Notes on a Post-Mehsud Afghanistan and Pakistan

After a weekend of thinking about it, it looks like we really did get Baitullah Mehsud. Hurray! And now his deputies are fighting each other over who gets to be leader of the club now. Double hurray! That saves us the trouble. Various analysts have speculated that whereas Mehsud focused his attacks more on Pakistan, which ever deputy ends up leading his group is likely to focus more on attacking U.S. forces in Afghanistan. That's both good news and bad news. Our troops will get attacked more, but they will be in Afghanistan, where we can fight back, not across the invisible line into Pakistan where we can only use drones.

The "successful" drone strike (it took us many attempts, and the strike that killed Mehsud may not have even been targeting him) means we will likely use drones even more readily. That's not necessarily a good thing, as we have a poor track record of killing the people we want to (terrorists and insurgents) and not the ones we don't (civilians).

On the drug front, we have decided to spend time and energy hunting down drug lords in Afghanistan. I wonder if we're going to include the drug lords who are some of Karzai's biggest supporters. Sure, extra heroin in the world is a bad thing, but we didn't invade Afghanistan to control drugs. Michael Cohen has been keeping an "Afghanistan Mission Creep Watch" going for awhile. Looks like he has some job security!

We are currently spending at least $60 billion per year in Afghanistan. That's roughly six times more (conservatively) than if we simply decided to buy everything Afghanistan produced (drugs included) every year. We're likely committed to spending at least $4 billion a year for quite a few years after we leave (whenever that may be) just to pay for the Afghan army and police forces, since their tax base cannot support it. What are we getting? Is this really the best strategy? Is there a strategy?

Baitullah Mehsud Dead? Now For My Second Wish... Actual Afghanistan Metrics!

I recently wished I would wake up and find out we had hit our exact target with a drone-fired missile in Pakistan. This evening I "awoke" from a Twitter slumber (a cybersecurity warning sign?) to find we actually did kill Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud with a drone strike yesterday--maybe. It seems we won't know for sure until we get in to South Waziristan to collect a DNA sample (quick side note: how do we possibly have another DNA sample to compare it to?), far easier said than done, since we can't do it by drone.

If we did get Mehsud that's great news of course, but before we get too cocky we should take note that militant groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and Mehsud's in particular, are like the hydra, and Mehsud apparently has several able deputies willing to step up and take his place.

So for my second wish, I'd like the Obama Administration to come up with actual metrics for success in Afghanistan (and Pakistan). Apparently Congress wants the same thing. After the first (or was it third) "AfPak" review the White House released a white paper promising metrics for success--and has failed not only to announce how we're doing, but what the metrics are. As I've argued repeatedly, you can't measure progress toward a goal you haven't established.

So far the White House has been better at determining what metrics not to use: enemy killed, miles of roads built, bombs defused, tips gathered, etc. Those are helpful steps, but if, according to the Times, we already have "nine broad objectives for metrics to guide the administration’s policy on Afghanistan and Pakistan" why can't we develop metrics now? We need another month or two to continue studying them? Is this a cooking-the-books plan where by the time the actual metrics are up it will be winter and things will look good because fighting is difficult for the militants?

We do need to get the metrics right, but metrics should measure progress toward a goal. Firmly and clearly state the goal, and and tell the social scientist metric creation team to get their academic butts in gear. We've wasted enough time.

Unstable Countries: Will We Ever Get Ahead of the Curve?

Editor's Note: The following is a guest post by Jamie Morgan. The views expressed are her own.

There has been much talk on the media waves about whether the Islamist sect Boko Harem is Nigeria’s version of the Taliban. “Will the next attack come from Nigeria??” In my opinion, the answer to that question is a moot point. The real question is, what is the United States doing to ensure that the Nigerian government begins to address the source of these problems – the lack of infrastructure and services for its people? And how long will the Obama administration’s attention span last?

Washington seems to have what I call the Terrorism Test. Violence erupts in a new country. Is the group connected with a known terrorist group? If Yes, we care. If No, we don’t. Secretary Clinton met this morning with the President of Somalia’s floundering Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and pledged additional military support – in the form of 40 tons of weapons – to the government forces. The support to the TFG’s security forces is the right course of action. Thus far the security situation on the ground in the areas held by Al-Shabaab has been so bad that many of the aid workers implementing the touted $150 million in U.S. assistance have been forced to relocate to the north – where the aid is much less needed.

Yet the attention to Somalia comes, again, once the crisis has already erupted. This type of reactionary policy-making will never get us ahead of the curve on the threats to U.S. national security – terrorism or otherwise. One never knows what the next big threat will be, or from where the next terrorist group will emerge. The nuanced factors that turn a population frustrated with its government into one that channels its outrage towards Western world are many, and we have yet to fully understand them. Thus, let’s start giving focused attention and proper resources to unstable regions from the start, not waiting until they turn into full-scale crises.

On the Brink of Becoming a Failed State (On the Eve of its 62nd Birthday)

Editor's Note: the following is a guest post from Haley Gallagher, who served in the Peace Corps in Bangladesh. The views expressed are her own.

Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the “father of Pakistan” had a vision that his country would be that of a modern, moderate, secular society. Much has changed since August 14, 1947. There is a growing force of Islam-loving people throughout Pakistan yearning for the implementation of Islamic law. Rather than fighting the Taliban, this group of people believes the current military operation is counter-productive and that the state should be engaging the Taliban.

While the debate continues, many agree that Pakistan consistently fails to provide sufficient resources to its citizens. Under already inadequate education and infrastructure systems, the poor suffer the most during wartime conditions. Moreover and somewhat disconcerting, the country has a moderate youth bulge; the average age is 21 and over 37% of Pakistanis are under the age of 15. Given the current economic downturn and rising unemployment rate, many of these youths sit idle with nothing to do. This presents opportunities for the Taliban to recruit and train, yes, even children to be suicide bombers. As Pakistanis’ patience wanes the risk of violence increases and everyday access to social services such as education suffer (six Christians were burnt to death this week following allegations that they had desecrated a Koran).

Pakistan is currently a very volatile society and its citizens are stuck between a rock and a hard place in terms of whom to trust, be it Americans or the Taliban. Given their vulnerability, America should seize this opportunity to increase development aid and resources to Pakistan in an effort to regain their loyalty. The Peace Corps is the most powerful symbol of non-military service in our history. Both President Obama and former Republican President George W. Bush called for expanding the Peace Corps and their funding was increased to $373.4M this year, the largest percentage increase since 1993. While many would argue against sending the Peace Corps back into Pakistan, especially now, there are those willing to serve for a greater collective good.

Every overseas assignment presents risks and perhaps tapping into the Peace Corps’ Crisis Corps would be a better option. When John F. Kennedy called on young Americans to serve, it wasn’t during times of peace. The ‘60s were tumultuous and those willing to volunteer embraced the responsibility. Re-entering Pakistan in this capacity could present challenges. However, this is not a new endeavor for the United States. Navigating the political system is clearly the biggest obstacle. In the meantime, as the Peace Corps continues to double its efforts globally, Pakistan will have to rely on those local organizations that focus their efforts on bringing good governance and sustainable development to the people directly. There is a sense of urgency, however, to partner with those on the right side of governance and honor the vision that Jinnah worked so hard to create.

Read C.J. Chivers on Afghanistan

I finally got around to reading C.J. Chivers' excellent article in Esquire about a 40-hour patrol along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. I know I should have read it earlier, since he authored the series of articles for the New York Times earlier this year that almost redeemed the concept of embedding reporters with military units. I recommend reading the whole thing, since he interweaves a story about one group of soldiers with observations that illustrate the challenges facing us in Afghanistan.

He discusses the four primary missions troops may be undertaking in Afghanistan: "It is hunting for, and hoping to capture or kill, the top-tier Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders and their coteries.... [W]orking with foreign governments, non government organizations, and American agencies to build a nation where ten years ago a nation existed principally in name....creat[ing] foundations for indigenous security," and fighting insurgents. All of these are tactics, and what we desperately need in Afghanistan is an end goal and a strategy to get there. "The problem with the United States' multiple missions is not that any of them is without merit, although each has had its mix-ups and flaws. The problem lies in the relationship of missions to one another."

Go read the whole article, but I think these few longer quotes stand ably on their own.

It is easier to be descriptive in Afghanistan than prescriptive, though there is no shortage of thoughtful voices prescribing solutions: more soft-shoe counterinsurgency tactics, more conventional troops to provide security (read: show up and fight) in areas where there is little security now, more troops to train and mentor Afghan soldiers and cops, more soldiers on the Afghan — Pakistan border to plug infiltration routes, more political engagement and security collaboration with Pakistan. Some advice is interlocking and neat and aligns with the invigorated war effort being pursued by the United States. Other advice is contradictory: The United States should conduct fewer Predator and Reaper strikes against insurgent leadership in Pakistan, or maybe it should conduct more. The United States should eradicate poppy fields, or perhaps it should encourage putting the crop to legal medicinal use. And some advice points to options that are easy to imagine but hard to execute, both politically and practically, including deciding which insurgents can be negotiated with and how....

The insurgency in the valley is on one level remarkably simple, though complicated by several factors. The simple distillation is that it is a revolt against outsiders that has been fueled by economic grievances. Most of the fighters are local Korangalis, and many have been displaced from work by the American-backed Afghan government, which banned most logging. Company B's outpost is on the grounds of the sawmill that Haji Matin had been dispossessed of — a symbol of jobs lost by loggers and mill workers and truck drivers and everyone else who lived off harvesting the forests in which Company B now sat. Later, as the war here escalated, Haji Matin's house was destroyed by an air strike, which extinguished hopes that he might be peacefully convinced to set aside his guns. Instead, Haji Matin and the displaced workers fight. Lieutenant Colonel Brett Jenkinson, Captain Howell's intense battalion commander, had summed up an underlying dynamic: The insurgency drew manpower from a pool of jobless laborers to create a guerrilla force without many other ways to eat....

Even among those with experience on the ground, the military, institutionally, has yet to resolve a central question faced by democracies fighting counterinsurgency war: how to balance the practical role of violence (raw, deliberate, and unblinking) against the constant risk that the same violence (raw, accidental, and reduced to euphemism) will miss its mark and erode support from civilians caught between competing sides.

Lords and Vassals in Modern Pakistan

Nicholas Kristof has one of the best, and shortest, summaries of one of the major problems facing Pakistan today: feudal lords. I recommend reading it in its entirety, and even some of the comments (especially those from Pakistanis) if you have time. Of the three power centers in the country--the government, the military, and feudal lords--the government has the least influence. Both major political parties, the PPP and the PML-N, are linked to feudal lords and families. Pakistan's leadership has mostly been alternating between members of the Bhutto clan (Zulfikar Ali, Benazir, and now her husband Zardari holding the position until the chosen one, their son Bilawal, is ready) alternating with military dictators, with a few other random leaders thrown in just to shake things up.

I've met some of these feudal lords at various events around the world. Some are truly Falstafian characters, quaffing whole bottles of Johnny Walker Black (for some reason South Asians tend to prefer blended whisky to single malt), devouring large quantities of meat, telling loud and crazy stories, and enjoying literally and figuratively throwing their weight around. They are great people to know and have as your friends, but I would hate to have one as a boss or landlord. We in the West are used to a strong central government, but in places like Pakistan the politics of any given region are much more complicated, with each area also belonging to a lord or tribe.

Kristof wonders if land reform is the solution. In an ideal world yes; India had fairly successful land reforms in the 1950s and '60s that created much of the middle class today (though of course poverty is still rampant). I have a hard time envisioning a process that would get us to land reform from the current situation, especially given Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and the need to avoid even more chaos. Care should be taken to prevent aid from further enriching these feudal lords and making sure it actually gets to the population, but confronting the feudal system directly would be doomed to failure.

Eikenberry Throws Stones From His Glass House

Karl Eikenberry, the current U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan and former military commander there, has an op-ed in today's Washington Post arguing that Afghanis have a choice coming up about the future direction of their country in the August 20th election. No doubt that's true. As he says,

"Five years ago, with guidance from the international community, Afghanistan held its first elections and began the process of building a new state -- a complex and difficult effort following 25 years of invasion, civil war, oppression and foreign-inspired terrorism. This time, Afghan authorities bear the full responsibility for fulfilling their people's right to choose their leaders, with the international community assisting, not leading. But none of this will matter unless the voters have a real choice and know what each candidate stands for. There must be a serious debate among the candidates and by the Afghan people."

But equally important is the debate, or lack of debate, here in the United States about what to do in Afghanistan. We don't have a real strategy, for staying or going, in Afghanistan. We don't know how long we plan to be there. We don't know if the Afghani government will survive without massive support from U.S. and NATO troops and civilians; almost certainly it and the Afghan National Army cannot survive without continuing massive amounts of foreign aid. All the reviews in the world haven't given us answers or even multiple possible solutions or futures to choose from. General McCrystal's review seems unlikely to change that, especially since his team contained no experts on Afghanistan or Pakistan, just military historians and strategists (Exum did serve in Afghanistan, but his academic work is on counterinsurgency elsewhere).

Equally disturbing to me is Eikenberry's between-the-lines endorsement of re-election for Karzai. Despite his talk of "We stand with absolute impartiality regarding who should be president of Afghanistan" parts of his article sound almost like a politician on the stump, talking about the future versus the past, progress or stagnation, and reforming society. All this while Karzai's brother has become the richest man in Afghanistan. I wish viable alternatives existed in the presidential election in Afghanistan, if only to strengthen the debate and force the candidates to be more honest.

U.S. policy makers need to be equally honest with themselves and with the American public. We need actual strategic options and policy decisions in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Until then progress will be impossible.