Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Haven't I Refuted This Before?

Seymour Hersh has an article in The New Yorker asking the tired questions of whether Pakistan's nuclear weapons are safe from capture by al-Qaeda or the Taliban. He asserts that because militants have attacked well-defended Pakistani military facilities, other well-defended facilities, including nuclear locations, could be in danger.

If I'm not mistaken a well-defended U.S. military facility, Fort Hood, was just attacked by someone with insider knowledge of security and facilities, but that doesn't mean that anyone outside of Hollywood screenwriters think U.S. nuclear facilities are likely to be attacked or captured by militants. Indian Maoist naxalite militants have attacked government facilities, but no one worries publicly about the security of India's nuclear weapons. Hersh argues that components are most vulnerable when they are being moved. Hmm, you mean like when nuclear parts are accidentally flown across the country, or mistakenly delivered to Taiwan? Didn't the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force get fired for those mistakes not too long ago? Let's discuss reality here.

Once again, yes, Pakistan's government is unstable. President "Mr. Ten Percent" Zardari may well be forced out of office in the next six months, but that may well lead to increased stability in Pakistan, not less. The Pakistani military is considered a common player in Pakistani society and politics, and is perhaps the most stable element. The nuclear warheads are stored and secured separately from the triggers and the delivery systems, and the Pakistanis have developed extensive nuclear security systems.

If anything Pakistan seemed more unstable back in May, when the Taliban had famously crept within 90 miles of the capital, Islamabad. The New York Times ran a piece quoting various experts as saying the nuclear stockpile was safe. What has changed since then other than Sy Hersh decided this was a good sensational story to write? He dismisses all the expert opinions he finds that run contrary to his view, because "are Pakistan's nuclear weapons safe? Yes" would be a pretty boring article.

I imagine I or someone like me will have to refute some sensationalist account about terrorists and Pakistan's nuclear weapons every six months or so for at least several years to come. Of course it's a valid concern and one that should not be ignored, but it is also unlikely, and Pakistan should be given credit for protecting its arsenal.

India Wants Attention!

What with the elections, violence, reviews, and strategic discussions in Afghanistan, drone and ground attacks in Pakistan, visits by senators to Burma, and even remembrances of how Ted Kennedy helped found Bangladesh, India is the odd South Asian country out in terms of news coverage lately.

What's a poor second-largest-country-on-Earth to do to get back in the headlines?

You could try having a well-respected former External Afairs minister, Jaswant Singh, get kicked out of his party for simply suggesting in a book that Pakistan's founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, wasn't the worst person ever. The BJP party, India's leading opposition, is now in turmoil as different factions support or oppose Singh.

If that's not enough, try scrambling a fighter jet to intercept a civilian airliner that had the wrong radio identifier.

Or you could make everyone nervous by re-hashing old battles about nuclear weapons tests, including having hard-liners suggest that more nuclear tests are necessary. Those always help with regional stability. Indian nuclear scientist K. Santhanam declared that India's 1998 nuclear tests were intended to have a much larger yield. The H-bomb test especially, was a "fizzle." He was, of course, refuted by former President A. P. J. Abdul Kalam, of the BJP, as well as the current defense ministry. As Arms Control Wonk points out, it's pretty common knowledge among the nuclear nerd community that the H-bomb test fizzled, so why bring it up again now? Apparently Santhanam is worried that India might sign the Comprehensive nuclear Test Ban Treaty and didn't want that to happen.

Of course Pakistan didn't want to be outdone in the nuclear crazy department, so they responded by releasing nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan, who ran a nuclear smuggling ring selling Pakistani knowledge and technology all over the world, from even his previous minimal house arrest.

South Asia has plenty of problems folks. Is a little restraint and common sense on nuclear issues really too much to ask?

Clarification on India's Nuclear Submarine

I've received comments from both friends and strangers about my post on India's new nuclear submarine, so allow me to clarify a few points.

First, I am totally in favor of India's right to defend itself. Whether this third leg of its nuclear triad is aimed at deterring Pakistan or China, it is clearly intended as a second-strike capability, especially given India's proclaimed no-first-use nuclear doctrine.

My argument is that launching its nuclear submarine now, with great fanfare, has the potential to make India less secure, since Pakistan will clearly become even more nervous and paranoid (Pakistan said the Indian sub is "detrimental to regional peace and security" you say?) and be less likely to focus on the biggest threat to both Pakistan and India at the moment, the militants. If any bystander were asked to come up with India's enemy she would name Pakistan, so how is calling a submarine the "destroyer of enemies" supposed to sound to Pakistan? Why not the INS Peacemaker? The INS Gandhi? Although it is intended as a second strike, it can hit from 700 km away with either conventional or nuclear K-15 missiles. It's not a zero-sum game; Indians need to think how they would react if they were Pakistan, and make decisions accordingly.

Second, I too applaud India's restraint in (not) responding to the Mumbai attacks. Previous Indian administrations would have had, at a minimum, massive military build-ups, and some of my friends and colleagues could have written a trilogy of books on India-Pakistan crises (together with the 1999 Kargil crisis and the 2001-2 standoff). Again, my point was to call for more restraint, and the wisdom that should help facilitate a peaceful rise to India's place as a great regional and someday world power. Acting like an 800-pound gorilla, as some previous U.S. administrations have demonstrated, only makes everyone go bananas. Far better to remain wise, prudent, and restrained, and increase your power and capabilities softly, humbly, and with carefully calculated timing.

India Launches a "Non-Aggressive" Nuclear Submarine

Over the weekend India launched its first domestically-built nuclear-powered submarine, one capable of carrying K-15 ballistic missiles with a range of at least 700km.

Certainly the INS Arihant (or "Destroyer of Enemies") represents a technological breakthrough for India, but why launch it now, just as peace talks with Pakistan are resuming over Kashmir? Pakistanis are paranoid enough about India; one Pakistani journalist, Ahmed Quraishi, commented on one of my posts that India was paying Baitullah Mehsud to attack Pakistani nuclear facilities so that they would look vulnerable and the United States would pressure Pakistan to get rid of them. Following the old rule that if you go out of your way to say what something is not, it usually is that ("it's not your father's Oldsmobile"), Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated that "We don't have any aggressive designs nor do we seek to threaten anyone."

India needs to be smart as it seeks to become a great power. The capability to build nuclear-powered submarines puts it in a league with the United States, Russia, France, Great Britain, and China. It is a rising power both in the region and the world, but its inferiority complex regarding Pakistan is holding it back and making it look petty. Just as Pakistan needs to acknowledge that its biggest threat is the militants, India needs to recognize that the only thing it has to fear from Pakistan are Mumbai-style attacks from militants, and the more it threatens Pakistan the less resources Pakistan will be willing to spend on fighting those same militants, be they LeT or Taliban.

Part of being a great power is showing restraint, wisdom, and timing. Those are lessons India has yet to learn.

Drinking From the Fire Hose: U.S.-India 3.0

Secretary of State Clinton is in India this week and announced, as expected, that relations with India are a priority and are going to be ramped up and become less formal; "U.S-India 3.0" is how Clinton described it.

MORE attention? That's great, but U.S. policymakers need to move more slowly. Perhaps the less formal relations will improve the process, but India, despite a huge population, has a limited number of bureaucrats and can make progress on only so many issues at a time. The agenda for Clinton's trip included everything from climate change (where India pushed back), education, food security, nuclear energy, and space cooperation. Wow. No wonder a deal on end-use monitoring is still being negotiated at the last minute--South Block (the equivalent of India's State Department/Foggy Bottom) must have been working day and night just to read the briefings and proposals on all the other issues. The trip and the deals have barely made news here in the States, whereas in India they are front page news. The United States needs a little patience. It's not easy to drink from the Foggy Bottom fire hose.

123 AND 126? Mrs. Clinton Goes to Delhi

As I've acknowledged before, one of the few major foreign policy successes the Bush Administration can be given credit for is having taken the ball they were given by President Clinton's visit to India in 2000 and running with it, fast. The Bush Administration pushed the U.S.-India relationship far and fast, and now Secretary of State Clinton is headed to India to put the cherry on top of potentially two big agreements.

One of the key quotes from a participant at my 2007 U.S.-India track-two dialogue was "after 123 comes 126," meaning after the 123 nuclear waiver would come the potential sale of 126 F-16's to India. Now the Obama Administration is in a place to push both pieces over the goal line. The 123 waiver actually passed last year, but rumor has it that during this visit India will announce at least two nuclear power plant sites reserved for U.S. energy companies. That is big news, since both French and Russian companies already have deals in place.

The second big piece is the possible announcement of an end-use monitoring agreement, allowing the United States to start selling higher technology military equipment, like F-16's, to India. If they have come up with an agreement that would be quite a coup.

Work remains to be done. The United States and India need to get closer together on climate change, the Proliferation Security Initiative, potentially Kashmir, and nonproliferation discussions for next year. The Obama Administration should be thankful it was set up for success, proud of itself for completing the agreements, and not rest on its laurels.

Jones Visits AfPak (+ India)

Normally I praise former President George W. Bush only slightly more often than Kieth Olbermann (deservedly so; the very thin document produced in late 2008 on "The Accomplishments of the Bush Administration" makes hilarious dramatic reading while enjoying adult beverages with a few friends), but his administration did a good job of improving relations with India. Sort of.

I often get asked my opinion of the U.S.-India nuclear deal. I tell people it depends on which half of my brain you're asking. The nonproliferation side says it's horrible; we didn't get anything, even a testing moratorium, and set a terrible precedent. The South Asia-loving side of my brain says the Bush Administration did a good job of winning Indian support by trading something now for a "player-to-be-named-later." Not a specific card to trade in, because I don't believe India is an automatic ally we have bought, but the effort we put into getting the Deal through has paid big dividends in terms of U.S. soft power in India.

Apparently the Obama Administration agrees. National Security Advisor General James Jones visited India (after a stop in Pakistan) and met with Indian National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan, saying he hoped to build on the successes of the Bush Administration. It doesn't seem that Jones was forceful during his meetings in either Pakistan or India. He did not pressure India to re-start negotiations on Kashmir. Oddly, many Pakistani bloggers and Twitterers seem to believe that Jones' visit was designed to negotiate a massive deployment of Indian troops into Afghanistan.

Many of the best South Asia hands from the Bush Administration are still around, including Donald Camp advising on India. I'm glad the Obama Administration continues to recognize good people and build on progress made by the other party.

What on Earth is Bruce Riedel Thinking?

Bruce Riedel is, by all accounts, a pretty smart guy. He's been a South Asia hand for the CIA, is a Senior Fellow at Brookings, and led one of President Obama's multiple Afghanistan-Pakistan reviews this past spring. Hopefully he gives better advice to the President, because the article he wrote for The National Interest is useless at best, damaging at worst.

In short he describes what would happen if the Taliban or other Islamic extremists took over Pakistan. He paints a grim scenario: Pakistan's embassies around the world used as terrorist bases, nuclear launches on Israel, Pakistan's Shia minority turning to Iran for help, war with India, etc.

It would be bad, no doubt. The statement is about as surprising as the recent pronouncementt that al-Qaeda would use nuclear weapons if it obtained them (a subject Riedel somehow barely addresses). Yet Riedel dangerously and surprisingly (for a former CIA analyst) devotes little attention to the probability of such an event occurring, stating only that,

A jihadist victory is neither imminent nor inevitable, but it is now a real possibility in the foreseeable future. This essay presumes (though does not predict) an Islamic-militant victory in Pakistan, examining how the country’s creation of and collusion with extremist groups has left Islamabad vulnerable to an Islamist coup.

It would be pretty bad if the Taliban took over North Dakota (home to quite a few nuclear weapons) too, but I don't see it as very likely.

Riedel then outlines quite a few events that would have to occur for the Taliban to take control: aligning with Kasmiri militant groups, defeating the MQM (moderate Muslim party based in the Sindh province), defeating the military (!), the Pashtun Taliban taking over the populous Punjabi region of the country, kicking out the military's current leadership, etc. None of those scenarios (with the possible exception of the first) is remotely likely.

In fact, I see the opposite happening. The Pakistani military is going after the Pakistani Taliban hard, and the Taliban is getting even more frustrated. Various leaders of the Taliban are disagreeing with each other, to the point of assassination. No matter how unpopular the United States is, will bombing Pakistani civilians make them more likely to support the Taliban? Will bombing mosques make Pakistanis more likely to attend?

The vast majority of Pakistanis are moderate and fairly modern, and becoming more so every year. They go to the mosque, but also enjoy a little Johnny Walker Black Label in the privacy of their own homes (political and military leaders included). The country is in a tough place, no doubt, but I believe the trend lines go in the right direction. Mr. Riedel should be more careful what he says and writes.

Cricket the Uniter!

I was in New Delhi, India in September 2007 for the finals of the inaugural Twenty20 (a roughly 3-hour version of cricket, as opposed to the multi-day test matches) World Cup, gathered around the TV in the bar in the basement of the ITC Maurya hotel watching India defeat arch rival Pakistan, celebrating with everyone present long into the night, and the boisterous mood throughout the city for the next several days.

Now Pakistan has won the second Twenty20 World Cup, defeating Sri Lanka mere months after the Sri Lankan team was attacked in Lahore, Pakistan. Pakistan was scheduled to host the 2011 World Cup, but will not due to security concerns. So far the celebrations seem to be enthusiastic and peaceful. Any act or excuse that causes Pakistanis to become closer and see themselves as a united body should help to defeat the Taliban and other extremists. Hopefully this victory can serve as a unifying rallying cry for Pakistani moderates.

(Photo from Telegraph.co.uk)

The Genius of The Economist

I'm always amazed at how the authors of The Economist can sum up the facts, salient points, arguments, and options that would take a typical graduate student (some of my friends included) a whole Master's thesis to go over. For example, check out Asia columnist Banyan's take on Indian Ocean naval competition between India and China in the June 13th issue. It's the most concise take on the "string-of-pearls" theory I've read yet. 

One Armed Economist...

With respect to President Harry Truman...

On the one hand, the decision by a Pakistani court to release Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, the founder of Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist group and alleged mastermind of the Mumbai attacks, is remarkably unproductive for both counter terrorism activities and Pakistan-India relations.

On the other hand the court ruled that the arrest of Saeed and his three colleagues violated Pakistan's already fragile constitution. Any decision that strengthens the secular judicial system at this point in Pakistan is a welcome step. 

I'm not sure how Pakistan's double jeopardy laws work, but I do wish that information/intelligence/evidence sharing between Pakistan, India, and the United States had been a little better so that Saeed could have been brought to justice with sufficient evidence to properly charge him with his crimes. 

New York Times Editorial on India

Someone at the Times' editorial board must be reading my blog. They published an editorial today calling for India to step up to its responsibilities as the world power they are striving to become.I've I've been saying that for some time now. The article appropriately calls for India to examine how its posture is viewed in Pakistan, and communicate better, especially about its activities in rebuilding Afghanistan. 

India has played a constructive role in helping rebuild Afghanistan, but it must take steps to allay Islamabad’s concerns that this is a plan to encircle Pakistan. It should foster regional trade with Pakistan and Afghanistan. 

Easier said than done of course. It's all well and good for the Times to call for India to initiate arms control talks with Pakistan and China and reach out for a solution on Kashmir. Israel should find a way to make peace with the Palestinians too, but it's just not that easy. Yes, India needs to step it up. But how about an article echoing my point about how focusing on Pakistan keeps India from achieving greatness? Follow me there, New York Times. 

Weekend South Asia News Briefs

A lot happening in South Asia in the past few days. For those not paying close attention:

Good news:

1) Big win by the Congress party in Indian elections.

1A) Very positive response by Indian business community/stock market.

2) Tamil Tigers give up in Sri Lanka.

Bad news:

3) Thousands more internally displaced by Pakistan's "major offensive" against the Taliban.

4) Reports that Pakistan is producing new nuclear weapons as fast as possible. 

My thoughts:

1) A stronger government should enable India to make more progress and have to spend less time trying to keep far flung partners--such as the communist parties in the last parliament--in the coalition. Clearly the Indian people and investors seem to agree with the decision.

2) The conflict wasn't going to end well, so better that it end quickly. The Tigers had been one of the most brutal groups in the world during the civil war. They certainly popularized--if not invented--suicide bombing as a large scale technique, and in the most recent stand off they took hundreds of thousands of civilians as human shields/hostages. Now hopefully the world will send in help to deal with the humanitarian crisis.

3) Another humanitarian crisis. This one won't end quickly, nor is there a natural geography to chase the "rebels" into. Hopefully some of the U.S. aid will get there quickly--and not be diverted for other purposes.

4) Frankly I don't understand the logic. Why on earth would Pakistan need MORE nuclear weapons? The 80-100 they are assumed to have aren't enough to destroy India? Who are they planning on nuking or deterring? Or perhaps it's part of a plan to rely more on nuclear deterrence in order to pull more troops off the Indian border. We'll see. Based in Zardari's appearance on last week's Meet the Press I'd say it's another attempt to consolidate domestic support by appearing strong and attempting the classic Pakistani game of blaming others for your problems. 

Indian Soft Power

If you have the time check out this thoughtful article on India's soft power by Sashi Tharoor, a candidate for India's Parliament. Tharoor has a good analysis of some of the sources of India's soft power, namely its multicultural traditions that are popular both regionally and worldwide. He describes India as not a melting pot like the United States but a collection of small dishes on a table, each with individual flavors and appeals.

In the information age, Joseph Nye has argued, it is often the side which has the better story that wins. India must remain the ‘land of the better story.’ 

Like any good politician, Tharoor helps his case by telling a good story about India's soft power. But for an article of this length he ignores other visions of soft power, like Josh Kurlantzick's book on China, Charm Offensive (or the chapter in my own thesis on India's soft power). He has no description of things Indian policymakers can do to either help build or utilize soft power.

To counter the terrorist threat, there is no substitute for hard power. Hard power without soft power stirs up resentments and enmities; soft power without hard power is a confession of weakness. Where soft power works is in attracting enough goodwill from ordinary people to reduce the sources of support and succour that the terrorists enjoy, and without which they cannot function.

Here Tharoor's vision of the utility of soft power is a little lacking. For the true hardened terrorist of course soft power will have no influence, but the attraction to a society or culture is one of the strongest tools for preventing potential terrorists from crossing over or being recruited. Furthermore, the indiscriminate and careless use of hard power can ultimately create more terrorists than it kills and be counterproductive, as demonstrated by some American air strikes along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. 

Response to Irfan on the Pakistani Mindset

Last week I wrote a post about my reactions to a Pakistani op-ed, and what I view as the Pakistani mindset. The author of that op-ed, Irfan Shahzad, was good enough to post a response. Unfortunately Irfan's response displayed all the anger and fear one might expect from someone in Pakistan today. My intention was to learn from and understand his perspective, and hopefully help him see the other side as well. I too would be terrified if the Pakistani Taliban had advanced to within 60 miles of the capital, and was openly inviting Osama bin Ladin and talking about imposing sharia on the United States.

My point about the Pakistani mindset is they seem to believe that nothing bad is their fault, it is always the fault of the Indians or the Americans (or both), not a failure of their leadership, or the fault of the militants. Irfan illustrates this point by stating that the United States and NATO allowed bin Ladin into Pakistan. I agree that more troops and a more comprehensive approach would have been better in 2001/2, as does almost every serious policymaker and scholar these days. It is a delusion that was common in Iraq as well, that the United States is all powerful, so if something bad happens (an IED, Osama bin Ladin escaping, a missile killing civilians) it is because the United States wanted it to happen and allowed it to happen.

Irfan, I recognize that you are scared and that bad things are happening. We are scared too, of extremists with nuclear weapons. Our countries need to help each other. I don't think General Patreaus simply stating that the militants are a bigger threat than India will make Pakistanis change their mind, only an honest self reflection of who is really threatening Pakistan can do that.

I will continue to read and interact with Pakistanis, and I hope Irfan and his colleagues will continue with a similar open mind. An invasion of Pakistan--or China, or Tajikistan--is not on the table of discussion. But we do need to work together to concentrate on the real threats facing Pakistan: militants and an incompetent leadership.

Is India Really Unhappy with Obama?

An Op-Ed in the New York Times declares that India is "Wary on Obama." Really? Yes, the U.S.-India "strategic partnership" could be considered George W. Bush's one foreign policy success, but to achieve that he had to punch large holes in some of the key nonproliferation agreements.

President Obama has gotten on India's bad side by talking about pushing for a permanent settlement on the Kashmir issue. He appointed a special envoy to South Asia, and India lobbied hard--and successfully--to not be under his jurisdiction with the "bad" countries of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Secretary of State Clinton talked extensively about the importance of China, but has barely mentioned India, and has not yet visited. Apparently India also felt snubbed that it was not one of the first congratulatory calls Obama returned.

The main area of dispute is that India fears that the Obama administration is returning to a regional South Asia policy rather than the "de-hyphenated" separate India and Pakistan policies Bush introduced. While I strongly support the de-hyphenation, the countries in the region do obviously have a major impact on each other, and to pretend otherwise would be naive. The Pakistani military is unwilling or unable to fight a successful counterinsurgency campaign against the militants threatening the country because it is designed to fight against India. Additionally Pakistan feels threatened by Indian involvement in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. India needs to act like the great power it aspires to be and recognize that its actions have both negative and positive effects in the region. Unfortunately whenever the subject of Pakistan comes up India goes back to its petty, juvenile posturing.

The first of India's five rounds of national elections started this week, and unlike in recent events such as the no-confidence vote that forced the ruling Congress party to scramble to retain its control, the U.S.-India nuclear deal--and by proxy the relationship with the United States--is not a major campaign issue. Obama does need to pay more attention to building the relationship with India, but no matter whether the Congress party retains the majority or the BJP takes over India is unlikely to turn sharply away from its closer ties with the United States.

Why Not Pressure India?

Special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke stopped by New Delhi, India this week after visits to Afghanistan and Pakistan, but said he was not pressuring India to resume talks over longer-term peace with Pakistan. The question is, why not? As Holbrooke stated, Islamic extremists threaten all three countries. One of the biggest problems is that Pakistan's military and leadership remains focused on preparing to fight India rather than on fighting the militants threatening its own stability. Only a settlement that makes Pakistan feel secure will allow it to refocus on the militants. Why not at least try for a settlement on Kashmir?

India is heavily involved in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, building infrastructure and numerous consulates. Pakistan feels threatened by this involvement, since it fears encirclement and has traditionally relied on Afghanistan for strategic depth. That's one reason why India's embassy in Kabul was bombed in July 2008 by a militant group linked to Pakistani intelligence.

When Holbrooke was named special envoy to the region, India lobbied hard to not be included under his jurisdiction, not wanting to be seen in the same boat as those troubled and militant-plagued countries. But really the lack of a Kashmir solution is hindering solutions. India and Pakistan came close to reaching an accord on their own. Why not at least get the two sides in a room again for a discussion?

Certainly India has valid concerns. Pakistani leadership is weak, and they may want to wait until a stronger leader comes into power before negotiating (although if Nawaz Sharif takes office it would almost certainly kill any deal). But a long-term solution on Kashmir is in everyone's interest. Why not at least try?

My Letter to the Editor of the NYT

Since the New York Times continues to believe that it comes up with its ideas all by itself, without any help from me, it refused to publish my letter to the editor about their editorial, "Watershed Moment on Nuclear Arms." Luckily for me, and you, I have this blog, so I can publish it myself:

To the Editor:

I wholeheartedly embrace your call in Wednesday’s editorial [“Watershed Moment on Nuclear Arms”] for setting a goal of reducing the U.S. nuclear arsenal to 1,000 deployed warheads by 2012. But that move can be made unilaterally in the Nuclear Posture Review, due by the end of the year, without any reduction in our deterrence capabilities. A replacement for START could be discussed concurrently or subsequently, but the announcement of the move need not wait for negotiators. The reduction would send a powerful message not just to Russia and nuclear aspirants like North Korea and Iran, as you mention, but establish the United States as a credible leader in the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world as we move toward the 2010 conference to renegotiate the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and attempt to create a solution that includes nuclear-armed India and Pakistan.

Robin J. Walker

Washington, DC

Preview of Afghanistan Review

The National Security Council's Afghanistan review will be release publicly tomorrow and was briefed to senior members of Congress today, so predictably some details are leaking out. Apparently at least 4,000 troops will be added (on top of the 17,000 already headed there) in order to train the Afghan military and police. Benchmarks will be a large component, and Obama will try, yet again, to convince Pakistan that their biggest threat is the militants, not India.

I'll run something more in depth when the document is actually out, but a few initial comments:

1) I hope the benchmarks are for the Afghan government on corruption, training, and governance issues. Coming up with counter terrorism benchmarks are next to impossible. As we've found with the Predator strikes, one dead terrorist/insurgent does not necessarily equal one less terrorist, especially if civilians are killed as well.

2) What will happen if (and I predict when) Afghanistan fails to meet the proposed benchmarks? Would we just leave? How will that leave us any different then our current situation?

3) I sure hope all the smart people in the Administration have put their big heads together and come up with something better than convincing Pakistan that India is not their biggest threat. That hasn't worked, and I have no reason to believe it will this time.

In related news, Friend Of The Blog Jim Arkedis discusses the decision to widen Predator drone missile strikes in Pakistan to include terrorist/insurgent groups that have only attacked within Pakistan, not Afghanistan. He seems to think it's an effort to buy Pakistan's loyalty. The term Global War on Terror may be officially dead, but terrorism, and insurgencies, are still a global enterprise.

Pakistani Government Aid to Militants

A front page article in Thursday's New York Times explores the support that Pakistan's government, specifically the S wing of the Inter-Service Intelligence, or ISI, is still providing to militant groups, including the Taliban, who are conducting attacks in Afghanistan. This support has continued despite repeated requests and high level visits from American and British officials.

These militant connections are partly to counter fears of Indian encirclement, since India has invested heavily in Afghan reconstruction, and most of the Pakistani military still sees India, not the militants, as their main threat and opponent, and Pakistan has a long history of using militants as proxy fighters against India, particularly in Kashmir. This connection fairly clearly led to the bombing of India's embassy in Kabul last summer.

A few key questions remain:

1) How closely was the ISI involved in last November's Mumbai attacks by Lashkar-e-Taiba? Was it just intelligence sharing and protection, as Pakistani officials claim, or was the whole thing a proxy attack planned by Pakistani military, or even civilian, leadership?

2) How deep do the connections between ISI and the militants run? Is it largely the work of a "few bad apples" who maintain their ties, or something much bigger?

3) What can the United States/coalition do to entice Pakistan to renounce support for these groups and leaders? Certainly just sending the Predator drones into Quetta and elsewhere in Baluchistan is possible (and being debated--watch for news of expanded strikes in the next few weeks), but is it worth the cost?