123 AND 126? Mrs. Clinton Goes to Delhi

As I've acknowledged before, one of the few major foreign policy successes the Bush Administration can be given credit for is having taken the ball they were given by President Clinton's visit to India in 2000 and running with it, fast. The Bush Administration pushed the U.S.-India relationship far and fast, and now Secretary of State Clinton is headed to India to put the cherry on top of potentially two big agreements.

One of the key quotes from a participant at my 2007 U.S.-India track-two dialogue was "after 123 comes 126," meaning after the 123 nuclear waiver would come the potential sale of 126 F-16's to India. Now the Obama Administration is in a place to push both pieces over the goal line. The 123 waiver actually passed last year, but rumor has it that during this visit India will announce at least two nuclear power plant sites reserved for U.S. energy companies. That is big news, since both French and Russian companies already have deals in place.

The second big piece is the possible announcement of an end-use monitoring agreement, allowing the United States to start selling higher technology military equipment, like F-16's, to India. If they have come up with an agreement that would be quite a coup.

Work remains to be done. The United States and India need to get closer together on climate change, the Proliferation Security Initiative, potentially Kashmir, and nonproliferation discussions for next year. The Obama Administration should be thankful it was set up for success, proud of itself for completing the agreements, and not rest on its laurels.

CIA's Assassination Squads

I think the headline of this LA Times article on the CIA's recently-scrapped attempt to form a team to assassinate terrorist leaders says it all: "CIA was a long way from Jason Bourne." More details are still coming out, but this article has the best summary I've read so far.

According to current and former U.S. intelligence officials, the CIA spent seven years trying to assemble teams capable of killing the world's most wanted terrorists but could never find a formula that worked.

This is yet another example of the intelligence community focusing too much on technology and not enough on people. This applies not just to hit squads but also to intelligence gathering. Technology is great, and making some forms of intelligence gathering obselete (I've heard the story that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff heard that Israel had entered the Gaza Strip via Twitter within five minutes, and it took military intelligence over a day to confirm it), but it can never tell you what somebody is thinking, or be able to stand right next to them in a cave in Waziristan. The intelligence community needs to accelerate the process of hiring more people capable of going around the world and blending in, with good language and cultural skills.

Catch-Up Thoughts

Those of you following me on Twitter will know I was out in California for a few days and not posting, so here are my brief thoughts on some of the recent events. I know you all missed my commentary.

• The CIA developed an assassination squad to go after al-Qaeda leadership... and it failed to have any successes that we know about and proved far more difficult than in James Bond movies. Neither of those facts is surprising. In fact I would be shocked if the CIA didn't still have a similar squad with similar goals. As other commenters have pointed out, the difference between firing missiles from drones and potentially firing bullets from sniper teams is mostly semantic, except that the drones seem to have a lot more collateral damage--that and the drones have actually been used. Nor is it shocking that Darth Cheney kept the program a secret from Congress. That fact bothers me more. Congress, or the Intelligence committees or the Gang of Eight at a bare minimum, should be kept appraised of all programs, especially the controversial ones. That's why we have checks and balances in our government.
• Secretary of State Clinton has ordered the first Quadrennial Development and Diplomacy Review (QDDR). Great! We need to know what we are doing, and giving, have a better idea of what is going where and why, and hopefully some oversight. I'll give you a preview of the report: 1) we need a director for USAID, 2) we don't have enough civilian experts on hand to plan much less execute a "civilian surge" in a place like Afghanistan. In the Pentagon the QDR sets the tone and direction for the Department of Defense; we'll see if the QDDR has the same weight and budget power for State and the other agencies involved with foreign aid and development.
• President Obama and Russian President Medvedev signed a Joint Understanding to a new START arms control treaty. The Joint Understanding is good progress, but it is really laying a foundation for more hard work to be done between now and December. By then hopefully the Nuclear Posture Review will be complete, satisfying certain Republican Senators, and real arms reductions can be made, hopefully down to the 1000-1200 range, although I would like to see us get even lower.

Predator Drone Groundhog Day

Just once I'd like to wake up, open the Washington Post, and read "Predator drone hits what it was aiming at in Pakistan." Today a drone fired six missiles into a South Waziristan militant training camp in an effort to kill Baitullah Mehsud, but killing six militants. Yesterday a drone fired two missiles and killed 12-16 militants in a training camp in South Waziristan in an effort to kill Mehsud. Sound familiar? For those keeping score at home, that's three drone strikes in four days, and at least the 26th of the year. Who taught us how to shoot, the evil henchmen from a James Bond movie?

Not that I'm at all arguing against striking terrorist camps. But the Pakistani military is doing just fine with both its air and ground campaigns. Training camps are fairly stationary and provide good targets for the Pakistani Air Force. We should be far more selective with our drone strikes in order to actually hit high value targets like Mehsud, not places where he might be or just was.

Clear-Hold...Build?

If John Nagl had a nickel for every time a news story mentioned the counterinsurgency concept of clear and hold, I suspect the news on Thursday of U.S. Marines making a "major push" into the Southern Afghanistan province of Helmand would have financed CNAS for quite some time. Now how about the third part of the counterinsurgency triad, build? Various experts have acknowledged that the much-hyped "civilian surge" won't be coming to Afghanistan, since the experts needed to staff it do not exist. Will that piece simply be forgotten? Improvised by the military? I'd like to hear more about that part of the strategy.

The same thing can be asked on the other side of the border. Pakistani troops have done a fairly good job on the clear stage in Swat, and are hoping the hold stage takes care of itself as it moves on to South Waziristan. Clear is the "fun" part for militaries (or as much fun as counterinsurgency can be); fighting an enemy, however elusive, is what the military signed up to do. Hold is less fun, since it is difficult and defensive, sitting there as targets for guerrilla attacks. Pakistan seems to be assuming that the United States, and $1.5 billion a year or more, will take care of the build phase in Swat and, presumably, South Waziristan. Given the plans for Helmand province, I'll believe it when I see it.

Jones Visits AfPak (+ India)

Normally I praise former President George W. Bush only slightly more often than Kieth Olbermann (deservedly so; the very thin document produced in late 2008 on "The Accomplishments of the Bush Administration" makes hilarious dramatic reading while enjoying adult beverages with a few friends), but his administration did a good job of improving relations with India. Sort of.

I often get asked my opinion of the U.S.-India nuclear deal. I tell people it depends on which half of my brain you're asking. The nonproliferation side says it's horrible; we didn't get anything, even a testing moratorium, and set a terrible precedent. The South Asia-loving side of my brain says the Bush Administration did a good job of winning Indian support by trading something now for a "player-to-be-named-later." Not a specific card to trade in, because I don't believe India is an automatic ally we have bought, but the effort we put into getting the Deal through has paid big dividends in terms of U.S. soft power in India.

Apparently the Obama Administration agrees. National Security Advisor General James Jones visited India (after a stop in Pakistan) and met with Indian National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan, saying he hoped to build on the successes of the Bush Administration. It doesn't seem that Jones was forceful during his meetings in either Pakistan or India. He did not pressure India to re-start negotiations on Kashmir. Oddly, many Pakistani bloggers and Twitterers seem to believe that Jones' visit was designed to negotiate a massive deployment of Indian troops into Afghanistan.

Many of the best South Asia hands from the Bush Administration are still around, including Donald Camp advising on India. I'm glad the Obama Administration continues to recognize good people and build on progress made by the other party.

Sherman's March to the Durand Line

As the Pakistani military blasts away the last few objects in Swat and heavily bombs South Waziristan in order to soften it up for an invasion designed to capture or kill Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud, some experts are questioning Pakistan's blunt object approach to countering the Taliban. The debate also goes on as to how aggressive the United States should be with its drones, particularly following the strike--intended for Mehsud--that killed scores of people at a funeral last week.

Friend of the Blog Chris Fair writes in the Wall Street Journal Asia that more counter-Taliban aid should be spent on Pakistan's police force and less on its military. While I agree that the police would be very appropriate as a bigger player and a worthy recipient of more aid, I think this one is on the shoulders of the military. But they, like the United States, need to keep in mind that the goal is to protect the population and prevent them from opposing our actions rather than simply leaving a trail of scorched earth hopefully leading to Mehsud.

Despite reports that the Taliban in Swat are shaving their beards and playing possum, I continue to thing that the recent attacks on both military/government targets and on civilians are signs of an increasingly desperate Taliban. Mehsud's followers are killing anyone suspected of cooperating with the government in South Waziristan. That's not likely to make people more willing to come forward, but it's not likely to win him any friends among the local population either. Mao said a revolutionary should move among the people like a fish in water. Increased violence against the population does not do that. A recent poll supports my idea, showing that most Pakistanis oppose the Taliban and al-Qaeda and support the governments efforts to fight the "miscreants."

As for drone attacks, I think they should continue, but only for high value targets likely to be driven out by the Pakistani offensive. Killing Mehsud would be a remarkable success, bu the consequences of missing--especially when 65 other people are collateral damage--need to be taken into account as well.