from Afghanistan, on the other hand, was as bad as Hagel's was good. Will should stick to decrying the decline of our entire society because we wear jeans. Will has already been savaged by left and right alike (my favorite comment was from Joshua Foust, "George Will waits for a Democrat to get in the White House before calling Afghanistan unwinnable. Classy."), so I'll just say that Will appears to be arguing for Bill Clinton's foreign policy: lob a few cruise missiles in based on inadequate intelligence. Did Will support that policy at the time? How well did it work?

On Monday Anthony Cordesman, a smart guy and a member of McChrystal's review team, argued that while we can't win in Afghanistan in the next three months, we can lose in that time frame, if enough resources are not devoted to the cause. That makes sense; we do almost certainly need additional resources. But then he bizarrely goes on to argue that we shouldn't worry about strategy, simply about tactics. That's the opinion of the "Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy?" A strategy is exactly what we need, and what we have been lacking. If we don't know what we are trying to achieve--based, as General Zinni said, on a strategic vision for the country--we will just continue treading water and making the same mistakes in Afghanistan.

I'm glad we're finally having a debate about Afghanistan. I wish it was a more educated one in which people argued honestly and about the same set of issues, primarily our strategic goals overall and in Afghanistan. And I hope President Obama and his team are listening and preparing to make actual decisions, not "middle grounds," before it is too late.

Walt's "Safe Haven" Update

Professor Walt nicely posted his own response to Bergen's critique just a few minutes after my own. He reiterates his scepticism that the Taliban would actually regain control of Afghanistan, and discusses how useful a base Afghanistan actually would make for al-Qaeda. I still think he should discuss the existing safe haven in the tribal areas along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, but no matter, he makes similar points as I do. I think the questions deserve to be asked, but the answer is not a cut-and-dry "withdraw" as Walt seems to be arguing.

Wading into the "Safe Haven" Debate

I am not a part of the 51 percent of Americans who apparently no longer think the war in Afghanistan is not worth fighting. Then again the public also approves of President Obama's handling of the war to date; I find myself in the minority of both groups. I believe that we should be in Afghanistan, but only if we develop a realistic and achievable desired end state and a strategy to accomplish that mission.

Over the last few days several foreign policy blogs have been discussing a line from President Obama's speech to the VFW, “If left unchecked, the Taliban insurgency will mean an even larger safe haven from which al Qaeda would plot to kill more Americans." Realist scholar Stephen Walt argued in six points that leaving Afghanistan (presumably immediately) would not create more of a safe haven for terrorists bent on attacking the United States, that it is not fundamental to our survival as a nation, and thus that Afghanistan is not a "war of necessity." He was then "slammed" by, among others, Peter Bergen, Paul Cruickshank, and Spencer Ackerman.

The thing is, while I don't agree with everything he is saying, Walt has a valid point. Would leaving Afghanistan create a safe haven for al-Qaeda? Probably, because either the Taliban would take over or Afghanistan would be come what is referred to as an "ungoverned space."

The first problem is, al-Qaeda already have a safe haven: the ungoverned space on the Pakistan side of the border. Has any analyst or policymaker been so bold as to propose that either the United States or Pakistan will be able to tame and rule the mountainous tribal areas? No power in history has been up to the task. Functioning countries on both sides of the border along with continued drone flights would contain the problem, and that is a valid, and hopefully achievable, goal, but totally eliminating a mountainous maze as a safe haven won't happen. Bergen points out that the 2005 London subway bombings, the 2006 liquid bombs on planes plot, and others were plotted in Pakistan, all while surrounded by thousands of U.S. and allied troops. Eliminating every nook and cranny along the Durand Line is just as difficult as eliminating every nook where a cockroach could be hiding in your house.

A second problem, which some of the commenters acknowledge and then ignore, is that many other ungoverned spaces exist, including Somalia and Yemen, that can and do serve just as well as terrorist bases and training areas. And in a modern, globalized, interconnected world safe havens in ungoverned or welcoming countries aren't necessary. Sure several of the 9/11 hijackers trained in Afghanistan, but they also spent significant time plotting, training, and waiting in Hamburg, Cairo, and Florida (is Florida an ungoverned space? It's easy to get and practice with guns and other weapons there, and parts of it certainly have religious fanatics...).

I don't believe we should withdraw from Afghanistan, although without a real strategy we are simply treading water. We need to set a realistic and achievable goal and figure out a plan to achieve it. The President is right, leaving now would result in an "even larger safe haven" (italics mine), but staying won't eliminate one completely, nor should that be the goal. I don't agree with Walt that we should leave, but he should not be attacked for pointing out that the idea of "safe havens" is not enough of a reason to stay.

I Think This Is an Emergency, Or So It Has Been

Guest Post: Michael Rohrs is a counterterrorism intelligence analyst and consultant with BAE Systems. He is a member of Young Professionals in Foreign Policy and an occasional blogger on national security and foreign policy issues. The views expressed are his own.

I participate in a discussion group on international terrorism. The topic of tonight’s discussion is: the Office of Foreign Assets Control's (OFAC) ability to designate U.S.-based entities as ‘specially designated global terrorists.’ One of the preparation questions posed in advance (admittedly not one at the true heart of this debate) asks, “Eight years after 9-11, are we still in the midst of a ‘national emergency’ which is necessary to invoke the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)?”

The IEEPA, as defined by Adam J. Szubin in particularly lucid testimony,

…grants the President a broad spectrum of powers to deal ‘with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat.’ The President typically exercises these IEEPA powers through Executive Orders that declare a national emergency and impose economic sanctions to address the emergency.

On September 23, 2001, President Bush issued E.O. 13224 which has been renewed every year since—including 2009. What should happen in 2010?

Regarding the above question, here are my preliminary thoughts on the issue as prepared for discussion:

I think we can all agree that in the years immediately following 9-11, the country was well within the designation of a state of national emergency; and as with DHS, emergency measures were hastily but necessarily taken to mitigate extreme circumstances. That said, the threat of a terrorist act being committed on U.S. soil—be it from without or originating within—has not, and in my opinion is not going away. Even further, if you believe Philip Bobbitt, this is only the leading edge of the inevitable. In that sense we are undoubtedly facing a threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, and rightfully in a national state of emergency.

The same flag, however, can justifiably be waved from the opposite shore; it is precisely the perpetual state of threat that nebulous, transnational terrorism poses—not only to the United States but also to Americans abroad and the democratic international community writ large—that negates “state of national emergency” designation. If you believe threats of irregular attack with intent to incite terror in the United States are imminent, indefinite, adaptive, and ongoing (regardless of whether you believe we are actually “at war” with terrorists or on terrorism) then the IEEPA as a designation reserved for unusual and extraordinary circumstances—which includes the implication that they’re temporary—no longer applies.

Adopting this conclusion, as I do, requires a fundamental revision of thinking. It’s no secret that bureaucracy in general and American bureaucracy specifically has difficulty reconstructing paradigms. No paradigm is more deeply ingrained in the United States and about which Americans are more sensitive, than individual—and by extension national—security. However, in order for the IEEPA label to be lifted, U.S. lawmakers with the CT, HS, MI, and Intelligence communities need to redefine the state of the union as it regards the (sober and realistic) threat of terror, and redraft sensible and timely legislation to deal with a changing threat environment; an environment in which combating terror financing is an essential part. Until the paradigm is redrawn and national attitude is adjusted accordingly, however, it is unwise, unsafe, and unacceptable to scale back our counterterrorism intelligence practices at the risk of the American people.

Finally, consider this question: Does the IEEPA extend beyond mitigating risks of the U.S. homeland and its citizens abroad to ensuring that the US is not in any way facilitating (unwittingly!) the financing of terrorist organizations and their operations anywhere in the world? Let us assume the target of a given terrorist organization is something other than Americans and/or American interests. If U.S.-based charities are serving as an avenue (be it merely a canal or as a hub), it remains our responsibility (especially ours!) to paralyze, penetrate, and prosecute these conduits of terrorism. The question remains, however, whether circumstances renders the IEEPA specifically applicable. If not, does a suitable and sustainable (remember the IEEPA is for extraordinary temporary circumstances) alternative statute exist? If not, are we not morally and axiomatically responsible to implement one?

Getting Schooled on Afghanistan

I sometimes feel like a school teacher handing out homework when writing this blog. As you sit around waiting for results from Thursday's election, here are some reading suggestions. We can discuss them in tomorrow's class.

Read yesterday's Washington Post article about how General McKiernan got fired in large part because he didn't know Washington or play politics well enough (while at the same time not being offered the same power or resources as McChrystal already enjoys). Read Andrew Exum's post where he finally (almost) admits to being too close to a tactic (counterinsurgency) and unable to objectively examine the strategic realities in Afghanistan (if you have a hammer every problem looks like a nail). Read the Times op-ed talking about how ethnic divisions in Afghanistan (like almost everywhere) complicate the process of creating a government. As always, read Steve Coll's take on the strategic debate over Afghanistan, which he says will heat up even more. And if you haven't yet done so read Rory Stewart's lengthy skeptical article in the London Review of Books asking, just as I have been for some time, what our strategic objectives are and taking specific umbrage with the tautological idea of counterinsurgency as a one-size-fits-all solution.

Some of my favorite Stewart quotes:

Policymakers perceive Afghanistan through the categories of counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, state-building and economic development. These categories are so closely linked that you can put them in almost any sequence or combination. You need to defeat the Taliban to build a state and you need to build a state to defeat the Taliban. There cannot be security without development, or development without security. If you have the Taliban you have terrorists, if you don’t have development you have terrorists, and as Obama informed the New Yorker, ‘If you have ungoverned spaces, they become havens for terrorists.’

....

The Afghan national army is reasonably effective. Pakistan is not in a position to support the Taliban as it did before. It would require far fewer international troops and planes than we have today to make it very difficult for the Taliban to gather a conventional army as they did in 1996 and drive tanks and artillery up the main road to Kabul.

....

Counter-insurgency is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for state-building. You could create a stable legitimate state without winning a counter-insurgency campaign (India, which is far more stable and legitimate than Afghanistan, is still fighting several long counter-insurgency campaigns from Assam to Kashmir). You could win a counter-insurgency campaign without creating a stable state (if such a state also required the rule of law and a legitimate domestic economy).

....

But Osama bin Laden is still in Pakistan, not Afghanistan. He chooses to be there precisely because Pakistan can be more assertive in its state sovereignty than Afghanistan and restricts US operations. From a narrow (and harsh) US national security perspective, a poor failed state could be easier to handle than a more developed one: Yemen is less threatening than Iran, Somalia than Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan than Pakistan.

....

This is not a plan: it is a description of what we have not got. Our approach is short-term; it has struggled to develop Afghan capacity, resolve regional issues or overcome civilian-military divisions; it has struggled to respect Afghan sovereignty or local values; it has failed to implement international standards of democracy, government and human rights; and it has failed to set clear and realistic objectives with clear metrics of success. Why do we believe that describing what we do not have should constitute a plan on how to get it? (Similarly, we do not notice the tautology in claiming to ‘overcome corruption through transparent, predictable and accountable financial processes’.)