On Paranoid Pakistanis

Given half an opportunity, Pakistanis can be some of the most paranoid people on the planet. They tend to fear that India -- or sometimes the United States -- is behind every single bad thing that happens to them. If a Pakistani stubs his toe it was probably an Indian spy who snuck in and made that crack in the sidewalk. Lou Dobbs would be a big hit in Pakistan; maybe he should do a show there rather than running for president in 2012. Ahmed Rashid has a good article up on the BBC News website on conspiracy theories in Pakistan.

Some people in Pakistan probably should be paranoid. President Zardari should be paranoid; people really are plotting against him, which is understandable given the job he is doing.

I've heard other crazy theories from Pakistanis ranging from the idea that all U.S. technology, especially nuclear technology, contains a secret "off" switch, so that when our Indian overlords give the order we can secretly send out a radio signal and make all Pakistani military equipment cease to work. Or that the militant bombings in Peshawar and elsewhere are not the work of the Taliban, but instead are the work of Blackwater.

The last thing you would want to do is give any kind of credibility to those rumors, right? Imagine how crazy Dobbs and the FreeRepublic folks would go if President Obama accidentally mentioned something about going "home" to Kenya, or said something about going to a mosque.

So who's bright idea was it to hire Blackwater Xe Total Intelligence Solutions (TIS) to work doing "snatch-and-grabs" based in Karachi, Pakistan? Apparently since we officially can't have our military operating in Pakistan, we'll just outsource it to civilians. Let's just hope none of them are of Indian descent.

Categorize this one as "stupid power."

Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Haven't I Refuted This Before?

Seymour Hersh has an article in The New Yorker asking the tired questions of whether Pakistan's nuclear weapons are safe from capture by al-Qaeda or the Taliban. He asserts that because militants have attacked well-defended Pakistani military facilities, other well-defended facilities, including nuclear locations, could be in danger.

If I'm not mistaken a well-defended U.S. military facility, Fort Hood, was just attacked by someone with insider knowledge of security and facilities, but that doesn't mean that anyone outside of Hollywood screenwriters think U.S. nuclear facilities are likely to be attacked or captured by militants. Indian Maoist naxalite militants have attacked government facilities, but no one worries publicly about the security of India's nuclear weapons. Hersh argues that components are most vulnerable when they are being moved. Hmm, you mean like when nuclear parts are accidentally flown across the country, or mistakenly delivered to Taiwan? Didn't the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force get fired for those mistakes not too long ago? Let's discuss reality here.

Once again, yes, Pakistan's government is unstable. President "Mr. Ten Percent" Zardari may well be forced out of office in the next six months, but that may well lead to increased stability in Pakistan, not less. The Pakistani military is considered a common player in Pakistani society and politics, and is perhaps the most stable element. The nuclear warheads are stored and secured separately from the triggers and the delivery systems, and the Pakistanis have developed extensive nuclear security systems.

If anything Pakistan seemed more unstable back in May, when the Taliban had famously crept within 90 miles of the capital, Islamabad. The New York Times ran a piece quoting various experts as saying the nuclear stockpile was safe. What has changed since then other than Sy Hersh decided this was a good sensational story to write? He dismisses all the expert opinions he finds that run contrary to his view, because "are Pakistan's nuclear weapons safe? Yes" would be a pretty boring article.

I imagine I or someone like me will have to refute some sensationalist account about terrorists and Pakistan's nuclear weapons every six months or so for at least several years to come. Of course it's a valid concern and one that should not be ignored, but it is also unlikely, and Pakistan should be given credit for protecting its arsenal.

Twisted Logic on Pakistan's Nukes

Someone help me understand this: the biggest danger in South/Central Asia is al Qaeda getting its hands on one or more of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. Al Qaeda's leadership and many of their fighters are currently in Pakistan. Therefore the argument is we should send 40,000 more troops to Afghanistan? I'm not sure I follow the logic chain. Assuming we failed and largely pulled out of Afghanistan, and assuming the Taliban (whose leaders are also primarily in Pakistan) re-take control of much of Afghanistan, and assuming the Taliban welcome al Qaeda back and provide them the oft-mentioned "safe haven" (and none of those assumptions are sure things by the way), they would then be MORE likely to attack Pakistan's nuclear facilities?

When the Taliban famously advanced into the Swat valley, within 90 miles of the capital Islamabad, I argued against the doom sayers, saying Pakistan was not about to collapse. Now the Pakistani military has largely driven the Taliban from Swat and is preparing for an offensive in South Waziristan, home to much of the Taliban leadership. Drone strikes have successfully taken out many leaders, including Baitullah Mehsud (leading to this lovely ditty). Pakistan was not about to collapse then, and is not about to collapse or give up its nuclear weapons now. Pakistan's nuclear weapons are safe, and should not be used as a bureaucratic pawn in the strategic debate. I'm all for a vigorous debate on goals and strategies, but let's apply a few sober standards of logic to this strategic conversation.

India Wants Attention!

What with the elections, violence, reviews, and strategic discussions in Afghanistan, drone and ground attacks in Pakistan, visits by senators to Burma, and even remembrances of how Ted Kennedy helped found Bangladesh, India is the odd South Asian country out in terms of news coverage lately.

What's a poor second-largest-country-on-Earth to do to get back in the headlines?

You could try having a well-respected former External Afairs minister, Jaswant Singh, get kicked out of his party for simply suggesting in a book that Pakistan's founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, wasn't the worst person ever. The BJP party, India's leading opposition, is now in turmoil as different factions support or oppose Singh.

If that's not enough, try scrambling a fighter jet to intercept a civilian airliner that had the wrong radio identifier.

Or you could make everyone nervous by re-hashing old battles about nuclear weapons tests, including having hard-liners suggest that more nuclear tests are necessary. Those always help with regional stability. Indian nuclear scientist K. Santhanam declared that India's 1998 nuclear tests were intended to have a much larger yield. The H-bomb test especially, was a "fizzle." He was, of course, refuted by former President A. P. J. Abdul Kalam, of the BJP, as well as the current defense ministry. As Arms Control Wonk points out, it's pretty common knowledge among the nuclear nerd community that the H-bomb test fizzled, so why bring it up again now? Apparently Santhanam is worried that India might sign the Comprehensive nuclear Test Ban Treaty and didn't want that to happen.

Of course Pakistan didn't want to be outdone in the nuclear crazy department, so they responded by releasing nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan, who ran a nuclear smuggling ring selling Pakistani knowledge and technology all over the world, from even his previous minimal house arrest.

South Asia has plenty of problems folks. Is a little restraint and common sense on nuclear issues really too much to ask?

Clarification on India's Nuclear Submarine

I've received comments from both friends and strangers about my post on India's new nuclear submarine, so allow me to clarify a few points.

First, I am totally in favor of India's right to defend itself. Whether this third leg of its nuclear triad is aimed at deterring Pakistan or China, it is clearly intended as a second-strike capability, especially given India's proclaimed no-first-use nuclear doctrine.

My argument is that launching its nuclear submarine now, with great fanfare, has the potential to make India less secure, since Pakistan will clearly become even more nervous and paranoid (Pakistan said the Indian sub is "detrimental to regional peace and security" you say?) and be less likely to focus on the biggest threat to both Pakistan and India at the moment, the militants. If any bystander were asked to come up with India's enemy she would name Pakistan, so how is calling a submarine the "destroyer of enemies" supposed to sound to Pakistan? Why not the INS Peacemaker? The INS Gandhi? Although it is intended as a second strike, it can hit from 700 km away with either conventional or nuclear K-15 missiles. It's not a zero-sum game; Indians need to think how they would react if they were Pakistan, and make decisions accordingly.

Second, I too applaud India's restraint in (not) responding to the Mumbai attacks. Previous Indian administrations would have had, at a minimum, massive military build-ups, and some of my friends and colleagues could have written a trilogy of books on India-Pakistan crises (together with the 1999 Kargil crisis and the 2001-2 standoff). Again, my point was to call for more restraint, and the wisdom that should help facilitate a peaceful rise to India's place as a great regional and someday world power. Acting like an 800-pound gorilla, as some previous U.S. administrations have demonstrated, only makes everyone go bananas. Far better to remain wise, prudent, and restrained, and increase your power and capabilities softly, humbly, and with carefully calculated timing.

India Launches a "Non-Aggressive" Nuclear Submarine

Over the weekend India launched its first domestically-built nuclear-powered submarine, one capable of carrying K-15 ballistic missiles with a range of at least 700km.

Certainly the INS Arihant (or "Destroyer of Enemies") represents a technological breakthrough for India, but why launch it now, just as peace talks with Pakistan are resuming over Kashmir? Pakistanis are paranoid enough about India; one Pakistani journalist, Ahmed Quraishi, commented on one of my posts that India was paying Baitullah Mehsud to attack Pakistani nuclear facilities so that they would look vulnerable and the United States would pressure Pakistan to get rid of them. Following the old rule that if you go out of your way to say what something is not, it usually is that ("it's not your father's Oldsmobile"), Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated that "We don't have any aggressive designs nor do we seek to threaten anyone."

India needs to be smart as it seeks to become a great power. The capability to build nuclear-powered submarines puts it in a league with the United States, Russia, France, Great Britain, and China. It is a rising power both in the region and the world, but its inferiority complex regarding Pakistan is holding it back and making it look petty. Just as Pakistan needs to acknowledge that its biggest threat is the militants, India needs to recognize that the only thing it has to fear from Pakistan are Mumbai-style attacks from militants, and the more it threatens Pakistan the less resources Pakistan will be willing to spend on fighting those same militants, be they LeT or Taliban.

Part of being a great power is showing restraint, wisdom, and timing. Those are lessons India has yet to learn.

What on Earth is Bruce Riedel Thinking?

Bruce Riedel is, by all accounts, a pretty smart guy. He's been a South Asia hand for the CIA, is a Senior Fellow at Brookings, and led one of President Obama's multiple Afghanistan-Pakistan reviews this past spring. Hopefully he gives better advice to the President, because the article he wrote for The National Interest is useless at best, damaging at worst.

In short he describes what would happen if the Taliban or other Islamic extremists took over Pakistan. He paints a grim scenario: Pakistan's embassies around the world used as terrorist bases, nuclear launches on Israel, Pakistan's Shia minority turning to Iran for help, war with India, etc.

It would be bad, no doubt. The statement is about as surprising as the recent pronouncementt that al-Qaeda would use nuclear weapons if it obtained them (a subject Riedel somehow barely addresses). Yet Riedel dangerously and surprisingly (for a former CIA analyst) devotes little attention to the probability of such an event occurring, stating only that,

A jihadist victory is neither imminent nor inevitable, but it is now a real possibility in the foreseeable future. This essay presumes (though does not predict) an Islamic-militant victory in Pakistan, examining how the country’s creation of and collusion with extremist groups has left Islamabad vulnerable to an Islamist coup.

It would be pretty bad if the Taliban took over North Dakota (home to quite a few nuclear weapons) too, but I don't see it as very likely.

Riedel then outlines quite a few events that would have to occur for the Taliban to take control: aligning with Kasmiri militant groups, defeating the MQM (moderate Muslim party based in the Sindh province), defeating the military (!), the Pashtun Taliban taking over the populous Punjabi region of the country, kicking out the military's current leadership, etc. None of those scenarios (with the possible exception of the first) is remotely likely.

In fact, I see the opposite happening. The Pakistani military is going after the Pakistani Taliban hard, and the Taliban is getting even more frustrated. Various leaders of the Taliban are disagreeing with each other, to the point of assassination. No matter how unpopular the United States is, will bombing Pakistani civilians make them more likely to support the Taliban? Will bombing mosques make Pakistanis more likely to attend?

The vast majority of Pakistanis are moderate and fairly modern, and becoming more so every year. They go to the mosque, but also enjoy a little Johnny Walker Black Label in the privacy of their own homes (political and military leaders included). The country is in a tough place, no doubt, but I believe the trend lines go in the right direction. Mr. Riedel should be more careful what he says and writes.

Walking the Iranian Balance Beam

Lots of good stuff to read on Iran, perhaps too much... much like clicking on the #Iranelection feed on Twitter. So far I think President Obama is doing an excellent job of walking the fine line between expressing support for democracy and not being seen as meddling or taking sides.

First read the op-ed in the New York Times from an anonymous Iranian student, who states that all our outside opinions, beliefs, and assumptions about Iran are likely to be at best outdated and at worst dead wrong. As both the student and Walt point out, even if a recount or re-vote occurs and Mousavi is declared the winner that doesn't necessarily mean a more pro-U.S. government or one that will stop pursuing nuclear weapons.

Also check out Tom Ricks' post about how the current situation reminds him of the aborted Hungarian revolution in 1956. Although my memories of Budapest are entirely from history books and The Company I had the same thought, and would hate to egg on the protests into a revolution with veiled promises of support only to leave the protesters holding their limp... lets just say empty handed and alone.

Cybersecurity is Useless...

...if we continue to make human errors like this one. Apparently we published a "highly classified" list of nuclear sites online, in "an online newsletter devoted to issues of federal secrecy." (emphasis mine).

We can have the best security procedures and safeguards in the world, but it can't make up for human beings making stupid decisions like this, or flying nuclear weapons around by accident. As the saying goes, we have to get it right every time, the terrorists just have to get it right, or be lucky, once.

North Korean Tests

My reaction to North Korea conducting another nuclear test and launching a few short range missiles? "Eh? Who cares?"

Not that I want North Korea (or anyone for that matter) setting off nuclear devices, but we didn't learn anything from this. Did we know North Korea had nuclear weapons, and that they didn't work very well? Of course. The last test was kind of a fizzle, this one was less so. It's like if you shank a golf shot and drop another ball on the same spot, your second hit is usually better. But in this case it wasn't even all that much better/bigger. It wasn't a shank into the woods and then a shot onto the green, it was a shank and then a weak hit into the rough. And the missiles it launched weren't ICBMs, those don't work, the were glorified bottle rockets. I'd be scared if I lived in Seoul, but not much more so because of the recent tests.

My read is that this is Kim Jong-Il tring to hold on to power, demonstrate that he is still alive, and make his generals happy. He wants attention, so he is throwing a tantrum like a two year old. The best reaction would be for us to shrug our shoulders. Sure, a UN Security Council resolution is a good idea, because that's what you do, but it won't accomplish much unless China wants to start playing hardball. But until then, ignore the tantrum and put Kim Jong-Il on a timeout.

Weekend South Asia News Briefs

A lot happening in South Asia in the past few days. For those not paying close attention:

Good news:

1) Big win by the Congress party in Indian elections.

1A) Very positive response by Indian business community/stock market.

2) Tamil Tigers give up in Sri Lanka.

Bad news:

3) Thousands more internally displaced by Pakistan's "major offensive" against the Taliban.

4) Reports that Pakistan is producing new nuclear weapons as fast as possible. 

My thoughts:

1) A stronger government should enable India to make more progress and have to spend less time trying to keep far flung partners--such as the communist parties in the last parliament--in the coalition. Clearly the Indian people and investors seem to agree with the decision.

2) The conflict wasn't going to end well, so better that it end quickly. The Tigers had been one of the most brutal groups in the world during the civil war. They certainly popularized--if not invented--suicide bombing as a large scale technique, and in the most recent stand off they took hundreds of thousands of civilians as human shields/hostages. Now hopefully the world will send in help to deal with the humanitarian crisis.

3) Another humanitarian crisis. This one won't end quickly, nor is there a natural geography to chase the "rebels" into. Hopefully some of the U.S. aid will get there quickly--and not be diverted for other purposes.

4) Frankly I don't understand the logic. Why on earth would Pakistan need MORE nuclear weapons? The 80-100 they are assumed to have aren't enough to destroy India? Who are they planning on nuking or deterring? Or perhaps it's part of a plan to rely more on nuclear deterrence in order to pull more troops off the Indian border. We'll see. Based in Zardari's appearance on last week's Meet the Press I'd say it's another attempt to consolidate domestic support by appearing strong and attempting the classic Pakistani game of blaming others for your problems. 

Experts on Pakistani Nuclear Weapons

Check out the New York Times' article where they asked experts what to do about the potential for Pakistan's nuclear weapons to fall into the hands of the Taliban or another extremist group. Highlights:

From Rolf Mowatt-Larssen:

Pakistani nuclear weapons fall under the control of the military, which is the most professional, disciplined and competent institution in the country. It takes nuclear security extremely seriously, and will surely adopt heightened measures to protect these weapons.... In assuring the security of nuclear weapons in Pakistan, we should remind ourselves that the insider threat is the key wild card.

Karin von Hippel:

[T]wo other, less extreme scenarios also cause serious concern. The first would be yet another military coup, potentially led by junior officers with sympathy for the Islamist militants.... The second nightmare scenario would be continued state disintegration, resulting in competing militias, terrorist groups and criminal gangs in charge of most of Pakistan’s provinces and territories, with the government exercising only nominal control over parts of the capital city and — maybe — some of the nuclear weapons.

To enhance diplomatic, development and military efforts, the U.S. government should support an extensive countrywide campaign that personalizes the victims and the heroes, telling the stories of those who were butchered by the Taliban and those who successfully resisted.

Danielle Pletka:

These problems aren’t going to be solved by having special envoys with better titles, or subcontracting American defense to Saudi Arabia. We need clear indications of long term American commitment to the region, training and equipping of the Pakistani military, and effectively integrated military and aid programs.

Ellen Laipson:

But a security breakdown at the nuclear facilities and total takeover of the state by the Taliban are exceedingly low probability scenarios, and should not be the main focus of American attention and concern. Rather, we still need to devote time and effort to building trust in our long-term intentions, and avoid antagonizing Pakistan’s tense leadership.

Parag Khanna:

If the recent protests against Talibanization rippling across continent are any indication, the secular elites are becoming quite vocal. This sliver of the population together with Pakistan’s wealthy diaspora could play an influential role in restoring unity among Pakistan’s many factions.

The consensus seems to be that there is a VERY low probability of the Taliban taking over the country or controlling nuclear weapons, at least without inside help. Pakistan does need a lot of assistance and a lot of work, but the nightmare scenarios are, as I've said all along, not imminent.

Another Fizzle: Best Possible Outcome on North Korea?

Yes, North Korea defied United Nations regulations and test-fired a multi-stage Taepodong-2 missile over the weekend. Yes, North Korea has some nuclear weapons capability. Yes, if the missile test had been successful it could potentially have reached Alaska or Hawaii. But it wasn't successful; the second stage didn't fire fully and the third stage not at all, leaving the hyped satellite in "subaquatic orbit" as a commenter from the wonderful geeks at Arms Control Wonk put it (the image is also from ACW).

Before the launch the debate ran rampant among the nonproliferation policy community about how to respond to the launch. Some advocated using either U.S. or Japanese resources to shoot it down in midflight, to the point that Kim Jong-Il stated that such actions would lead to war. South Korea shouted about how scared they were, but an ICBM isn't at all necessary to hit South Korea, so the test shouldn't seem any more threatening.

The failed launch can be considered the best possible outcome. Since 2006 North Korea now has two highly-publicized missile launch failures (the 2006 test after only 35 seconds) and a largely failed nuclear test. Why should that scare anyone, particularly the United States (Joseph Cirincione argues this at length)? Miniaturizing a nuclear device to fit on a warhead is quite difficult, and North Korea would be hard pressed to do it in a decade. Even then, given their track record, what are the odds that all three stages of an ICBM and a miniaturized warhead would work?

As Fred Kaplan argues, making a big deal about a missile launch that ultimately failed was the action of a weak state, not a strong one, and President Obama should not play North Korea's game. Frankie Sturm agrees, calling for managing North Korea's brinksmanship. John Bolton calls the launch a win for North Korea and says Obama is weak, but considering he worked for an administration with the least diplomatic success in the past 50 years, whose actions (or lack thereof) allowed North Korea to reprocess plutonium and test a nuclear device I take that as a good sign.

President Obama has demonstrated his leadership by not spending too much energy on a UN resolution, and instead focusing on the larger real nonproliferation issues, including a call for global nuclear disarmament in Sunday's speech. As the New York Times stated, again echoing me,

It is a strategy based on the idea that if the United States shows it is willing to greatly shrink the size of its atomic arsenal, ban nuclear testing and cut off the worldwide production of bomb material, reluctant allies and partners around the world will be more likely to rewrite nuclear treaties and enforce sanctions against North Korea and Iran.

My Letter to the Editor of the NYT

Since the New York Times continues to believe that it comes up with its ideas all by itself, without any help from me, it refused to publish my letter to the editor about their editorial, "Watershed Moment on Nuclear Arms." Luckily for me, and you, I have this blog, so I can publish it myself:

To the Editor:

I wholeheartedly embrace your call in Wednesday’s editorial [“Watershed Moment on Nuclear Arms”] for setting a goal of reducing the U.S. nuclear arsenal to 1,000 deployed warheads by 2012. But that move can be made unilaterally in the Nuclear Posture Review, due by the end of the year, without any reduction in our deterrence capabilities. A replacement for START could be discussed concurrently or subsequently, but the announcement of the move need not wait for negotiators. The reduction would send a powerful message not just to Russia and nuclear aspirants like North Korea and Iran, as you mention, but establish the United States as a credible leader in the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world as we move toward the 2010 conference to renegotiate the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and attempt to create a solution that includes nuclear-armed India and Pakistan.

Robin J. Walker

Washington, DC

Dearth of Pakistani Leadership

Whenever one of my grad school professors, a retired Pakistani Brigadier, would discuss Pakistan he would say "I reserve the right to come in here tomorrow and tell you that everything I said yesterday is wrong" because facts change and events happen just that fast in Pakistan. With that caveat, here is my current take on Pakistani leadership.

President Asif Ali Zardari is the widower of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who took over the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) when his wife was assassinated after her return to Pakistan in December 2007. He is both corrupt, having been known as Mr. Ten Percent for the amount he supposedly embezzled when his wife was Prime Minister, and weak, having backed down several times during his rule.

Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif leads the egotistically-named Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz). He was deposed in a coup in 1999 following the failed attempt to use militants to take over part of Kashmir, which led to the Kargil War. Reportedly when briefed at the front on the operation his only question was "which way is India?" He is clearly shrewd, but his beliefs are eclectic. He is a populist leader who ordered the 1998 nuclear tests and has partnered with various religious groups and political parties, and once called for a return to Islamic law in Pakistan. At the same time he was close to the Clinton administration, so it is difficult to know how reliable an ally he might be now. He has led and won the populist push to reinstate the sacked Supreme Court Chief Justice, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry.

Zardari and Sharif are longtime rivals, but the only thing they hated more than each other was former President General Pervez Musharraf. Now that Musharraf has been forced out they are going head to head, and Zardari has blinked twice, allowing Sharif out of house arrest and agreeing to reinstate Chaudhry, who will almost certainly revers the decision to bar Sharif and his brother from running for office. Zardari's days as leader of Pakistan seem doomed.

The wild card is General Ashfaq Kayani, Musharraf's hand-picked successor as Army Chief. Although the United States is a strong proponent of democracy, military participation in politics is seen as normal in Pakistan. With Zardari ineffective bordering on incompetent, and Sharif with troubling ties to the very militants we are fighting, should the United States consider the possible advantaged of military rule in Pakistan?

Election for Head of IAEA

Elections to see who will replace Egyptian Mohamed ElBaradei as the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency are at a stalemate so far, locked between Japan's Yukiya Amano and South Africa's Abdul Samad Minty. Although I don't know much about either of the candidates themselves, I believe the choice would result in quite different directions for the IAEA.

A Japanese minister would likely be more concerned with countries interested in developing nuclear weapons capabilities, most prominently North Korea and Iran, and would take a hard line approach with them. For this reason Amano is preferred by the United States. The Bush Administration was frequently frustrated b ElBaradei's more diplomatic and nuanced approach toward Iran and North Korea.

A South African like Minty would probably be more focused on the goal of reducing existing levels of nuclear weapons and arms control measures. South Africa is the only country to have totally given up nuclear weapons (albeit partly because the white apartheid government didn't want to see their black successors have nuclear weapons), and remains a strong player in the Non-Aligned Movement, which actually expressed support for Iran's efforts to achieve nuclear power (though not weapons).

At a conference on over-the-horizon nuclear proliferation I helped run in 2007 a scholar suggested that one thing that might drive South Africa to re-develop nuclear weapons would be to express frustration at the state of the arms control/nonproliferation community, and potentially use them as a bargaining chip for future international treaties. (note, he didn't say this was likely, just possible).

All of this will have a profound impact on the focus and possible success of the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty renegotiation. This is one of those small decisions that could have a big impact on world events in the years to come.

New York Times Follows My Lead

Today's New York Times addresses the same topic I wrote about a month ago and draws largely the same conclusion: the United States should set a goal of reducing its nuclear arsenal to 1,000 deployed warheads as an example to other current and potentially nuclear-weapons powers.

Mr. Bush and then-President Vladimir Putin signed only one arms-control agreement in eight years. It allowed both sides to keep between 1,700 and 2,200 deployed warheads. Further cuts — 1,000 each makes sense for the next phase — would send a clear message to Iran, North Korea and other wannabes that the world’s two main nuclear powers are placing less value on nuclear weapons.

I won't go in to a Colbert-esque rant about "who's snubbing me now" but it is nice to have gotten there first. The Times focuses more on Russia, North Korea, and Iran and fails to address the example it would set for India and Pakistan, especially in advance of the 2010 NPT conference. Next time their editorial board should call me for my opinion!

Steinberg Discusses U.S.-India Nuclear Deal

Yesterday at Brookings Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg discussed the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal and the future of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), saying:

"Both the United States and India have the responsibility to help to craft a strengthened NPT regime to foster safe, affordable nuclear power to help the globe's energy and environment needs, while assuring against the spread of nuclear weapons."

No, it's nothing earth shattering and in fact is pretty standard language, but it's the first major comments on the Deal from the new administration. As senators both President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton voted for the deal last September with little comment, but since then little progress has been made. Both Russia and France--taking advantage of last year's waiver for India by the Nuclear Suppliers' Group--already have designated sites in India where they will build nuclear power plants. No U.S. companies currently have been assigned sites for a plant. I don't expect any action on that front until after the Indian elections, since any interaction with the U.S. government makes political headlines in India, but we should note that France and Russia are getting a head start.

Steinberg's comment itself is of course right on point. It will be interesting to see if the Administration starts dropping more comments to try to smooth the way for progress in the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference.

Obama's Nuclear Leadership Opportunity

This piece was originally posted at The Moderate Voice:

http://themoderatevoice.com/26749/obama’s-nuclear-leadership-opportunity/

Obama’s Nuclear Leadership Opportunity

February 26th, 2009 By Guest Voice

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The Truman National Security Project bills itself as “the nation’s only organization that recruits, trains, and positions a new generation of progressives across America to lead on national security.” The following essay (the first in a series for TMV) is from Robin Walker, a Project fellow. As with other “guest voice” posts, this and future contributions from the Truman Project do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the TMV editorial board or writers.

By Robin Walker, Truman National Security Project

Of the various challenges President Obama mentioned in his Tuesday evening address to Congress — two wars, a housing crisis, energy, healthcare, education, the deficit, etc. — one challenge got little attention but represents an opportunity for serious progress: nuclear weapons.

By law the President has to produce a new Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) by the end of 2009. If properly handled, the NPR could improve our security, reduce the deficit, improve the United States’ standing in the world, and increase security in one of the most dangerous regions of the world, South Asia.

The 2001 NPR set a fairly aggressive goal of reducing the U.S. nuclear arsenal from Cold War levels down to a range of 1,700 to 2,200 warheads by 2012. President Obama could set a nuclear agenda as aggressive as his campaign rhetoric by establishing a new goal of 1,500 or even 1,000 warheads in that timeframe, which would in turn establish the United States as a leader toward a world of the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons, ideally zero. Leading by example would encourage the rest of the world to reduce or at least stop enlarging their nuclear arsenals. The United States and the international community could take additional steps to increase both the security and reliability of established nuclear powers’ arsenals, hopefully reducing the need for backup weapons.

The longstanding India-Pakistan rivalry is frequently described as the most likely nuclear war scenario in the modern world. Since both countries demonstrated their nuclear capabilities with tests in 1998, three crises have narrowly averted escalating to the level of nuclear exchanges: the 1999 Kargil war; the 2001-2 military buildup; and the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai. Anything the United States can do to minimize the risk of these countries using nuclear weapons is clearly in the interest of the United States and the international community.

Pakistan feels threatened by India’s overwhelming size and conventional military superiority. Current estimates of Pakistan’s arsenal range from 65 to 110 nuclear warheads. Command and control of Pakistan’s weapons is shaky, and one scholar even reported that Pakistani leaders contemplated giving command of one or more nuclear weapons to Taliban-controlled Afghanistan as a hedge against India during the 1999 war. Pakistani leaders also believe the recent U.S.-India nuclear deal will allow India to produce many more nuclear warheads, thus prompting Pakistani leaders to feel they need to “catch up.”

India has stated policies of “no first use” and “minimum credible deterrence,” in other words, a robust second-strike capability. It is unclear just what quantity of warheads is needed for such a capability: 50? 100? 300? Recent estimates put India’s arsenal in the range of 70 to 120 warheads, which will likely increase as India continues to experiment with submarine-launched nuclear weapons. India has overwhelming conventional and nuclear superiority over Pakistan; establishing and declaring a limit would not reduce that edge but would provide some measure of stability for the region.

India wants to be a great power and a leader in the region. The United States needs to re-establish its image as a force for good in the world after eight years of the Bush Administration. President Obama should set an example by ordering aggressive reductions of the U.S. nuclear arsenal in the 2009 NPR, and work to leverage that good example to get India and Pakistan to declare and implement limits to their own nuclear arsenals.