Wrong Answer for Indonesian Terror

Editor's Note: The following is a guest post by Jamie Morgan. The views expressed are her own.

Indonesian officials announced a plan to tighten anti-terrorist laws, which would allow the government to detain suspects for up to two years. The government claims this will allow them to get more in line with the laws of Western nations. (Are two year detention allowances standard in Western nations now?) Additionally, several of the senior-level government Ministers are seeking an amendment to a terrorism investigation law that would allow non-police forces, including the Indonesian Military (TNI), to conduct anti-terror investigations.

All of this is disconcerting for two reasons. First, we are talking about a country that just emerged from a brutal dictatorship 11 years ago. The military was the major instrument of former President Suharto to control the population during his rule, and expanding the military’s powers such a short time after his fall does not send a good message to the population, nor is it a good idea for the fledgling democracy.

Second, and possibly more importantly for the rest of the world, expanding the amount of time the Indonesian government can legally hold terrorism suspects without charge is not going to do anything for its fight against Noordin M. Top’s terrorist group. It actually might harm it. The government needs to focus on identifying the root causes of support for Top’s group among certain areas of the Indonesian population, rather than inflame public opinion against it. The International Crisis Group reports that support among the local population, and even among the less militant terrorist group Jemmah Islamiyah (JI), is not high for Top’s extremist faction. However, if Top’s faction is allowed to continue to infiltrate Islamic boarding schools, it will continue to find the few supporters it needs to plan operations like the July 17 hotel bombing in Jakarta.

Recent revelations connecting Top’s group and various extremist groups in the Middle East and South Asia make all of this even more alarming. Unfortunately, given the lack of general media attention on this issue, I am not hopeful for improvement anytime soon.

The Time Has Come, the Walrus Said, to Talk of Many Things

Editor's Note: the following is a guest post from, Haley Gallagher. The views expressed are her own.

I doubt Lewis Carroll predicted when he published Through the Looking- Glass and What Alice Found There that it would have lessons as applicable today as they were to the late 1800’s. The message that resonated yesterday from Brian Katulis at the Center for American Progress (CAP) was that it’s time to move beyond the rhetorical debate about U.S. foreign policy in Afghanistan and seize the opportunity to engage in a broad and serious discussion.

CAP hosted an event, “Assessing the Afghan Election” yesterday and had a panel of experts (Jackie Northam, Eric Bjornlund and Brian Katulis) analyze the current situation in Afghanistan as well as suggest recommendations moving forward. Sadly, positive accolades given by the Obama Administration for the success of the elections in Afghanistan on August 20^th are not being echoed in other news publications. Turnout was not as high as expected due to various reasons highlighted by the panel including voter intimidation by the Taliban specifically in the South, heightened security, general apathy, and a sense of defeatism that neither candidate was a good option. Ms. Northam informed the audience that there was hope turnout would increase over the course of the day, but this was not the case. She never saw lines of more than 6-8 people coming out to vote in the streets of Kabul, one of the more heavily protected areas.

Mr. Bjornlund, with Democracy International, admitted that the security situation in Afghanistan made the elections very difficult to observe. Additionally, while this was the first time observers joined provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), it was extremely challenging to observe in rural areas. He echoed Ms. Northam’s sentiment that the climate influenced a lack of voter turnout. Furthermore, gauging an accurate percentage of voter turnout is nearly impossible to measure given that the amount of voters is uncertain. While an independent election commission exists to deal with allegations of voter fraud and electoral complaints, there is speculation over what the commission expects to do—or can do— with complaints once they’re registered.

Katulis painted an even grimmer picture stating that we can expect more violence to ensure in the days to come with potential increases in Taliban threats as well as candidates refusing to accept results. However, the time is crucial and the U.S. should seize the moment to engage in a serious policy debate about Afghanistan and determine how to ensure cooperation moving forward. He outlined three points: 1) It’s not too early to think about how to advance power sharing, 2) It’s extremely important for the U.S. to put pressure on Afghan leaders, who emerge from the election, to focus on anti-corruption, counter-narcotics and governance, and 3) The U.S. should be concerned about the lack of clear goals and objectives in Afghanistan.

The U.S. should demand a commitment from Afghan leaders to agree to power-sharing and working from the ground up to uproot the systems that have plagued Afghanistan for years. Moreover, we’ve been hearing the same thing about Afghanistan over the past two years which is endemic of a Groundhog Day effect. Katulis cautioned against using misleading words such as victory, win and success to describe the situation in Afghanistan. He also claimed that he has yet to hear a cogent case for more troops.

Another great point from the panel was that if the U.S. starts to look like an occupation, Afghanistan will reassert its sovereignty. Currently we lack a strong U.S. framework for a strategy in Afghanistan. While General Stanley McChrystal is expected to deliver this soon, there are questions regarding strength of the strategy. We cannot insert a U.S. model into Afghanistan and expect it to be a recipe for success. The U.S. tried before to impose the idea of a strong central government in Afghanistan and given the complexity of the society this will not work. Government must come from the ground up and include all of the right players in order to establish credibility and legitimacy. The dialogue needs to continue on a more serious level before opportunities are lost.

Aaaaand, We’re Going With the 80% Solution. Again.

Editor's Note: The following is a guest post by Jamie Morgan. The views expressed are her own.

“Smart power,” “the 3Ds”: Everyone seems to have an answer to the national security crisis facing our country. How do we realign our governmental infrastructure to address new and non-traditional security threats? General (ret.) Tony Zinni took a good stab at it today with a funny, thoughtful presentation at the New America Foundation. Yet despite a brilliant analysis of the problem, General Zinni stopped short of pushing the 100% solution. And I don’t think one can approach such sweeping problems with 80% solutions.

General Zinni suggested building a Civil Affairs Command, run by DOD, which would house the requisite capabilities for addressing the social, economic, political, and security efforts involved in post-conflict reconstruction.

With all due respect to General Zinni’s analysis and expertise, here are my problems with his proposed solution:

Low likelihood of full State and USAID participation. The likelihood of getting full participation, cooperation, and integration of personnel from State and USAID is unlikely if a new Civil Affairs Command is under DoD. Look at AFRICOM: The Command had the initial goal of upwards of 100 personnel from State, and after nearly a full year since being stood up, it currently houses 4. The reasons State officials cite for this range from a lack of available personnel to not wanting to send personnel over to make a DoD agency look good (this is of course, not the publically given answer). Regardless, State and AID are not going to come running with personnel and resources for a DoD run venture.

Leaves organizational culture issues unaddressed. While many elements of the culture of DoD are valuable and worth carrying into future organizations (such as the tireless determination to plan), some elements of DoD culture* would not be ideal for post-conflict reconstruction (such as the rigid adherence to organizational rules and models). Building a Civil Affairs Command under DoD rather than an inter-agency organization would not build on the positive cultural elements that State and AID have to offer, and would retain some of the organizational modus operandi that hinder it from being truly effective in post-conflict reconstruction.

Just is not the sweeping reform that is needed. Such an organization would not impart the message of sweeping reform among personnel – which is at the heart of the issue. In order for State, AID, and DoD personnel to really begin to consider the security, developmental, and political issues involved in post-conflict reconstruction, they will need to change the way they think and operate on a day-to-day basis. That type of change is hard for people to make. It takes pushing from on top, and pulling from a few determined soles within. Moving a few boxes on the organizational chart is not going to do that.

I Think This Is an Emergency, Or So It Has Been

Guest Post: Michael Rohrs is a counterterrorism intelligence analyst and consultant with BAE Systems. He is a member of Young Professionals in Foreign Policy and an occasional blogger on national security and foreign policy issues. The views expressed are his own.

I participate in a discussion group on international terrorism. The topic of tonight’s discussion is: the Office of Foreign Assets Control's (OFAC) ability to designate U.S.-based entities as ‘specially designated global terrorists.’ One of the preparation questions posed in advance (admittedly not one at the true heart of this debate) asks, “Eight years after 9-11, are we still in the midst of a ‘national emergency’ which is necessary to invoke the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)?”

The IEEPA, as defined by Adam J. Szubin in particularly lucid testimony,

…grants the President a broad spectrum of powers to deal ‘with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat.’ The President typically exercises these IEEPA powers through Executive Orders that declare a national emergency and impose economic sanctions to address the emergency.

On September 23, 2001, President Bush issued E.O. 13224 which has been renewed every year since—including 2009. What should happen in 2010?

Regarding the above question, here are my preliminary thoughts on the issue as prepared for discussion:

I think we can all agree that in the years immediately following 9-11, the country was well within the designation of a state of national emergency; and as with DHS, emergency measures were hastily but necessarily taken to mitigate extreme circumstances. That said, the threat of a terrorist act being committed on U.S. soil—be it from without or originating within—has not, and in my opinion is not going away. Even further, if you believe Philip Bobbitt, this is only the leading edge of the inevitable. In that sense we are undoubtedly facing a threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, and rightfully in a national state of emergency.

The same flag, however, can justifiably be waved from the opposite shore; it is precisely the perpetual state of threat that nebulous, transnational terrorism poses—not only to the United States but also to Americans abroad and the democratic international community writ large—that negates “state of national emergency” designation. If you believe threats of irregular attack with intent to incite terror in the United States are imminent, indefinite, adaptive, and ongoing (regardless of whether you believe we are actually “at war” with terrorists or on terrorism) then the IEEPA as a designation reserved for unusual and extraordinary circumstances—which includes the implication that they’re temporary—no longer applies.

Adopting this conclusion, as I do, requires a fundamental revision of thinking. It’s no secret that bureaucracy in general and American bureaucracy specifically has difficulty reconstructing paradigms. No paradigm is more deeply ingrained in the United States and about which Americans are more sensitive, than individual—and by extension national—security. However, in order for the IEEPA label to be lifted, U.S. lawmakers with the CT, HS, MI, and Intelligence communities need to redefine the state of the union as it regards the (sober and realistic) threat of terror, and redraft sensible and timely legislation to deal with a changing threat environment; an environment in which combating terror financing is an essential part. Until the paradigm is redrawn and national attitude is adjusted accordingly, however, it is unwise, unsafe, and unacceptable to scale back our counterterrorism intelligence practices at the risk of the American people.

Finally, consider this question: Does the IEEPA extend beyond mitigating risks of the U.S. homeland and its citizens abroad to ensuring that the US is not in any way facilitating (unwittingly!) the financing of terrorist organizations and their operations anywhere in the world? Let us assume the target of a given terrorist organization is something other than Americans and/or American interests. If U.S.-based charities are serving as an avenue (be it merely a canal or as a hub), it remains our responsibility (especially ours!) to paralyze, penetrate, and prosecute these conduits of terrorism. The question remains, however, whether circumstances renders the IEEPA specifically applicable. If not, does a suitable and sustainable (remember the IEEPA is for extraordinary temporary circumstances) alternative statute exist? If not, are we not morally and axiomatically responsible to implement one?

Unstable Countries: Will We Ever Get Ahead of the Curve?

Editor's Note: The following is a guest post by Jamie Morgan. The views expressed are her own.

There has been much talk on the media waves about whether the Islamist sect Boko Harem is Nigeria’s version of the Taliban. “Will the next attack come from Nigeria??” In my opinion, the answer to that question is a moot point. The real question is, what is the United States doing to ensure that the Nigerian government begins to address the source of these problems – the lack of infrastructure and services for its people? And how long will the Obama administration’s attention span last?

Washington seems to have what I call the Terrorism Test. Violence erupts in a new country. Is the group connected with a known terrorist group? If Yes, we care. If No, we don’t. Secretary Clinton met this morning with the President of Somalia’s floundering Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and pledged additional military support – in the form of 40 tons of weapons – to the government forces. The support to the TFG’s security forces is the right course of action. Thus far the security situation on the ground in the areas held by Al-Shabaab has been so bad that many of the aid workers implementing the touted $150 million in U.S. assistance have been forced to relocate to the north – where the aid is much less needed.

Yet the attention to Somalia comes, again, once the crisis has already erupted. This type of reactionary policy-making will never get us ahead of the curve on the threats to U.S. national security – terrorism or otherwise. One never knows what the next big threat will be, or from where the next terrorist group will emerge. The nuanced factors that turn a population frustrated with its government into one that channels its outrage towards Western world are many, and we have yet to fully understand them. Thus, let’s start giving focused attention and proper resources to unstable regions from the start, not waiting until they turn into full-scale crises.

On the Brink of Becoming a Failed State (On the Eve of its 62nd Birthday)

Editor's Note: the following is a guest post from Haley Gallagher, who served in the Peace Corps in Bangladesh. The views expressed are her own.

Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the “father of Pakistan” had a vision that his country would be that of a modern, moderate, secular society. Much has changed since August 14, 1947. There is a growing force of Islam-loving people throughout Pakistan yearning for the implementation of Islamic law. Rather than fighting the Taliban, this group of people believes the current military operation is counter-productive and that the state should be engaging the Taliban.

While the debate continues, many agree that Pakistan consistently fails to provide sufficient resources to its citizens. Under already inadequate education and infrastructure systems, the poor suffer the most during wartime conditions. Moreover and somewhat disconcerting, the country has a moderate youth bulge; the average age is 21 and over 37% of Pakistanis are under the age of 15. Given the current economic downturn and rising unemployment rate, many of these youths sit idle with nothing to do. This presents opportunities for the Taliban to recruit and train, yes, even children to be suicide bombers. As Pakistanis’ patience wanes the risk of violence increases and everyday access to social services such as education suffer (six Christians were burnt to death this week following allegations that they had desecrated a Koran).

Pakistan is currently a very volatile society and its citizens are stuck between a rock and a hard place in terms of whom to trust, be it Americans or the Taliban. Given their vulnerability, America should seize this opportunity to increase development aid and resources to Pakistan in an effort to regain their loyalty. The Peace Corps is the most powerful symbol of non-military service in our history. Both President Obama and former Republican President George W. Bush called for expanding the Peace Corps and their funding was increased to $373.4M this year, the largest percentage increase since 1993. While many would argue against sending the Peace Corps back into Pakistan, especially now, there are those willing to serve for a greater collective good.

Every overseas assignment presents risks and perhaps tapping into the Peace Corps’ Crisis Corps would be a better option. When John F. Kennedy called on young Americans to serve, it wasn’t during times of peace. The ‘60s were tumultuous and those willing to volunteer embraced the responsibility. Re-entering Pakistan in this capacity could present challenges. However, this is not a new endeavor for the United States. Navigating the political system is clearly the biggest obstacle. In the meantime, as the Peace Corps continues to double its efforts globally, Pakistan will have to rely on those local organizations that focus their efforts on bringing good governance and sustainable development to the people directly. There is a sense of urgency, however, to partner with those on the right side of governance and honor the vision that Jinnah worked so hard to create.

Seth Jones' Book: It's All Been Said Before

Editor's Note: the following is a guest post from my colleague, Haley Gallagher on an event for Seth Jones' new book In the Graveyard of Empires. The views expressed are her own.

After attending Seth Jones’ presentation of his new book, In the Graveyard of Empires, I wouldn’t quite give him the glowing praise supported by the Times.

For one thing, Jones didn’t illuminate anything that we South Asianists haven’t pondered before. You mean the U.S. should address the massive corruption, decentralization of Afghani politics, and engagement of the Pakistani military and civilian leaders? You don’t say.

To his first point, corruption at the national and local levels exists throughout all of South Asia. We have to ask ourselves why it’s so entrenched in these societies and how we work to minimize it? It seems to me that it’s due to the lack of revenue, resources and the law. If the United States can work at the grassroots level to promote real economic development and access to social services that is better than what the insurgents or foreign Islamic Aid agencies are providing, we’ll hopefully rebuild our trust and reputation among the Afghani people.

To his second point, most development and South Asia policy experts are aware of the level of decentralization that exists throughout Afghanistan. We all realize the importance, historical relevance and complexity of the clan and tribal structure within Afghanistan’s political system. We know that to win a war, we must foster strong tribal relationships and win their support. This cannot be done from the compound in Kabul, however. Nor should the United States rely solely on police, military or intelligence forces to win hearts and minds. The United States needs to promote good governance at the grassroots level within an Afghan context and their existing political structures. In addition to grassroots diplomacy, the United States should actively engage and support civil society and NGOs working throughout Afghanistan.

To Jones’ third point, no one has thought about Afghanistan in isolation from the rest of the region. We all know that Pakistan and India are other big players who can serve a vital role in finding and snuffing out militant groups. The geopolitics at play, however, are of great consequence. Many of Washington’s challenges in Pakistan and Afghanistan are linked, and so it is correct and overdue that the United States should formulate a strategy to address the region as a whole.

Back in April, the Council on Foreign Relations released a policy paper response to the new U.S. Strategy for South Asia, “From AfPak to PakAf.” In it, Daniel Markey suggests that “a policy of inducement—through financial, technical and diplomatic assistance—is the best means to shift the strategic calculations of influential Pakistanis and bolster moderates who share basic U.S. interests.” He also suggests that the United States should support long-term development assistance in Afghanistan, with the capacity and mandate to support and expand local, community-based development projects. I couldn’t agree more. As we’ve recently witnessed with the Iranian election, change oftentimes begins from the bottom up.

Guest Post: Double-Dutch Diplomacy

Ed. Note: The following is another guest post by Michael Rohrs. The views expressed are his own.

President Obama and his administration have heretofore taken a double-dutch approach to diplomacy; that is to stand just outside the turbine and gauge the tempo; pick a calculated spot and jump in; do work, jump out, and circle back for another pass. For the most part, they have done so adeptly and eloquently. Three weeks following his address in Cairo, however, the President seems to have gotten a little tripped and tangled.

• 24 June- President Obama reinstates the U.S. Ambassador to Syria—A post that has been strategically vacant for four years.
• 25 June- The White House rescinds its invitation to Iranian diplomats to attend Fourth of July celebrations worldwide (presumably held at American Embassies).
• 26 June- Ahmadinejad publicly demands an apology from President Obama for interfering in Iranian affairs of state.

The United States is in a heated diplomatic playoff with Iran. We know this. President Obama’s strategic reinstatement of the American Ambassador to Syria on Wednesday was a straight-steal. As the Post reported, “The loss of U.S. diplomatic leverage in the region,” caused by the American response to the Syrian government’s complicity in the 2005 assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, “has left a vacuum filled in large part by Iran.” It is no coincidence that because politics has forced President Obama to be careful regarding the contentious Iranian election, we’re trying to regain some diplomatic high-ground by climbing up the backside of the hill. The problem is we’re doing so clumsily.

Yesterday, the State department “disinvited” Iranian envoys from partaking in its Independence Day dissipation—a diplomatic disaster akin to taking your baseball and going home because they made you play right field. A tantrum only amplified by the White House’s self-deprecating quip, "July 4th allows us to celebrate the freedom and the liberty we enjoy…Freedom of speech. Freedom of religion. Freedom to assemble peacefully. Freedom of the press. So I don't think it's surprising that nobody's signed up to come."

Even if extending invitations to celebrate our (and the rest of the world’s) freedom is standard diplomatic practice, American diplomacy operates best when we’re calling the pitches. As George Orwell espoused as his sixth and final rule of writing, we should have broken any of these rules before doing anything outright barbarous. By offering up our most sacred regalia to a base body politic, we undercut our axiomatic authority. Remember, we’re dealing with no less than half of the official state sponsors of terrorism. I’m all for extending an open hand, but you don’t invite vegans to a bull roast.

Let’s hope the President regains his diplomatic rhythm and finds his double-dutch dexterity. We need to be playing by American league rules; especially on Independence Day.