People: the Best Homeland Security

I imagine someone might be reading this on a mobile device as they are in an interminable security line at the airport waiting to go on spring break (they wisely got there early). But know this: the most draconian security measures we are proposing - full-body scans and extensive pat downs/strip searches - still would not have caught the Christmas day "Underpants Bomber" Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab.

I was going to write that because he flew from Nigeria Abdulmutallab wouldn't have gone through a full-body scanner, but it turns out that Nigeria's international airport already has scanners. It doesn't seem Abdulmutallab was scanned, since as the Truman Project's Melissa Skorka points out, the workers in many developing countries' airports are often concerned with things other than safety. But the real story, as Marc Sageman discussed at a Middle East Policy Council event today, is that Abdulmutallab carried only about three ounces of explosive, the equivalent of three packets of sugar, and it is extremely unlikely that either a body scan or a pat down would have discovered the packets. As another panelist today mentioned, Yemen now has a very creative bomb maker, and though both the butt bomb and the underpants bomb have failed, he will keep trying. Three sugar packets worth of powder makes me think he could hide it in actual sugar packets, or as tooth powder, or really just about anywhere.

We'll know more about what exactly led to the breakdown of intelligence in the case of the underpants bomber when the unclassified version of the report is released later today, but we do know this: our best defense is alert, smart people talking to each other. We need our intelligence community to do its job. The National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) is designed to bring representatives from the various agencies to share information with each other and put their heads together. One person should poke their head up over the cubicle and say "hey, this guy in Nigeria says his son is becoming radical" and another says "hey, I know of a Nigerian posting some radical thoughts online" and a third could say "hmm, the British just revoked a Nigerian's visa. Maybe we should do the same thing." But it didn't seem to work. No wonder people are clamoring for NCTC director Michael Leiter's head. Of course the NCTC has bigger problems, but Leiter has had plenty of time to work on them.

We also need as much interaction between governments and people in other countries. As much as an Obama Doctrine currently exists, it is based on the idea of smart power, and that means we need to keep our foot on the gas with diplomacy, exchanges, and training. DHS' Office of International Affairs needs to be fully staffed and step up its mission working on training, cooperation, and increasing security practices around the world. And people need to keep traveling the world and showing the good and productive side of Americans.

Finally, homeland security is everyone's responsibility. Who became suspicious and subdued Abdulmutallab? Not an air marshall (there wasn't one): other passengers. Same thing for Richard Reid, the shoe bomber. The DC Metro system constantly has announcements to report suspicious packages and the like. An alert and educated public can be our best weapon, since even DHS can hire only so many people.

DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano said "the system worked" in the aftermath of the attempted bombing, a quote she clearly regrets. Parts of the system didn't work, the parts we pay billions of dollars a year for, and clearly those parts need to work better. But if you include everyone in the system, than the system did work. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks everyone wanted to help, and many did by donating blood or needed materials. President Bush had an opportunity to tell everyone that they were part of the solution, and that their role was to always be vigilant. Instead he told them to go shopping. Luckily for us many got the message anyway. People are the most important defense against terror.

Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Haven't I Refuted This Before?

Seymour Hersh has an article in The New Yorker asking the tired questions of whether Pakistan's nuclear weapons are safe from capture by al-Qaeda or the Taliban. He asserts that because militants have attacked well-defended Pakistani military facilities, other well-defended facilities, including nuclear locations, could be in danger.

If I'm not mistaken a well-defended U.S. military facility, Fort Hood, was just attacked by someone with insider knowledge of security and facilities, but that doesn't mean that anyone outside of Hollywood screenwriters think U.S. nuclear facilities are likely to be attacked or captured by militants. Indian Maoist naxalite militants have attacked government facilities, but no one worries publicly about the security of India's nuclear weapons. Hersh argues that components are most vulnerable when they are being moved. Hmm, you mean like when nuclear parts are accidentally flown across the country, or mistakenly delivered to Taiwan? Didn't the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force get fired for those mistakes not too long ago? Let's discuss reality here.

Once again, yes, Pakistan's government is unstable. President "Mr. Ten Percent" Zardari may well be forced out of office in the next six months, but that may well lead to increased stability in Pakistan, not less. The Pakistani military is considered a common player in Pakistani society and politics, and is perhaps the most stable element. The nuclear warheads are stored and secured separately from the triggers and the delivery systems, and the Pakistanis have developed extensive nuclear security systems.

If anything Pakistan seemed more unstable back in May, when the Taliban had famously crept within 90 miles of the capital, Islamabad. The New York Times ran a piece quoting various experts as saying the nuclear stockpile was safe. What has changed since then other than Sy Hersh decided this was a good sensational story to write? He dismisses all the expert opinions he finds that run contrary to his view, because "are Pakistan's nuclear weapons safe? Yes" would be a pretty boring article.

I imagine I or someone like me will have to refute some sensationalist account about terrorists and Pakistan's nuclear weapons every six months or so for at least several years to come. Of course it's a valid concern and one that should not be ignored, but it is also unlikely, and Pakistan should be given credit for protecting its arsenal.

Twisted Logic on Pakistan's Nukes

Someone help me understand this: the biggest danger in South/Central Asia is al Qaeda getting its hands on one or more of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. Al Qaeda's leadership and many of their fighters are currently in Pakistan. Therefore the argument is we should send 40,000 more troops to Afghanistan? I'm not sure I follow the logic chain. Assuming we failed and largely pulled out of Afghanistan, and assuming the Taliban (whose leaders are also primarily in Pakistan) re-take control of much of Afghanistan, and assuming the Taliban welcome al Qaeda back and provide them the oft-mentioned "safe haven" (and none of those assumptions are sure things by the way), they would then be MORE likely to attack Pakistan's nuclear facilities?

When the Taliban famously advanced into the Swat valley, within 90 miles of the capital Islamabad, I argued against the doom sayers, saying Pakistan was not about to collapse. Now the Pakistani military has largely driven the Taliban from Swat and is preparing for an offensive in South Waziristan, home to much of the Taliban leadership. Drone strikes have successfully taken out many leaders, including Baitullah Mehsud (leading to this lovely ditty). Pakistan was not about to collapse then, and is not about to collapse or give up its nuclear weapons now. Pakistan's nuclear weapons are safe, and should not be used as a bureaucratic pawn in the strategic debate. I'm all for a vigorous debate on goals and strategies, but let's apply a few sober standards of logic to this strategic conversation.

Overstating my Power? bin Laden, You're On Notice!

Apparently expressing my frustration that we have yet to catch or kill a given terrorist is enough to get said terrorist killed. Do the world's terrorist-hunting teams all read Smart Influence and get motivated when they see me write about their prey? First I expressed my frustration that we had shot at Baitullah Mehsud repeatedly without hitting him and lo and behold we hit him. Last week Jamie Morgan's guest post talked about the right and wrong ways to fight Noordin M. Top's terrorist group in Indonesia; I'm pretty sure killing Top is part of the right way!

So who's left? Lots of people, for sure, but for now, Osama bin Laden, you're on notice (copyright Stephen Colbert)! I'm officially sick of our inability to capture or kill you. Can't we just look where they are sending his record label checks from his new Auto-Tuned album?

Wrong Answer for Indonesian Terror

Editor's Note: The following is a guest post by Jamie Morgan. The views expressed are her own.

Indonesian officials announced a plan to tighten anti-terrorist laws, which would allow the government to detain suspects for up to two years. The government claims this will allow them to get more in line with the laws of Western nations. (Are two year detention allowances standard in Western nations now?) Additionally, several of the senior-level government Ministers are seeking an amendment to a terrorism investigation law that would allow non-police forces, including the Indonesian Military (TNI), to conduct anti-terror investigations.

All of this is disconcerting for two reasons. First, we are talking about a country that just emerged from a brutal dictatorship 11 years ago. The military was the major instrument of former President Suharto to control the population during his rule, and expanding the military’s powers such a short time after his fall does not send a good message to the population, nor is it a good idea for the fledgling democracy.

Second, and possibly more importantly for the rest of the world, expanding the amount of time the Indonesian government can legally hold terrorism suspects without charge is not going to do anything for its fight against Noordin M. Top’s terrorist group. It actually might harm it. The government needs to focus on identifying the root causes of support for Top’s group among certain areas of the Indonesian population, rather than inflame public opinion against it. The International Crisis Group reports that support among the local population, and even among the less militant terrorist group Jemmah Islamiyah (JI), is not high for Top’s extremist faction. However, if Top’s faction is allowed to continue to infiltrate Islamic boarding schools, it will continue to find the few supporters it needs to plan operations like the July 17 hotel bombing in Jakarta.

Recent revelations connecting Top’s group and various extremist groups in the Middle East and South Asia make all of this even more alarming. Unfortunately, given the lack of general media attention on this issue, I am not hopeful for improvement anytime soon.

Post Op-Eds on Afghanistan

As the debate over Afghanistan heats up inside the Beltway and around the country the Washington Post has had four significant op-eds on Afghanistan this week, two terrible, one merely repetitive, and one very good.

Let's start with the good. Everyone should read former Senator Chuck Hagel's piece from today, in which he argues that,

Our greatest threats today come from the regions left behind after World War II. Addressing these threats will require a foreign policy underpinned by engagement -- in other words, active diplomacy but not appeasement. We need a clearly defined strategy that accounts for the interconnectedness and the shared interests of all nations. Every great threat to the United States -- whether economic, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, health pandemics, environmental degradation, energy, or water and food shortages -- also threatens our global partners and rivals. Accordingly, we cannot view U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan through a lens that sees only "winning" or "losing." Iraq and Afghanistan are not America's to win or lose. Win what? We can help them buy time or develop, but we cannot control their fates.

Meanwhile David Ignatius' column yesterday was virtually identical to any number of stories from February, March, and April on the President deciding between counterinsurgency and counter terrorism options, the only difference being the substitution of McChrystal for McKiernan. That's not Ignatius' fault, it is simply a good indicator that we are still treading water in Afghanistan.

George Will's column arguing for a withdrawal from Afghanistan, on the other hand, was as bad as Hagel's was good. Will should stick to decrying the decline of our entire society because we wear jeans. Will has already been savaged by left and right alike (my favorite comment was from Joshua Foust, "George Will waits for a Democrat to get in the White House before calling Afghanistan unwinnable. Classy."), so I'll just say that Will appears to be arguing for Bill Clinton's foreign policy: lob a few cruise missiles in based on inadequate intelligence. Did Will support that policy at the time? How well did it work?

On Monday Anthony Cordesman, a smart guy and a member of McChrystal's review team, argued that while we can't win in Afghanistan in the next three months, we can lose in that time frame, if enough resources are not devoted to the cause. That makes sense; we do almost certainly need additional resources. But then he bizarrely goes on to argue that we shouldn't worry about strategy, simply about tactics. That's the opinion of the "Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy?" A strategy is exactly what we need, and what we have been lacking. If we don't know what we are trying to achieve--based, as General Zinni said, on a strategic vision for the country--we will just continue treading water and making the same mistakes in Afghanistan.

I'm glad we're finally having a debate about Afghanistan. I wish it was a more educated one in which people argued honestly and about the same set of issues, primarily our strategic goals overall and in Afghanistan. And I hope President Obama and his team are listening and preparing to make actual decisions, not "middle grounds," before it is too late.

I Think This Is an Emergency, Or So It Has Been

Guest Post: Michael Rohrs is a counterterrorism intelligence analyst and consultant with BAE Systems. He is a member of Young Professionals in Foreign Policy and an occasional blogger on national security and foreign policy issues. The views expressed are his own.

I participate in a discussion group on international terrorism. The topic of tonight’s discussion is: the Office of Foreign Assets Control's (OFAC) ability to designate U.S.-based entities as ‘specially designated global terrorists.’ One of the preparation questions posed in advance (admittedly not one at the true heart of this debate) asks, “Eight years after 9-11, are we still in the midst of a ‘national emergency’ which is necessary to invoke the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)?”

The IEEPA, as defined by Adam J. Szubin in particularly lucid testimony,

…grants the President a broad spectrum of powers to deal ‘with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat.’ The President typically exercises these IEEPA powers through Executive Orders that declare a national emergency and impose economic sanctions to address the emergency.

On September 23, 2001, President Bush issued E.O. 13224 which has been renewed every year since—including 2009. What should happen in 2010?

Regarding the above question, here are my preliminary thoughts on the issue as prepared for discussion:

I think we can all agree that in the years immediately following 9-11, the country was well within the designation of a state of national emergency; and as with DHS, emergency measures were hastily but necessarily taken to mitigate extreme circumstances. That said, the threat of a terrorist act being committed on U.S. soil—be it from without or originating within—has not, and in my opinion is not going away. Even further, if you believe Philip Bobbitt, this is only the leading edge of the inevitable. In that sense we are undoubtedly facing a threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, and rightfully in a national state of emergency.

The same flag, however, can justifiably be waved from the opposite shore; it is precisely the perpetual state of threat that nebulous, transnational terrorism poses—not only to the United States but also to Americans abroad and the democratic international community writ large—that negates “state of national emergency” designation. If you believe threats of irregular attack with intent to incite terror in the United States are imminent, indefinite, adaptive, and ongoing (regardless of whether you believe we are actually “at war” with terrorists or on terrorism) then the IEEPA as a designation reserved for unusual and extraordinary circumstances—which includes the implication that they’re temporary—no longer applies.

Adopting this conclusion, as I do, requires a fundamental revision of thinking. It’s no secret that bureaucracy in general and American bureaucracy specifically has difficulty reconstructing paradigms. No paradigm is more deeply ingrained in the United States and about which Americans are more sensitive, than individual—and by extension national—security. However, in order for the IEEPA label to be lifted, U.S. lawmakers with the CT, HS, MI, and Intelligence communities need to redefine the state of the union as it regards the (sober and realistic) threat of terror, and redraft sensible and timely legislation to deal with a changing threat environment; an environment in which combating terror financing is an essential part. Until the paradigm is redrawn and national attitude is adjusted accordingly, however, it is unwise, unsafe, and unacceptable to scale back our counterterrorism intelligence practices at the risk of the American people.

Finally, consider this question: Does the IEEPA extend beyond mitigating risks of the U.S. homeland and its citizens abroad to ensuring that the US is not in any way facilitating (unwittingly!) the financing of terrorist organizations and their operations anywhere in the world? Let us assume the target of a given terrorist organization is something other than Americans and/or American interests. If U.S.-based charities are serving as an avenue (be it merely a canal or as a hub), it remains our responsibility (especially ours!) to paralyze, penetrate, and prosecute these conduits of terrorism. The question remains, however, whether circumstances renders the IEEPA specifically applicable. If not, does a suitable and sustainable (remember the IEEPA is for extraordinary temporary circumstances) alternative statute exist? If not, are we not morally and axiomatically responsible to implement one?

Notes on a Post-Mehsud Afghanistan and Pakistan

After a weekend of thinking about it, it looks like we really did get Baitullah Mehsud. Hurray! And now his deputies are fighting each other over who gets to be leader of the club now. Double hurray! That saves us the trouble. Various analysts have speculated that whereas Mehsud focused his attacks more on Pakistan, which ever deputy ends up leading his group is likely to focus more on attacking U.S. forces in Afghanistan. That's both good news and bad news. Our troops will get attacked more, but they will be in Afghanistan, where we can fight back, not across the invisible line into Pakistan where we can only use drones.

The "successful" drone strike (it took us many attempts, and the strike that killed Mehsud may not have even been targeting him) means we will likely use drones even more readily. That's not necessarily a good thing, as we have a poor track record of killing the people we want to (terrorists and insurgents) and not the ones we don't (civilians).

On the drug front, we have decided to spend time and energy hunting down drug lords in Afghanistan. I wonder if we're going to include the drug lords who are some of Karzai's biggest supporters. Sure, extra heroin in the world is a bad thing, but we didn't invade Afghanistan to control drugs. Michael Cohen has been keeping an "Afghanistan Mission Creep Watch" going for awhile. Looks like he has some job security!

We are currently spending at least $60 billion per year in Afghanistan. That's roughly six times more (conservatively) than if we simply decided to buy everything Afghanistan produced (drugs included) every year. We're likely committed to spending at least $4 billion a year for quite a few years after we leave (whenever that may be) just to pay for the Afghan army and police forces, since their tax base cannot support it. What are we getting? Is this really the best strategy? Is there a strategy?

Unstable Countries: Will We Ever Get Ahead of the Curve?

Editor's Note: The following is a guest post by Jamie Morgan. The views expressed are her own.

There has been much talk on the media waves about whether the Islamist sect Boko Harem is Nigeria’s version of the Taliban. “Will the next attack come from Nigeria??” In my opinion, the answer to that question is a moot point. The real question is, what is the United States doing to ensure that the Nigerian government begins to address the source of these problems – the lack of infrastructure and services for its people? And how long will the Obama administration’s attention span last?

Washington seems to have what I call the Terrorism Test. Violence erupts in a new country. Is the group connected with a known terrorist group? If Yes, we care. If No, we don’t. Secretary Clinton met this morning with the President of Somalia’s floundering Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and pledged additional military support – in the form of 40 tons of weapons – to the government forces. The support to the TFG’s security forces is the right course of action. Thus far the security situation on the ground in the areas held by Al-Shabaab has been so bad that many of the aid workers implementing the touted $150 million in U.S. assistance have been forced to relocate to the north – where the aid is much less needed.

Yet the attention to Somalia comes, again, once the crisis has already erupted. This type of reactionary policy-making will never get us ahead of the curve on the threats to U.S. national security – terrorism or otherwise. One never knows what the next big threat will be, or from where the next terrorist group will emerge. The nuanced factors that turn a population frustrated with its government into one that channels its outrage towards Western world are many, and we have yet to fully understand them. Thus, let’s start giving focused attention and proper resources to unstable regions from the start, not waiting until they turn into full-scale crises.

Promising Pakistani Prognostications

Four hopefull signs relating to Pakistan recently:

1. The U.S. House of Representatives passed the aid bill for Pakistan and Afghanistan last week.
2. The European Union pledged $100 million in aid to Pakistan and will hold a meeting on EU-Pakistan relations in the near future.
3. Pakistani authorities caught at least one of the terrorists who attacked the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore.
4. Prime Minister Singh and President Zardari met in Russia at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting, and the back-channel negotiations, primarily on Kashmir, are likely to resume soon.

Hopefully things will keep trending upward. The country could use good news.

One Armed Economist...

With respect to President Harry Truman...

On the one hand, the decision by a Pakistani court to release Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, the founder of Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist group and alleged mastermind of the Mumbai attacks, is remarkably unproductive for both counter terrorism activities and Pakistan-India relations.

On the other hand the court ruled that the arrest of Saeed and his three colleagues violated Pakistan's already fragile constitution. Any decision that strengthens the secular judicial system at this point in Pakistan is a welcome step. 

I'm not sure how Pakistan's double jeopardy laws work, but I do wish that information/intelligence/evidence sharing between Pakistan, India, and the United States had been a little better so that Saeed could have been brought to justice with sufficient evidence to properly charge him with his crimes. 

The Taliban Will Not Take Over Pakistan

I know I've addressed this before, but a lot has been happening in Pakistan, and a lot of people are scared, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Various prognosticators are predicting that Pakistan will "collapse" or that or that the country's "60-100" nuclear weapons will fall into terrorist hands. I firmly believe that neither one will happen. Yes, things are bad, but the Taliban will not control Islamabad, and are extremely unlikely to gain control of any of the nuclear weapons.

Why remain calm?

1) Ethnic disagreement. The Taliban are Pashtun. Most of the population around Islamabad are Punjabi. The two groups do not get along. Even though when they controlled the Buner district "only 60 miles from Islamabad" the Taliban were still well within the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), not being welcomed by Punjabis.

2) Geography. The nuclear weapons are in the Punjabi areas, and are well protected. General Kidwai toured the United States in 2006 describing some of the security measures being put in place. Since then the United States has helped provide money and expertise to continue beefing up nuclear security in Pakistan. (Admiral Mullen apparently now agrees the nuclear weapons are secure.)

3) The army is fighting back... and winning. Pakistan has a 620,000 person army, many times the size of the Taliban. Yes, many are on the border with India, but not all. The Pakistani army has driven the Taliban from Buner and is moving on other districts. Perhaps it is like the sleeping dragon, slow to wake but then (eventually? hopefully?) overwhelming. (more on this in a later post)

4) Pakistan will not "collapse." The current leadership may change, as President Zardari is barely holding on to power, but the institutions within Pakistan will remain functional (or as functional as they currently are). The Pakistani people want stability and an end to the violence. They embraced a peace deal in the Swat valley because they believed it would stop the violence, not because they wanted sharia. Zardari is not a strong leader holding the country together. The government and the country can easily go along without him.

When Will Pakistan Collapse?

With the newly-released Pakistani cleric Sufi Mohammed seemingly taking the lesson from the Swat cease-fire not that working with the government is good but that it is weak, the inside-the-Beltway consensus seems to be that Pakistan will collapse and become an Islamic theocracy sooner rather than later. Page one of the Washington Post declared that an "Extremist Tide Rises in Pakistan." The Washington Times quotes Bruce Riedel, one of President Obama's South Asia advisors, as saying that the Administration is turning toward Nawaz Sharif as the last hope, since Zardari is on his way out. Jim Arkedis declares that "Pakistan is the new Afghanistan" and says the United States is caught between doing too much (like escalating air strikes against militants) and further alienating the population and standing back and watching the militants take over.

Call me naive, but I'm a little more hopeful about Pakistan's chances. Sure, I've been pretty hard on the country and all the challenges it faces--incompetent leadership, aggressive Islamic militants, a hurting economy, a military rivalry with India, a collapsed neighboring country with an active insurgency, a superpower placing huge demands on it, and a population that resents that superpower--but enough positive signs exist for me to be optimistic.

1) The population doesn't really want Islamic law imposed, it just wants some semblance of order restored. What polls exist show that the United States is extremely unpopular, but so are the militants. Even in the Swat valley where sharia was imposed in the most recent election the 1.5 million residents voted overwhelmingly for the two main secular parties. Islamist parties have never received more than single digit support in any election, and I don't expect them to this year either.

2) Some people are actually standing up to the militants. While neither of the two main leaders, Zardari or Sharif, has shown any courage in this department, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, has called out both the government and the militants for their actions in Swat. Next door the courageous women of Afghanistan marched last week to protest the impact of sharia. Hopefully the moderate majority in Pakistan can start making similar statements.

3) Pakistanis know what they would be getting into. In the 1980s General Zia-ul-Haq ruled a military dictatorship and began imposing Islamic laws throughout Pakistan. While young Pakistanis won't remember the era their parents will, and they can contrast it with the comparatively moderate and prosperous 1990s and 2000s.

4) The military has not truly been a major player lately. While I know this statement scares many of my more liberal friends, the Pakistani military is one of the more moderate, stable, modern, and respected sectors of society. It's intervention into politics is seen as the norm in Pakistan. While a coup is a possibility if things start to get too far out of hand, General Kiyani could intervene in subtler ways, as he did in the recent heated exchange between Zardari and Sharif. Additionally, it is important to note that Pakistan's nuclear weapons are in the military's hands, which should help people in the region and all over the world sleep a little bit better as militants creep closer to Islamabad.

5) Pakistan is squarely in the sights of the Obama Administration. It recognized Pakistan's importance, and is working hard to figure out a solution. It hasn't come up with a perfect plan yet, but at least it has its top people on the job. The additional $1.5 billion per year in civilian aid should only help.

It will be an interesting next few months in Pakistan to be sure, but I think the momentum of the Washington commentators describing Pakistan's eminent collapse may be greater than the momentum of the collapse itself.

Pirate Wars

After yesterday's dramatic rescue of American captive Captain Richard Phillips it seems like every news outlet but ESPN is running a story on pirates (Navy SEALs apparently make good copy), and every blog or commenter is discussing how to stop piracy.

Sure, building more Littoral Combat Ships is a good idea, since our brown-water naval capability is low, but what is needed at this point are the same things needed to combat terrorism or any other asymmetric threat: cooperation and intelligence.

Anywhere valuable ships have to maneuver slowly through restricted waterways has been prime pirate territory for hundreds if not thousands of years, including parts of the Caribbean, the Straits of Malacca, the South China Sea, and, yes, the Gulf of Aden off Somalia. When a good friend of mine took a semester at sea cruise around the world she had to take a turn standing guard at the rail with a fire hose to fend off pirate attacks when they were near the Straits of Malacca. Fire hoses are still the recommended tool, as shooting back at the pirates would almost certainly lead to the crew being killed if captured, and at least heavy damage to the ship (rocket propelled grenades can easily go through the sides of most ships).

Navies in the sixteenth-nineteenth centuries routinely spent significant time escorting convoys of commercial ships through dangerous waters. That remains one option here, but would be fairly ship-intensive given the current makeup of our navy. A far better option is inviting countries whose ships pass through the Gulf of Aden to send one or more naval vessels and coordinate a multilateral patrol of the region. Cooperation will be essential, and the European Union and NATO ships in the region are not doing a good job of playing nicely, but it can be done. Countries seeking to expand their blue water naval capabilities, especially China and India, will jump at the chance to share logistical support and learn from the navies with more experience. Additionally the Chinese, Indian, and other navies have slightly looser rules of engagement and can be slightly more aggressive (you may recall the Indian navy had some success against a pirate mother ship). China would also love to be given permission for a permanent base in Somalia.

Piracy cannot be completely stopped, and pirates in a country as poor as Somalia are unlikely to be deterred from risky operations, but with a low-tech, intensive, coordinated effort sharing the burden we can make it far more manageable than the current situation.

AfPak: Much Review About Nothing

I've been struggling with how to express my opinion on the "new" Afghanistan and Pakistan, or AfPak, policy President Obama rolled out last Friday. Frankly I haven't commented on it because my initial comments remain valid, and not a whole lot else needs to be said. Despite all the reviews and events on Afghanistan (and I'm not even attending or writing about close to all of them) the policy that was rolled out isn't very different from the existing policy. Granted the Bush Administration never clearly stated its policy, so it is certainly helpful to have the objectives laid out clearly, but the new policy is an adjustment, not a course shift. Other than that I do have a few observations:

1) In the debate over whether to pursue a minimalist counter terrorism (CT) approach, as apparently favored by Vice President Biden, or a more intensive counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy the objectives (protecting U.S. interests by eliminating AfPak as a base of operations for terrorists groups) are primarily CT, but many of the tools come from the COIN playbook. The President chose a middle ground, pleasing everyone, or no one. As Ashley Tellis said at today's event, "what we are involved in is nation building in everything but name."

2) The President frequently mentioned the problems facing and emanating from Pakistan and discussed the need to convince Pakistan to help out more, but I didn't see or hear any real plan to do so.

3) The much-hyped benchmarks either don't exist yet, or are not being made public. Good reasons do exist for not making them all public, including my skepticism over whether they will be met, but even a general discussion of what kinds of things to look at would have been useful.

4) I think his main audience in discussing Pakistan was Congress, and in that he should be successful, as Senator Kerry has proposed an even larger aid package to Pakistan than the one Biden proposed last year when he was Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee--at least $1.6 billion a year.

I, like the neocons, am happy the President didn't decide to pull the plug. South and Central Asia is going to be one of the crucial regions in the world for at least the next decade. I think that most of the things in the report are good, and it is certainly good to have them available in black and white rather than a directionless and open-ended commitment. But calling the new strategy bold, revolutionary, or even very different is a step too far.

Dearth of Pakistani Leadership

Whenever one of my grad school professors, a retired Pakistani Brigadier, would discuss Pakistan he would say "I reserve the right to come in here tomorrow and tell you that everything I said yesterday is wrong" because facts change and events happen just that fast in Pakistan. With that caveat, here is my current take on Pakistani leadership.

President Asif Ali Zardari is the widower of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who took over the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) when his wife was assassinated after her return to Pakistan in December 2007. He is both corrupt, having been known as Mr. Ten Percent for the amount he supposedly embezzled when his wife was Prime Minister, and weak, having backed down several times during his rule.

Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif leads the egotistically-named Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz). He was deposed in a coup in 1999 following the failed attempt to use militants to take over part of Kashmir, which led to the Kargil War. Reportedly when briefed at the front on the operation his only question was "which way is India?" He is clearly shrewd, but his beliefs are eclectic. He is a populist leader who ordered the 1998 nuclear tests and has partnered with various religious groups and political parties, and once called for a return to Islamic law in Pakistan. At the same time he was close to the Clinton administration, so it is difficult to know how reliable an ally he might be now. He has led and won the populist push to reinstate the sacked Supreme Court Chief Justice, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry.

Zardari and Sharif are longtime rivals, but the only thing they hated more than each other was former President General Pervez Musharraf. Now that Musharraf has been forced out they are going head to head, and Zardari has blinked twice, allowing Sharif out of house arrest and agreeing to reinstate Chaudhry, who will almost certainly revers the decision to bar Sharif and his brother from running for office. Zardari's days as leader of Pakistan seem doomed.

The wild card is General Ashfaq Kayani, Musharraf's hand-picked successor as Army Chief. Although the United States is a strong proponent of democracy, military participation in politics is seen as normal in Pakistan. With Zardari ineffective bordering on incompetent, and Sharif with troubling ties to the very militants we are fighting, should the United States consider the possible advantaged of military rule in Pakistan?

Pakistani Government Aid to Militants

A front page article in Thursday's New York Times explores the support that Pakistan's government, specifically the S wing of the Inter-Service Intelligence, or ISI, is still providing to militant groups, including the Taliban, who are conducting attacks in Afghanistan. This support has continued despite repeated requests and high level visits from American and British officials.

These militant connections are partly to counter fears of Indian encirclement, since India has invested heavily in Afghan reconstruction, and most of the Pakistani military still sees India, not the militants, as their main threat and opponent, and Pakistan has a long history of using militants as proxy fighters against India, particularly in Kashmir. This connection fairly clearly led to the bombing of India's embassy in Kabul last summer.

A few key questions remain:

1) How closely was the ISI involved in last November's Mumbai attacks by Lashkar-e-Taiba? Was it just intelligence sharing and protection, as Pakistani officials claim, or was the whole thing a proxy attack planned by Pakistani military, or even civilian, leadership?

2) How deep do the connections between ISI and the militants run? Is it largely the work of a "few bad apples" who maintain their ties, or something much bigger?

3) What can the United States/coalition do to entice Pakistan to renounce support for these groups and leaders? Certainly just sending the Predator drones into Quetta and elsewhere in Baluchistan is possible (and being debated--watch for news of expanded strikes in the next few weeks), but is it worth the cost?