Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Haven't I Refuted This Before?

Seymour Hersh has an article in The New Yorker asking the tired questions of whether Pakistan's nuclear weapons are safe from capture by al-Qaeda or the Taliban. He asserts that because militants have attacked well-defended Pakistani military facilities, other well-defended facilities, including nuclear locations, could be in danger.

If I'm not mistaken a well-defended U.S. military facility, Fort Hood, was just attacked by someone with insider knowledge of security and facilities, but that doesn't mean that anyone outside of Hollywood screenwriters think U.S. nuclear facilities are likely to be attacked or captured by militants. Indian Maoist naxalite militants have attacked government facilities, but no one worries publicly about the security of India's nuclear weapons. Hersh argues that components are most vulnerable when they are being moved. Hmm, you mean like when nuclear parts are accidentally flown across the country, or mistakenly delivered to Taiwan? Didn't the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force get fired for those mistakes not too long ago? Let's discuss reality here.

Once again, yes, Pakistan's government is unstable. President "Mr. Ten Percent" Zardari may well be forced out of office in the next six months, but that may well lead to increased stability in Pakistan, not less. The Pakistani military is considered a common player in Pakistani society and politics, and is perhaps the most stable element. The nuclear warheads are stored and secured separately from the triggers and the delivery systems, and the Pakistanis have developed extensive nuclear security systems.

If anything Pakistan seemed more unstable back in May, when the Taliban had famously crept within 90 miles of the capital, Islamabad. The New York Times ran a piece quoting various experts as saying the nuclear stockpile was safe. What has changed since then other than Sy Hersh decided this was a good sensational story to write? He dismisses all the expert opinions he finds that run contrary to his view, because "are Pakistan's nuclear weapons safe? Yes" would be a pretty boring article.

I imagine I or someone like me will have to refute some sensationalist account about terrorists and Pakistan's nuclear weapons every six months or so for at least several years to come. Of course it's a valid concern and one that should not be ignored, but it is also unlikely, and Pakistan should be given credit for protecting its arsenal.

Twisted Logic on Pakistan's Nukes

Someone help me understand this: the biggest danger in South/Central Asia is al Qaeda getting its hands on one or more of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. Al Qaeda's leadership and many of their fighters are currently in Pakistan. Therefore the argument is we should send 40,000 more troops to Afghanistan? I'm not sure I follow the logic chain. Assuming we failed and largely pulled out of Afghanistan, and assuming the Taliban (whose leaders are also primarily in Pakistan) re-take control of much of Afghanistan, and assuming the Taliban welcome al Qaeda back and provide them the oft-mentioned "safe haven" (and none of those assumptions are sure things by the way), they would then be MORE likely to attack Pakistan's nuclear facilities?

When the Taliban famously advanced into the Swat valley, within 90 miles of the capital Islamabad, I argued against the doom sayers, saying Pakistan was not about to collapse. Now the Pakistani military has largely driven the Taliban from Swat and is preparing for an offensive in South Waziristan, home to much of the Taliban leadership. Drone strikes have successfully taken out many leaders, including Baitullah Mehsud (leading to this lovely ditty). Pakistan was not about to collapse then, and is not about to collapse or give up its nuclear weapons now. Pakistan's nuclear weapons are safe, and should not be used as a bureaucratic pawn in the strategic debate. I'm all for a vigorous debate on goals and strategies, but let's apply a few sober standards of logic to this strategic conversation.

Catch-Up Thoughts

Those of you following me on Twitter will know I was out in California for a few days and not posting, so here are my brief thoughts on some of the recent events. I know you all missed my commentary.

• The CIA developed an assassination squad to go after al-Qaeda leadership... and it failed to have any successes that we know about and proved far more difficult than in James Bond movies. Neither of those facts is surprising. In fact I would be shocked if the CIA didn't still have a similar squad with similar goals. As other commenters have pointed out, the difference between firing missiles from drones and potentially firing bullets from sniper teams is mostly semantic, except that the drones seem to have a lot more collateral damage--that and the drones have actually been used. Nor is it shocking that Darth Cheney kept the program a secret from Congress. That fact bothers me more. Congress, or the Intelligence committees or the Gang of Eight at a bare minimum, should be kept appraised of all programs, especially the controversial ones. That's why we have checks and balances in our government.
• Secretary of State Clinton has ordered the first Quadrennial Development and Diplomacy Review (QDDR). Great! We need to know what we are doing, and giving, have a better idea of what is going where and why, and hopefully some oversight. I'll give you a preview of the report: 1) we need a director for USAID, 2) we don't have enough civilian experts on hand to plan much less execute a "civilian surge" in a place like Afghanistan. In the Pentagon the QDR sets the tone and direction for the Department of Defense; we'll see if the QDDR has the same weight and budget power for State and the other agencies involved with foreign aid and development.
• President Obama and Russian President Medvedev signed a Joint Understanding to a new START arms control treaty. The Joint Understanding is good progress, but it is really laying a foundation for more hard work to be done between now and December. By then hopefully the Nuclear Posture Review will be complete, satisfying certain Republican Senators, and real arms reductions can be made, hopefully down to the 1000-1200 range, although I would like to see us get even lower.

My Letter to the Editor of the NYT

Since the New York Times continues to believe that it comes up with its ideas all by itself, without any help from me, it refused to publish my letter to the editor about their editorial, "Watershed Moment on Nuclear Arms." Luckily for me, and you, I have this blog, so I can publish it myself:

To the Editor:

I wholeheartedly embrace your call in Wednesday’s editorial [“Watershed Moment on Nuclear Arms”] for setting a goal of reducing the U.S. nuclear arsenal to 1,000 deployed warheads by 2012. But that move can be made unilaterally in the Nuclear Posture Review, due by the end of the year, without any reduction in our deterrence capabilities. A replacement for START could be discussed concurrently or subsequently, but the announcement of the move need not wait for negotiators. The reduction would send a powerful message not just to Russia and nuclear aspirants like North Korea and Iran, as you mention, but establish the United States as a credible leader in the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world as we move toward the 2010 conference to renegotiate the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and attempt to create a solution that includes nuclear-armed India and Pakistan.

Robin J. Walker

Washington, DC

Election for Head of IAEA

Elections to see who will replace Egyptian Mohamed ElBaradei as the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency are at a stalemate so far, locked between Japan's Yukiya Amano and South Africa's Abdul Samad Minty. Although I don't know much about either of the candidates themselves, I believe the choice would result in quite different directions for the IAEA.

A Japanese minister would likely be more concerned with countries interested in developing nuclear weapons capabilities, most prominently North Korea and Iran, and would take a hard line approach with them. For this reason Amano is preferred by the United States. The Bush Administration was frequently frustrated b ElBaradei's more diplomatic and nuanced approach toward Iran and North Korea.

A South African like Minty would probably be more focused on the goal of reducing existing levels of nuclear weapons and arms control measures. South Africa is the only country to have totally given up nuclear weapons (albeit partly because the white apartheid government didn't want to see their black successors have nuclear weapons), and remains a strong player in the Non-Aligned Movement, which actually expressed support for Iran's efforts to achieve nuclear power (though not weapons).

At a conference on over-the-horizon nuclear proliferation I helped run in 2007 a scholar suggested that one thing that might drive South Africa to re-develop nuclear weapons would be to express frustration at the state of the arms control/nonproliferation community, and potentially use them as a bargaining chip for future international treaties. (note, he didn't say this was likely, just possible).

All of this will have a profound impact on the focus and possible success of the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty renegotiation. This is one of those small decisions that could have a big impact on world events in the years to come.

Obama's Nuclear Leadership Opportunity

This piece was originally posted at The Moderate Voice:

http://themoderatevoice.com/26749/obama’s-nuclear-leadership-opportunity/

Obama’s Nuclear Leadership Opportunity

February 26th, 2009 By Guest Voice

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The Truman National Security Project bills itself as “the nation’s only organization that recruits, trains, and positions a new generation of progressives across America to lead on national security.” The following essay (the first in a series for TMV) is from Robin Walker, a Project fellow. As with other “guest voice” posts, this and future contributions from the Truman Project do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the TMV editorial board or writers.

By Robin Walker, Truman National Security Project

Of the various challenges President Obama mentioned in his Tuesday evening address to Congress — two wars, a housing crisis, energy, healthcare, education, the deficit, etc. — one challenge got little attention but represents an opportunity for serious progress: nuclear weapons.

By law the President has to produce a new Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) by the end of 2009. If properly handled, the NPR could improve our security, reduce the deficit, improve the United States’ standing in the world, and increase security in one of the most dangerous regions of the world, South Asia.

The 2001 NPR set a fairly aggressive goal of reducing the U.S. nuclear arsenal from Cold War levels down to a range of 1,700 to 2,200 warheads by 2012. President Obama could set a nuclear agenda as aggressive as his campaign rhetoric by establishing a new goal of 1,500 or even 1,000 warheads in that timeframe, which would in turn establish the United States as a leader toward a world of the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons, ideally zero. Leading by example would encourage the rest of the world to reduce or at least stop enlarging their nuclear arsenals. The United States and the international community could take additional steps to increase both the security and reliability of established nuclear powers’ arsenals, hopefully reducing the need for backup weapons.

The longstanding India-Pakistan rivalry is frequently described as the most likely nuclear war scenario in the modern world. Since both countries demonstrated their nuclear capabilities with tests in 1998, three crises have narrowly averted escalating to the level of nuclear exchanges: the 1999 Kargil war; the 2001-2 military buildup; and the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai. Anything the United States can do to minimize the risk of these countries using nuclear weapons is clearly in the interest of the United States and the international community.

Pakistan feels threatened by India’s overwhelming size and conventional military superiority. Current estimates of Pakistan’s arsenal range from 65 to 110 nuclear warheads. Command and control of Pakistan’s weapons is shaky, and one scholar even reported that Pakistani leaders contemplated giving command of one or more nuclear weapons to Taliban-controlled Afghanistan as a hedge against India during the 1999 war. Pakistani leaders also believe the recent U.S.-India nuclear deal will allow India to produce many more nuclear warheads, thus prompting Pakistani leaders to feel they need to “catch up.”

India has stated policies of “no first use” and “minimum credible deterrence,” in other words, a robust second-strike capability. It is unclear just what quantity of warheads is needed for such a capability: 50? 100? 300? Recent estimates put India’s arsenal in the range of 70 to 120 warheads, which will likely increase as India continues to experiment with submarine-launched nuclear weapons. India has overwhelming conventional and nuclear superiority over Pakistan; establishing and declaring a limit would not reduce that edge but would provide some measure of stability for the region.

India wants to be a great power and a leader in the region. The United States needs to re-establish its image as a force for good in the world after eight years of the Bush Administration. President Obama should set an example by ordering aggressive reductions of the U.S. nuclear arsenal in the 2009 NPR, and work to leverage that good example to get India and Pakistan to declare and implement limits to their own nuclear arsenals.