Smart Influence

An iSpeech To Change The World

2010-01-27T11:07:00.005-05:00

A powerful and mysterious man steps in front of an audience of devoted followers, skeptics, and critics to deliver a speech that could change the world, create jobs, save industries, or all come crashing down around him. Both Steve Jobs and Barack Obama have big tasks today, and my advice for both of them is the same: manage expectations, show your work, be strong, and get a win.

Both speeches will anger some people, primarily for what they leave out. They will have features people won't expect. Some people will love it, no matter what, and others will hate it.

Apple's iPad, iTab, or whatever it ends up being called won't cure cancer (though ironically it might contribute to it). It might revolutionize the printing and journalism industries, though it might not. Jobs needs to tell us what it is and what it can be, but also what it is not. Whatever features it does not include (removable battery, forward facing camera) he should tell us why not. It should be evident what it does better than every device that has tried to do that task first, and he should hammer that point home and get a win.

The President needs to do the same thing. He is already getting based this week, especially from the Left, for a spending freeze very similar to that proposed by John McCain during the presidential debates. He's considered to be on the ropes after our new Republican/tea party overlord Scott Brown became the 41st senator. People are mad because they don't have jobs, the healthcare bill hasn't passed, the healthcare bill might pass, the government is spending too much money and running a deficit, they haven't received enough government money, etc. They will be mad at the things that are included, and mad if things like ending Don't Ask Don't Tell are not included after rumors said it would be. The president needs to lay out what can be accomplished in a way that makes it difficult for Congress not to work with him. He needs to show what he has done, and why he has not done more on other topics. He needs to seriously smack someone down and get a definite win in almost any arena. I almost hope a Republican does jeer him during the speech so that he can pull a "The Rock Obama." Nothing succeeds like success, and if the President wants to bring people back to his side he needs to take strong leadership on more issues.

Foreign policy probably will not be mentioned very much tonight, because jobs and the economy are first on people's minds. George H. W. Bush became a foreign policy focused president after facing domestic problems, and then became a one term president. If President Obama doesn't have wins in some arena he won't have the political capital for any arena, foreign or domestic.

Perhaps this time next year we'll all be watching and live-Tweeting President Obama's State of the Union on our iTab's, not able to imagine life without them. Perhaps Obama will also have approval ratings in the 70s after a wildly successful year continuing to bring us back from the depths of the Bush years. An Obama presidency in the abstract was as wonderful and open to possibility as the iTab has been for the past few months. People could imagine anything was possible. Delivering in the real world is a lot harder. But show what you have done, where it might still be possible to go, and how to get there and a lot more people will agree and help the process.

Google and Corporate Soft Power

2010-01-13T17:42:00.003-05:00

Underneath today's headlines of horror and destruction in Haiti (when was the last time something good happened to Haiti?) are two stories of courage, and in both cases the courage seems to be self-serving. In the first case Conan O'Brian told NBC to stick its schedule change where the sun don't shine, for which he seems to be universally praised, received great free publicity, and will probably end up with a better deal from Fox. Personally I can't imagine watching anything other than Stephen Colbert at 11:30, but it was a good and courageous move on Conan's part.

Google announced - on its blog - that it would no longer censor Google search results in China, risking having to close Google.cn and lose the potentially lucrative growing Chinese market. Before the announcement most people loved Google's products, but many people also feared its size, domination, and what it was doing with all the information it collects. Now Google has revamped its image, and may not even suffer financially, as China may back down and stop having their hackers try as intensively to hack Gmail (apparently the real cause of Google's ire). While some reactions range from skeptical to confused, most praise Google's actions, including the same free speech advocates who are scared of Google's expansion.

Google has proved very adept at improving its own image. I wonder how this move will play in China, and how many will notice (the Chinese government, not surprisingly, blocked news of the announcement). The question is important because much of the world sees the United States as much through our corporations as through the actions of our government. What is the United States' most important export? Democracy and capitalism? Or Levi's, McDonalds, Baywatch, and Nike?

Some countries, like China, take a very proactive role in determining their country's image abroad, making an effort to promote it, build cultural exchanges, and spread their aid toward countries where it needs a positive image. Other countries, like the United States and emulated by India, are willing to let their country's image be the image of their corporations. If the usual image of Americans is of fat, violent polluters with no morals, it is nice to think that other messages about some of our companies will get out as well, especially when those companies make moves that are both the right thing to do, and good for business. It's good to know the Obama Administration has hired some Google talent to help them, and supports Google's plan to pull out. The government could use some Google savvy in helping manage its image in the world.

Analyzing Underpants: On Intelligence Sharing Problems and Solutions

2010-01-08T12:56:00.002-05:00

A lot of articles, columns, blogs, and other material is out there analyzing what happened and why the intelligence community was not able to do its job and stop the Christmas Day "underpants bomber." Of course anyone looking for information should read the White House's own report (I've heard the classified version is much harsher). The Washington Post's infographic is quite good in showing how the system was supposed to work.

For a good insider account of the difficulties involved, especially with different spellings of non-English names, from former intelligence and friend-of-the-blog Jim Arkaedis read his latest post. (Jim's post on AQAP is also quite good, though I disagree with him regarding terrorist safe-havens).

If you want to follow the finger pointing, Josh Rogin is all over it.

If you want to talk about solutions Jennifer Sims and Bob Gallucci have a very sharp piece in the Post today, which echoes some of Malcolm Gladwell's ideas from Blink.

To win against a networked adversary, the intelligence community must share critical information with decision makers but not always with every element of its own community first. Assembling "puzzles" from many pieces is often necessary for planning and strategy; it takes time and the meticulous management of databases by analytical experts. But for day-to-day operations, decision makers often hold as many or more pieces than intelligence agencies do and certainly know better from moment to moment what knowledge they need to act. In terms of tactical decisions, sharing among intelligence agencies so that an "all source" product can be generated can be a form of hoarding. It can result in finished analyses that are irrelevant, unhelpful or even harmful to national security. [Italics mine]

Tico Thinking

2010-01-08T12:44:00.004-05:00

When I was 12 and 13 years old I lived (with my parents) in Costa Rica. The experience helped me deal with other cultures and ways of doing things, and often led to interesting discussions.

Why do we have to stand in line for everything, and why do you need six notarized forms and two passport-sized photos for any interaction with the government? Wouldn't it be easier to do only wait in one line?

Oh, that's gringo thinking.

Why don't they actually fix the potholes instead of just filling them with gravel?

That's gringo thinking.

Why doesn't the United States buy fewer tanks and fighter planes and spend the money on schools?

Silly, that's tico (as Costa Ricans are known) thinking!

Times columnist Nicholas Kristof seems to have discovered the same thing on his recent visit to Costa Rica, and names that choice as a primary reason why ticos are the happiest people.

What sets Costa Rica apart is its remarkable decision in 1949 to dissolve its armed forces and invest instead in education. Increased schooling created a more stable society, less prone to the conflicts that have raged elsewhere in Central America. Education also boosted the economy, enabling the country to become a major exporter of computer chips and improving English-language skills so as to attract American eco-tourists.
I’m not antimilitary. But the evidence is strong that education is often a far better investment than artillery.

People: the Best Homeland Security

2010-01-07T14:53:00.005-05:00

I imagine someone might be reading this on a mobile device as they are in an interminable security line at the airport waiting to go on spring break (they wisely got there early). But know this: the most draconian security measures we are proposing - full-body scans and extensive pat downs/strip searches - still would not have caught the Christmas day "Underpants Bomber" Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab.

I was going to write that because he flew from Nigeria Abdulmutallab wouldn't have gone through a full-body scanner, but it turns out that Nigeria's international airport already has scanners. It doesn't seem Abdulmutallab was scanned, since as the Truman Project's Melissa Skorka points out, the workers in many developing countries' airports are often concerned with things other than safety. But the real story, as Marc Sageman discussed at a Middle East Policy Council event today, is that Abdulmutallab carried only about three ounces of explosive, the equivalent of three packets of sugar, and it is extremely unlikely that either a body scan or a pat down would have discovered the packets. As another panelist today mentioned, Yemen now has a very creative bomb maker, and though both the butt bomb and the underpants bomb have failed, he will keep trying. Three sugar packets worth of powder makes me think he could hide it in actual sugar packets, or as tooth powder, or really just about anywhere.

We'll know more about what exactly led to the breakdown of intelligence in the case of the underpants bomber when the unclassified version of the report is released later today, but we do know this: our best defense is alert, smart people talking to each other. We need our intelligence community to do its job. The National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) is designed to bring representatives from the various agencies to share information with each other and put their heads together. One person should poke their head up over the cubicle and say "hey, this guy in Nigeria says his son is becoming radical" and another says "hey, I know of a Nigerian posting some radical thoughts online" and a third could say "hmm, the British just revoked a Nigerian's visa. Maybe we should do the same thing." But it didn't seem to work. No wonder people are clamoring for NCTC director Michael Leiter's head. Of course the NCTC has bigger problems, but Leiter has had plenty of time to work on them.

We also need as much interaction between governments and people in other countries. As much as an Obama Doctrine currently exists, it is based on the idea of smart power, and that means we need to keep our foot on the gas with diplomacy, exchanges, and training. DHS' Office of International Affairs needs to be fully staffed and step up its mission working on training, cooperation, and increasing security practices around the world. And people need to keep traveling the world and showing the good and productive side of Americans.

Finally, homeland security is everyone's responsibility. Who became suspicious and subdued Abdulmutallab? Not an air marshall (there wasn't one): other passengers. Same thing for Richard Reid, the shoe bomber. The DC Metro system constantly has announcements to report suspicious packages and the like. An alert and educated public can be our best weapon, since even DHS can hire only so many people.

DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano said "the system worked" in the aftermath of the attempted bombing, a quote she clearly regrets. Parts of the system didn't work, the parts we pay billions of dollars a year for, and clearly those parts need to work better. But if you include everyone in the system, than the system did work. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks everyone wanted to help, and many did by donating blood or needed materials. President Bush had an opportunity to tell everyone that they were part of the solution, and that their role was to always be vigilant. Instead he told them to go shopping. Luckily for us many got the message anyway. People are the most important defense against terror.

Federal Contracting: a Plague on Both Your Houses!

2009-12-22T21:30:00.005-05:00

President Obama signed the $626 billion defense bill recently, and various columnists and bloggers have decried what is or is not in the final version, including various ships, planes, and helicopters that are of no use or are vastly over budget. To me just as big a problem is the federal government's use of contractors. I'm not the only one who has noticed: the President himself asked for $40 billion in contracting costs to be cut over the next two budgets, and CNAS and others have come out with reports, but more attention needs to be paid.

Contractors come in multiple flavors (for the moment I'm not talking about government contracts to buy goods or materials). Some consider themselves "consultants" and swoop in with their MBAs and PowerPoint flow charts from companies like McKinsey or Deloitte, tell the government what they are doing wrong using proprietary jargon, and swoop on to the next project. A second group are essentially mercenaries, like the infamous Xe (formerly Blackwater) and others who serve in and around combat zones, primarily supporting the troops, but frequently overstepping their bounds. I have plenty of problems with those groups, but for now will focus on the third kind of contractors who are, for the most part, seat fillers hired by various agencies to supplement the federal workforce (whether their physical seats are in government buildings or not doesn't really matter, they are intended to supplement or replace federal employees by their mere presence).

I've worked as a "seat filling" contractor before, and I can tell you it is far from the most efficient way of doing things. Federal employees may be notorious for being inefficient and not hard working, a reputation that is normally false, but I can tell you that contractors are generally no better. Many if not most contractors actually want federal jobs, but have been unable to fight through the bureaucracy. Because contractors, usually make more than federal employees, and because the company makes overhead on top of their salaries, they don't normally end up being any cheaper than federal employees. The Bush administration wanted a smaller government and the flexibility to have a surge of workers, but the contractor complexes that have sprouted up around Northern Virginia demonstrate the long-term nature of federal seat-filling contracting. As the contracting workforce grows and the federal government remains stagnant the size of each portfolio of contracts administered by an individual federal employee increases drastically, leading to a lack of specificity, oversight, standards, and quality of work. Many of my contractor friends are bored out of their skulls in their cubicles in Northern Virginia because the over-worked federal employee only has so much time to look over their work, give them new projects, or do much of his own work, so the contractors sit burning contract hours slowly, wasting everyone's time.

The federal government needs to streamline its hiring process and hire the best of these contractors into permanent government service. As the last wave of federal employees starts to retire they will need replacing, so let the new generation start learning on the job. Hiring people who have served as contractors to administer contracts will lead to better performance from both parties. Federal contractors were intended to serve as short term surges for projects. They should actually serve that way rather than as expensive, non-empowered, de facto federal employees who are contracted out simply because they can't be hired quickly enough or to avoid having a bigger government. End the facade, it hurts everyone.

A Tale of Two Speeches

2009-12-16T17:44:00.005-05:00

President Obama gave two important foreign policy speeches recently, and the opinion pages and blogosphere can't seem to stop talking about them. I didn't want to have my voice be lost in the immediate aftermath, but now that much of the dust has settled I thought I'd add a few thoughts.

The President's long-awaited speech rolling out his new Afghanistan strategy pleased almost no one who chose to examine it closely. It took too long, it wasn't detailed enough, it was too specific, some of the details were wrong, he didn't focus on Pakistan enough, he focused too much on Pakistan... Jon Stewart made fun of it for being too much like a speech President Bush could have given. Some bloggers complained that he had conflated the Afghanistan and Pakistani Taliban, and that anyone who doesn't understand the difference couldn't possibly come up with a good strategy. The West Point cadets watching the speech didn't seem to know how to respond until the speech stopped being specific and started going in to broad, soaring generalities and hopeful themes - Obama's specialty. In the days following the speech it turned out that few of the specifics were actually totally true. The troop "surge" may not take place until Fall 2010, and they will only "start" to be pulled out in Summer 2011. The speech failed to be all things to all people, and thus was not well received.

President Obama's Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech made up for it in a big way. It was masterfully written and beautifully delivered. Critics called it the best of Obama's career, and certainly the best of his Presidency so far. It spoke truth to the power of the Nobel committee, addressed the oddity of winning a peace prize while leading a nation engaged in two wars, acknowledged previous winners, and defended the use of military force while advancing progressive ideals. It was a perfect encapsulation of the Truman Project worldview - which makes sense since it was written by someone affiliated with the Truman Project. Writers from the progressive side to at least the conservative moderation of David Brooks loved the speech. About all critics of the speech could say was that it was rambling and disjointed. I loved the speech, but the critics are right. Everyone was happy with it because they could read what they wanted into the speech. Dan Drezner made an attempt to map out the various international relations theories referred to in the speech. It was another classic piece of Obama magic: choosing the middle path and creating buy-in from all sides by incorporating their arguments. It made for a powerful speech, but it will be hard to predict his future foreign policy moves based on a speech that left almost every door open.

On Paranoid Pakistanis

2009-11-24T14:40:00.006-05:00

Given half an opportunity, Pakistanis can be some of the most paranoid people on the planet. They tend to fear that India -- or sometimes the United States -- is behind every single bad thing that happens to them. If a Pakistani stubs his toe it was probably an Indian spy who snuck in and made that crack in the sidewalk. Lou Dobbs would be a big hit in Pakistan; maybe he should do a show there rather than running for president in 2012. Ahmed Rashid has a good article up on the BBC News website on conspiracy theories in Pakistan.

Some people in Pakistan probably should be paranoid. President Zardari should be paranoid; people really are plotting against him, which is understandable given the job he is doing.

I've heard other crazy theories from Pakistanis ranging from the idea that all U.S. technology, especially nuclear technology, contains a secret "off" switch, so that when our Indian overlords give the order we can secretly send out a radio signal and make all Pakistani military equipment cease to work. Or that the militant bombings in Peshawar and elsewhere are not the work of the Taliban, but instead are the work of Blackwater.

The last thing you would want to do is give any kind of credibility to those rumors, right? Imagine how crazy Dobbs and the FreeRepublic folks would go if President Obama accidentally mentioned something about going "home" to Kenya, or said something about going to a mosque.

So who's bright idea was it to hire ~~Blackwater~~ Xe Total Intelligence Solutions (TIS) to work doing "snatch-and-grabs" based in Karachi, Pakistan? Apparently since we officially can't have our military operating in Pakistan, we'll just outsource it to civilians. Let's just hope none of them are of Indian descent.

Categorize this one as "stupid power."

Does The Onion Now Have a Foreign Policy Editor?

2009-11-19T16:33:00.004-05:00

That bastion of satire The Onion has been on a roll lately regarding foreign policy. Did they get a new writer or editor with more foreign policy, or is Afghanistan just really easy to mock because no obvious answers exist? Here's a quick round up, but keep your eyes out for others.

"Obama Weighs Options in Afghanistan" -- my favorite is "Not only learn the lessons of Vietnam, but apply them as well"

"Heroin Addicts Pressure President to Stay the Course in Afghanistan"

"Afghan Presidential Election A Celebration Of All Forms Of Government" -- "Afghanistan has become a shining beacon of democracy, theocracy, autocracy, and authoritarianism in an otherwise troubled region."

Perhaps the best is "U.S. Continues Quagmire-Building Effort In Afghanistan"

This video of course is similar to my idea about Call of Duty: Counterinsurgency.

Ultra-Realistic Modern Warfare Game Features Awaiting Orders, Repairing Trucks

Of course the greatest Onion foreign affairs article ever, written just before George W. Bush took office and proving to be all to prophetic, remains "Bush: 'Our Long National Nightmare of Peace and Prosperity is Finally Over.'" It gets sadder and more true every time I read it.

"Off Ramps" for Afghanistan

2009-11-16T10:47:00.003-05:00

With the "all COIN all the time" crowd calling for 40,000 more troops and years upon years in Afghanistan I'm relieved to know that President Obama is dissatisfied with the current options and is looking for an "off ramp" for Afghanistan. Whether Ambassador Eikenberry's leaked cables were the catalyst for that kind of thinking or not, I'm glad that the President is looking for a way out. The difference between us and the British or Soviets is that we are not seeking an empire, we do not wish to remain in Afghanistan indefinitely, therefore our end goal must be leaving, and the strategy has to include doing that as soon as possible while preserving our long-term security.

Steve Coll is always worth reading, so check out his "If we fail in Afghanistan" article. I'm not sure I agree with his second point/scenario especially, but it's an interesting read. Coll is far more pessimistic on the consequences of leaving Afghanistan than skeptics like Stephen Walt. Coll and Walt were on different panels at a RAND discussion on Afghanistan a few weeks ago (Paul Pillar was also excellent), but I would love to have seen them actually debate the issue.

I am not calling for an immediate withdrawal. I would support sending more troops, as long as it is for a purpose and we have a plan for what they will do, but I am very glad that the subject of how and when we can leave is an important part of the discussion.

Police and Counterinsurgency, Home and Abroad

2009-11-16T10:02:00.005-05:00

Yesterday's Washington Post had an interesting article on page A3 about students (military officers) from my alma mater, the "elite" Naval Postgraduate School, teaching police in Salinas, California "counterinsurgency strategy, bringing lessons from the battlefield to the meanest streets in an American city" in order to combat Salinas' gang problems.

I'm all for increased civilian-military interaction and sharing of lessons learned. And I certainly don't count myself as an expert in counterinsurgency tactics or operations. But here's the thing: police are supposed to be good at counterinsurgency. The military has adapted to doing counterinsurgency out of necessity, but they are unsuited to it and would prefer to go back to force-on-force operations. Police officers, both in Salinas and in Iraq and Afghanistan, ideally come from the community, live in the community, are committed long-term, know and win the respect of the local population, and can spot people or events that are out of place and a potential threat. Hopefully that's what the article is trying to say: "The thrust of the plan relies on winning the trust of people. In Salinas, as in Iraq and Afghanistan, the uniformed forces patrolling 'are still viewed as an occupying force,' said Police Chief Louis Fetherolf."

Even the much-maligned (by me) Michael O'Hanlon seems to recognize that in his Post op-ed today (that IS his point, right? That we need the police to be better in Afghanistan?).

So I hope what my former NPS colleagues are telling the Salinas police force is to learn Spanish, hire more Latino police officers, and involve the community. More firepower is not what's needed, in Salinas or Kandahar.

Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Haven't I Refuted This Before?

2009-11-10T23:40:00.004-05:00

Seymour Hersh has an article in The New Yorker asking the tired questions of whether Pakistan's nuclear weapons are safe from capture by al-Qaeda or the Taliban. He asserts that because militants have attacked well-defended Pakistani military facilities, other well-defended facilities, including nuclear locations, could be in danger.

If I'm not mistaken a well-defended U.S. military facility, Fort Hood, was just attacked by someone with insider knowledge of security and facilities, but that doesn't mean that anyone outside of Hollywood screenwriters think U.S. nuclear facilities are likely to be attacked or captured by militants. Indian Maoist naxalite militants have attacked government facilities, but no one worries publicly about the security of India's nuclear weapons. Hersh argues that components are most vulnerable when they are being moved. Hmm, you mean like when nuclear parts are accidentally flown across the country, or mistakenly delivered to Taiwan? Didn't the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force get fired for those mistakes not too long ago? Let's discuss reality here.

Once again, yes, Pakistan's government is unstable. President "Mr. Ten Percent" Zardari may well be forced out of office in the next six months, but that may well lead to increased stability in Pakistan, not less. The Pakistani military is considered a common player in Pakistani society and politics, and is perhaps the most stable element. The nuclear warheads are stored and secured separately from the triggers and the delivery systems, and the Pakistanis have developed extensive nuclear security systems.

If anything Pakistan seemed more unstable back in May, when the Taliban had famously crept within 90 miles of the capital, Islamabad. The New York Times ran a piece quoting various experts as saying the nuclear stockpile was safe. What has changed since then other than Sy Hersh decided this was a good sensational story to write? He dismisses all the expert opinions he finds that run contrary to his view, because "are Pakistan's nuclear weapons safe? Yes" would be a pretty boring article.

I imagine I or someone like me will have to refute some sensationalist account about terrorists and Pakistan's nuclear weapons every six months or so for at least several years to come. Of course it's a valid concern and one that should not be ignored, but it is also unlikely, and Pakistan should be given credit for protecting its arsenal.

Obama's Fort Hood Speech

2009-11-10T21:00:00.005-05:00

It's hard picking a favorite speech from a president who is both known for his public speaking and has great speechwriters, but his brief remarks at the Fort Hood memorial service this afternoon is one of the best, especially coming the day before Veterans Day. I encourage everyone to take the time to read or watch it.

Management Consultant as Foreign Affairs Columnist?

2009-11-02T18:15:00.005-05:00

Foreign Policy blogger and Tufts professor Daniel Drezner went to a management consultant conference and shared his top ten tips, both on his blog and Twitter. All I could think of was how it sounded just like 90% of Thomas Friedman's columns.

4) In Every Coversation with a Client, Mention Your Last Trip to China. This is tricky, as you have to be casual about it, while still drivng home the point that you are intimately familiar with the world's fastest-growing market. Here are some possible ways to get this point into casual conversation: "I was talking to one of our clients in Shenzhen On Monday, and...""I was sunbathing in Chengdu a week ago...""When I went bass-fishing in Chongqing last month...""A funny thing happened when I went to a cockfight in Harbin on Tuesday....""If, like me, you ever find yourself in Tianjin biting the head off of a live chicken...." ...

6) Use Factoids To Distract Amaze Your Audience. To drive home a point that might encounter pushback from the audience, be sure to snap off a statistic that seems related to your point. For example, if you're trying to convince your customers that Western Africa is a more promising market than Western Europe, you can say, "Did you know there are more live births in Nigeria than in W. Europe?" Some other possibilities:"Did you know that in Tokyo, a bicycle is faster than a car for any distance less than 30 miles?""Did you know that the most popular first name in the world is Muhammad?""Did you know that the first product to have a bar code was Wrigleys gum?""Did you know that Jedi is an official religion in Australia?"

7) Put a Modern Spin on Old Cliches. Example: "To paraphrase Keynes, 'In the long run, we're all liquefie-- I mean, we're all liquid.'"

Where Does Afghanistan Go From Here?

2009-11-02T17:15:00.003-05:00

As late as two days ago requests for observers to go monitor the Afghanistan run-off election were passing my email inbox; now President Karzai's challenger, Abdullah Abdullah, has dropped out, cancelling the run-off and handing Karzai a second term he was likely to have won anyway. Wow. Where does that leave the government of Afghanistan?

Weak and corrupt to be sure, but that's nothing new. News broke last week that Karzai's brother Amed Wali, he of the rapidly growing wallet and probably drug and warlord ties, has been on the CIA payroll for years. Abdullah said he dropped out because he didn't have confidence the run-off would be any less corrupt than the first election. That's fair, but I also think Abdullah was unprepared to actually lead Afghanistan. United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki Moon is said to be attempting to negotiate a place for Abdullah in the government, but I'm not holding my breath.

The run-off was supposed to be another chance to establish some semblance of credibility in the Afghan government. With Karzai still in power without even having to stuff ballot boxes it weakens the U.S. position. We are stuck saying "please be less corrupt and actually try to govern" much like we were stuck for long periods of time asking the Pakistani government to pretty please attack those pesky terrorists hiding in their country.

All of this makes things more difficult for President Obama's still-debating Afghanistan team. I'd still be debating too, as I have talked to and heard from many smart people who disagree strongly on the best course of action. It's another obstacle in a difficult swamp we are negotiating. It's clear that those calling for a rushed decision, like Dick Cheney, were wrong. We need a well-reasoned strategy to allow us to withdraw as soon as possible (even if that is a few years away) and leave behind as little chaos as possible.

Soon is the Winter of Our Afghanistan Discontent

2009-10-18T22:30:00.004-04:00

The three main stories about South Asia in the recent news all focus on waiting: for President Obama to make a decision on a strategy and troop levels, for the official results of the Afghanistan election, and for the Pakistani Army to finally begin its offensive into South Waziristan. Waiting is not the worst thing in the world; no matter what is decided on any of those matters the fighting will likely slow to a trickle soon, since Afghanistan becomes even more inhospitable and difficult to fight in every winter.

President Obama is right to take his time discussing his South Asian strategy with as many advisers as he needs and for as long as it takes. With every passing day the critics and think tankers here inside the Beltway pace across their offices and write more and more op-eds bravely criticizing a war many of them once supported and then argued should be left alone in favor of invading Iraq, but it is worth the time needed to come up with a functional strategy. As Truman Fellow Alex Rossmiller points out, the current situation in Afghanistan is not the cliched do-or-die crossroads/critical juncture; we could sustain the current stalemate for many years to come without "losing" or "winning" any more than we currently are. General McChrystal's suspected request of 40,000 additional troops, if approved, would not arrive until around a year from now, and would still fall far, far short of the number needed for a "true" counterinsurgency campaign. Even then, as McChrystal admits, if we don't have an effective partner in the Afghan government even hundreds of thousands of troops spending another decade in Afghanistan would likely do little good.

The much-delayed results of the Afghanistan election were supposed to finally be announced this weekend, but have been delayed yet again. Enough fraudulent ballots are expected to be thrown out that Karzai will fall short of the 50 percent needed to avoid a run-off. The ideal situation would be for Karzai to accept some sort of power-sharing arrangement situation, but that looks unlikely. Since he has proved to be at best a reluctant partner in actually governing his country, many U.S. leaders would prefer to work around him, but as the recognized leader of Afghanistan that is proving quite difficult. The necessity of propping up and empowering a corrupt, incompetent leader who will only inevitably collapse when we leave is not much incentive for committing more time, money, and personnel.

After over a month of buildup (both actual military buildup and media hype) this weekend the Pakistan Army finally began its offensive into South Waziristan, the home of the Mehsud clan. Since everyone knew the offensive was coming everyone has had a chance to prepare themselves to flee (an estimated 100,000 people have been displaced so far) or fight.

The looming winter will allow all parties time to sit around and think. I think the Pakistani military timed their offensive when they did in order to accomplish just enough that the Pakistani Taliban wouldn't be able to regroup and mount a major counter-offensive and to ensure that the military would not be able to overcommit. President Obama's Afghanistan strategy group will not make a decision before the results of the election are clear. The winter lull is a mixed blessing for the Administration, since no major action will be possible. The President's team should avoid getting distracted by the sniping attacks from neoconservatives all winter and focus on determining the best course of action in a region with no good options.

The Big Afghanistan Strategy Rendezvous

2009-10-06T16:12:00.002-04:00

I was at East Potomac Golf Course yesterday afternoon when a bunch of military helicopters flew by overhead. I remarked to my playing companions that it was probably Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen headed to the White House for the afternoon Afghanistan discussion. They looked at me like I was sharing top secret information rather than readily available news, but it goes to show that even in DC, where "everyone" is enthralled with the ongoing Afghanistan strategy debate, "everyone" is really just a few of the wonkiest of us.

To recap, so far General McChrystal is arguing for an intensive population-centric counterinsurgency strategy, including an increase of probably 40,000 U.S. troops. Vice President Joe Biden continues to advocate for a troop draw down and a focus on counter terrorism and targeting al Qaeda leadership. President Obama has gathered the usual suspects for regular discussions in hopes of coming up with a coherent strategy. While I have been calling for a defined and articulated end goal and strategy since at least several things we introduced as strategies ago, I applaud the effort now as better late than never, assuming in the end we come up with an actual strategy. So what if it took the farce of an Afghan election to cast doubt on the idea of the Afghanistan government taking over smoothly in a few years and keeping Afghanistan stable, at least we're now discussing it.

Last week Fred Kaplan brought up two key questions the strategy team should answer:

First, is Afghan President Hamid Karzai likely to rally the support of his own people, especially given the massive fraud in the recent election? (If he doesn't rally this support, counterinsurgency is doomed to fail; this, the top U.S. military leaders acknowledge.)
Second, given the vast amount of blood, treasure, and time that a COIN campaign requires under the best of circumstances, are the prospective benefits worth the cost?

And today Marc Lynch countered with five questions of his own. I think all of those questions are important, and I hope they are being discussed in the room, but my big concern is what the end goal is for Afghanistan. The major difference I see between us and the British and Soviets - and hopefully the reason we can succeed where they failed - is that we do not want to occupy Afghanistan any longer than necessary. The goal is for us to withdraw from an Afghanistan that no longer harbors a threat to the world, and I hope the team takes that long term a view of the problem.

It only added to the turmoil when General McChrystal mentioned that he had only ever talked to President Obama once since taking over, and has advocated for his counterinsurgency campaign (which he falsely calls a strategy) in recent talks and media interviews he has done. This has led to debates about whether the field commander should be playing politics and pushing his agenda through the media rather than going through the chain of command. Some have interpreted this as pulling a MacArthur, others have defended him. Obama has yet to pull a Truman in '51 - though he would be justified since McChrystal to me is undermining his Commander in Chief and clearly has said his piece - but was smacked down by Secretary Gates. McChrystal was put in place over General McKiernan because he could supposedly think in bigger and more flexible ways, but so far only seems to follow the COIN orthodoxy.

I'm glad the Afghanistan strategy debate is happening, both behind closed doors and out in the public. It's about bloody time, and by that I mean it's about eight years too late. But McChrystal needs to contribute through the chain of command, the way he has his entire career. I know he's an unconventional warrior, but he can't ambush the President. The principals need to go into the room and spend as much time as necessary, but when they come out they need to speak with one voice, believe it, and execute it. If McChrystal can't get on board if the decision doesn't go his way he will need to be sent home.

Twisted Logic on Pakistan's Nukes

2009-10-06T14:46:00.004-04:00

Someone help me understand this: the biggest danger in South/Central Asia is al Qaeda getting its hands on one or more of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. Al Qaeda's leadership and many of their fighters are currently in Pakistan. Therefore the argument is we should send 40,000 more troops to Afghanistan? I'm not sure I follow the logic chain. Assuming we failed and largely pulled out of Afghanistan, and assuming the Taliban (whose leaders are also primarily in Pakistan) re-take control of much of Afghanistan, and assuming the Taliban welcome al Qaeda back and provide them the oft-mentioned "safe haven" (and none of those assumptions are sure things by the way), they would then be MORE likely to attack Pakistan's nuclear facilities?

When the Taliban famously advanced into the Swat valley, within 90 miles of the capital Islamabad, I argued against the doom sayers, saying Pakistan was not about to collapse. Now the Pakistani military has largely driven the Taliban from Swat and is preparing for an offensive in South Waziristan, home to much of the Taliban leadership. Drone strikes have successfully taken out many leaders, including Baitullah Mehsud (leading to this lovely ditty). Pakistan was not about to collapse then, and is not about to collapse or give up its nuclear weapons now. Pakistan's nuclear weapons are safe, and should not be used as a bureaucratic pawn in the strategic debate. I'm all for a vigorous debate on goals and strategies, but let's apply a few sober standards of logic to this strategic conversation.

CIA's Climate Change Center

2009-09-30T16:09:00.002-04:00

For those of you still in doubt about the link between national security and climate change - natural security as some have dubbed it - the Central Intelligence Agency, not best known for cutting edge innovation, has opened a new Center on Climate Change and National Security. It seems to be mostly to predict when and where natural disasters or natural resource shortages will cause instability, but it's a start.

New Thinkers Needed for Afghanistan

2009-09-28T09:38:00.003-04:00

Let me get this straight: what we're doing in Afghanistan is not working; the President has been presented with options, basically double down or go for a minimalist approach; the leading commander in Afghanistan says we could be there for 100 years and still fail; we're promising continued support for Karzai even though the main problem is that Afghanistan's central government is corrupt, incompetent, and generally refuses to pull any weight; and the main argument for adding additional troops is that we tried the alternative (a "counter terrorism" approach) under Bush and it didn't work. Really? Only two options exist? The President is right to think about this one long and hard.

Where are the real alternative ideas? Better yet, where are the alternative thinkers, preferably someone under 50 who has actually been on the ground in Afghanistan without a huge protective escort. Gates, Jones, Petraeus, McChrystal, Holbrooke, Clinton, Riedel... all over 50. Is it any wonder that all of their reviews said basically the same thing -- Afghanistan is critical, but we can still win -- without offering a real strategy or real solutions?

Give me someone really outside the box. How about we make Joshua Foust think of solutions instead of criticizing others. Let's get Fred Kaplan in the room. Why isn't someone asking Katherine Tiedemann for new ideas? Ask Craig Mullaney what he would do. Maybe Greg Mortenson could add an outsider's opinion of what to do. For all the talk about how the Obama Administration is full of young go-getters his Afghanistan team is full of old retreads with the same old ideas. I'm far from the first person to say we aren't fighting an eight-year war in Afghanistan, we're fighting a one-year war eight times in a row. You think going back to the same ideas is going to break that cycle?

Fighting in Afghanistan will die down in a few weeks, as it does every winter. That gives us the luxury of a real debate for new ideas. We don't need another strategic review, we need a real strategy, and we should include new thinkers and new ideas in the debate.

Worse Decision Making: Redskins or the Afghanistan Team?

2009-09-21T09:25:00.005-04:00

The Washington Post headline this morning blared out: "McChrystal: More Forces or 'Mission Failure;'" I wished they had used the headline from below the fold (about the Redskins): "First and Unsure of the Goal."

It was inevitable that General McChrystal's classified review of the situation in Afghanistan would be leaked. It was almost as inevitable that the review, as Joshua Foust put it, contains "absolutely nothing new." The most disturbing aspect of the review is that it talks about the "counterinsurgency strategy." Our commander in Afghanistan thinks that counterinsurgency IS the strategy. Shouldn't that be a red flag? McChrystal's expertise is supposedly thinking unconventionally, but his review is extremely inside the (counterinsurgency) box in its thinking: more troops, more resources, more time, full speed ahead.

At last week's excellent Foreign Policy and New America Foundation event "Covering Afghanistan:A Conversation On How It Looks From the Ground" Steve Coll expressed optimism that President Obama's team was taking a full and deep assessment of the strategic rationale for being in Afghanistan (look for my question and his answer near the end of the video). I'm still more skeptical that new thinking will emerge, though I'm slightly more hopeful after reading the Post's other article today. The key quote is:

The president, one adviser said, is "taking a very deliberate, rational approach, starting at the top" of what he called a "logic chain" that begins with setting objectives, followed by determining a methodology to achieve them. Only when the first two steps are completed, he said, can the third step -- a determination of resources -- be taken.

And he should work in that order. It's good to hear that starting to happen, although perhaps it would have been nice to start the process four or five "strategic reviews" ago, or during the transition, or in 2002. It remains to be seen who has a plan to score a touchdown first, the national security team or the Redskins. Better late than never?

Overstating my Power? bin Laden, You're On Notice!

2009-09-17T10:22:00.005-04:00

Apparently expressing my frustration that we have yet to catch or kill a given terrorist is enough to get said terrorist killed. Do the world's terrorist-hunting teams all read Smart Influence and get motivated when they see me write about their prey? First I expressed my frustration that we had shot at Baitullah Mehsud repeatedly without hitting him and lo and behold we hit him. Last week Jamie Morgan's guest post talked about the right and wrong ways to fight Noordin M. Top's terrorist group in Indonesia; I'm pretty sure killing Top is part of the right way!

So who's left? Lots of people, for sure, but for now, Osama bin Laden, you're on notice (copyright Stephen Colbert)! I'm officially sick of our inability to capture or kill you. Can't we just look where they are sending his record label checks from his new Auto-Tuned album?

Recycled Afghanistan Stories and Ideas

2009-09-16T14:09:00.003-04:00

I haven't written much not because I had nothing to say, but rather to avoid getting caught up in the tornado of voices, especially on Afghanistan. The news all seems recycled, and so do the ideas.

Afghanistan is corrupt and the election was likely stolen. We knew that was the case, and we knew the elections would probably be stolen.
Both Fareed Zakaria and Fred Kaplan had the same brilliant idea that we should simply throw money at the problem by bribing everyone and their brother in Afghanistan.
Paul Pillar sums up the "safe haven" debate nicely, but it's nothing I, or others didn't say.
Another smart, young officer, Joseph Kerns Goodwin, returned from Afghanistan to tell us how bad the situation is on the ground, which we will likely ignore.
A draft of the metrics was released today, and while it appears to be thoughtful and contain a list of good things to measure, it lacks any actual numbers. Don't worry, apparently Afghanistan is like kindergarten, we can keep trying as many reviews and metrics as it takes to get it right. For as long as I've waited for the metrics you might think they would get me excited, but nope, nothing.
The COIN crowd keeps arguing that COIN is awesome and the solution to everything and ignoring the lack of a strategy that COIN is supposed to help implement. They are even having a big COIN conference to talk about how important COIN is. Fun! (would they seem even nerdier if we called them numismatists?)
Even Osama bin Ladin's message seemed phoned in. "Death to America and Israel, blah blah blah." (although at least one blogger has promised to Auto-Tune the tape; maybe that can spice it up.)

Is it the economy? Is there a down market for ideas right now? Even I feel repetitive: Pakistan is not going to collapse despite the heavy-handed Pakistani military; we need an actual strategy in Afghanistan; we need to work on our smart power; etc, etc.

I'm all for recycling, but this is ridiculous. Wake me up when you're ready to have a non-circular debate.

Wrong Answer for Indonesian Terror

2009-09-09T12:05:00.003-04:00

Editor's Note: The following is a guest post by Jamie Morgan. The views expressed are her own.

Indonesian officials announced a plan to tighten anti-terrorist laws, which would allow the government to detain suspects for up to two years. The government claims this will allow them to get more in line with the laws of Western nations. (Are two year detention allowances standard in Western nations now?) Additionally, several of the senior-level government Ministers are seeking an amendment to a terrorism investigation law that would allow non-police forces, including the Indonesian Military (TNI), to conduct anti-terror investigations.

All of this is disconcerting for two reasons. First, we are talking about a country that just emerged from a brutal dictatorship 11 years ago. The military was the major instrument of former President Suharto to control the population during his rule, and expanding the military’s powers such a short time after his fall does not send a good message to the population, nor is it a good idea for the fledgling democracy.

Second, and possibly more importantly for the rest of the world, expanding the amount of time the Indonesian government can legally hold terrorism suspects without charge is not going to do anything for its fight against Noordin M. Top’s terrorist group. It actually might harm it. The government needs to focus on identifying the root causes of support for Top’s group among certain areas of the Indonesian population, rather than inflame public opinion against it. The International Crisis Group reports that support among the local population, and even among the less militant terrorist group Jemmah Islamiyah (JI), is not high for Top’s extremist faction. However, if Top’s faction is allowed to continue to infiltrate Islamic boarding schools, it will continue to find the few supporters it needs to plan operations like the July 17 hotel bombing in Jakarta.

Recent revelations connecting Top’s group and various extremist groups in the Middle East and South Asia make all of this even more alarming. Unfortunately, given the lack of general media attention on this issue, I am not hopeful for improvement anytime soon.

The Afghanistan Genie: Wish Three

2009-09-08T22:33:00.003-04:00

The war in Afghanistan is a funny thing. Who ever thought that Nicholas Kristof, Thomas Friedman, George Will, and Cindy Sheehan would all agree on something? For that matter, who thought that a band of neocons including Sarah Palin and I would basically agree?

But at a time when our presence in Afghanistan is being compared to everything from Vietnam to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (ignoring the many obvious differences) hope and optimism can spring from the most unlikely places. We were all waiting on General McChrystal's strategic review, which apparently will not be released publicly. But Laura Rozen, in her job over at Politico, unearthed a gem dated August 10th entitled "United States Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign for Support to Afghanistan." Wow. Why didn't THIS receive more publicity? A coordinated approach from McChrystal and U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Eikenberry, what a concept. The plan seems very well thought out, I'm highly impressed. I challenge anyone to read the plan and not be more optimistic than they were before. It leans very heavily on counterinsurgency theory, but it doesn't make the mistake so many Beltway think tankers do of equating COIN with actual strategy.

You may recall that I first wished we would actually hit Baitullah Mehsud with a Predator drone strike after so many tries, and with my second wish asked for actual metrics for success in Afghanistan (and Pakistan). Well guess what? The "Integrated Civ-Mil Campaign" plan contains metrics! Not the National Security Council's metrics, set to be delivered to Congress by September 24th, but pretty good ones. The loquacious Spencer Ackerman has a very nice write up of the metrics.

So what should I wish for with my third wish? A job on the National Security Council? Fifteen minutes alone in a room with Holbrooke to try to talk sense to him? Those seem in the realm of possibility; my other option--magically having the personnel for an actual "civilian surge"--does not.

Post Op-Eds on Afghanistan

2009-09-03T10:00:00.004-04:00

As the debate over Afghanistan heats up inside the Beltway and around the country the Washington Post has had four significant op-eds on Afghanistan this week, two terrible, one merely repetitive, and one very good.

Let's start with the good. Everyone should read former Senator Chuck Hagel's piece from today, in which he argues that,

Our greatest threats today come from the regions left behind after World War II. Addressing these threats will require a foreign policy underpinned by engagement -- in other words, active diplomacy but not appeasement. We need a clearly defined strategy that accounts for the interconnectedness and the shared interests of all nations. Every great threat to the United States -- whether economic, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, health pandemics, environmental degradation, energy, or water and food shortages -- also threatens our global partners and rivals. Accordingly, we cannot view U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan through a lens that sees only "winning" or "losing." Iraq and Afghanistan are not America's to win or lose. Win what? We can help them buy time or develop, but we cannot control their fates.

Meanwhile David Ignatius' column yesterday was virtually identical to any number of stories from February, March, and April on the President deciding between counterinsurgency and counter terrorism options, the only difference being the substitution of McChrystal for McKiernan. That's not Ignatius' fault, it is simply a good indicator that we are still treading water in Afghanistan.

George Will's column arguing for a withdrawal from Afghanistan, on the other hand, was as bad as Hagel's was good. Will should stick to decrying the decline of our entire society because we wear jeans. Will has already been savaged by left and right alike (my favorite comment was from Joshua Foust, "George Will waits for a Democrat to get in the White House before calling Afghanistan unwinnable. Classy."), so I'll just say that Will appears to be arguing for Bill Clinton's foreign policy: lob a few cruise missiles in based on inadequate intelligence. Did Will support that policy at the time? How well did it work?

On Monday Anthony Cordesman, a smart guy and a member of McChrystal's review team, argued that while we can't win in Afghanistan in the next three months, we can lose in that time frame, if enough resources are not devoted to the cause. That makes sense; we do almost certainly need additional resources. But then he bizarrely goes on to argue that we shouldn't worry about strategy, simply about tactics. That's the opinion of the "Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy?" A strategy is exactly what we need, and what we have been lacking. If we don't know what we are trying to achieve--based, as General Zinni said, on a strategic vision for the country--we will just continue treading water and making the same mistakes in Afghanistan.

I'm glad we're finally having a debate about Afghanistan. I wish it was a more educated one in which people argued honestly and about the same set of issues, primarily our strategic goals overall and in Afghanistan. And I hope President Obama and his team are listening and preparing to make actual decisions, not "middle grounds," before it is too late.

The Time Has Come, the Walrus Said, to Talk of Many Things

2009-09-02T12:15:00.002-04:00

Editor's Note: the following is a guest post from, Haley Gallagher. The views expressed are her own.

I doubt Lewis Carroll predicted when he published Through the Looking- Glass and What Alice Found There that it would have lessons as applicable today as they were to the late 1800’s. The message that resonated yesterday from Brian Katulis at the Center for American Progress (CAP) was that it’s time to move beyond the rhetorical debate about U.S. foreign policy in Afghanistan and seize the opportunity to engage in a broad and serious discussion.

CAP hosted an event, “Assessing the Afghan Election” yesterday and had a panel of experts (Jackie Northam, Eric Bjornlund and Brian Katulis) analyze the current situation in Afghanistan as well as suggest recommendations moving forward. Sadly, positive accolades given by the Obama Administration for the success of the elections in Afghanistan on August 20^th are not being echoed in other news publications. Turnout was not as high as expected due to various reasons highlighted by the panel including voter intimidation by the Taliban specifically in the South, heightened security, general apathy, and a sense of defeatism that neither candidate was a good option. Ms. Northam informed the audience that there was hope turnout would increase over the course of the day, but this was not the case. She never saw lines of more than 6-8 people coming out to vote in the streets of Kabul, one of the more heavily protected areas.

Mr. Bjornlund, with Democracy International, admitted that the security situation in Afghanistan made the elections very difficult to observe. Additionally, while this was the first time observers joined provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), it was extremely challenging to observe in rural areas. He echoed Ms. Northam’s sentiment that the climate influenced a lack of voter turnout. Furthermore, gauging an accurate percentage of voter turnout is nearly impossible to measure given that the amount of voters is uncertain. While an independent election commission exists to deal with allegations of voter fraud and electoral complaints, there is speculation over what the commission expects to do—or can do— with complaints once they’re registered.

Katulis painted an even grimmer picture stating that we can expect more violence to ensure in the days to come with potential increases in Taliban threats as well as candidates refusing to accept results. However, the time is crucial and the U.S. should seize the moment to engage in a serious policy debate about Afghanistan and determine how to ensure cooperation moving forward. He outlined three points: 1) It’s not too early to think about how to advance power sharing, 2) It’s extremely important for the U.S. to put pressure on Afghan leaders, who emerge from the election, to focus on anti-corruption, counter-narcotics and governance, and 3) The U.S. should be concerned about the lack of clear goals and objectives in Afghanistan.

The U.S. should demand a commitment from Afghan leaders to agree to power-sharing and working from the ground up to uproot the systems that have plagued Afghanistan for years. Moreover, we’ve been hearing the same thing about Afghanistan over the past two years which is endemic of a Groundhog Day effect. Katulis cautioned against using misleading words such as victory, win and success to describe the situation in Afghanistan. He also claimed that he has yet to hear a cogent case for more troops.

Another great point from the panel was that if the U.S. starts to look like an occupation, Afghanistan will reassert its sovereignty. Currently we lack a strong U.S. framework for a strategy in Afghanistan. While General Stanley McChrystal is expected to deliver this soon, there are questions regarding strength of the strategy. We cannot insert a U.S. model into Afghanistan and expect it to be a recipe for success. The U.S. tried before to impose the idea of a strong central government in Afghanistan and given the complexity of the society this will not work. Government must come from the ground up and include all of the right players in order to establish credibility and legitimacy. The dialogue needs to continue on a more serious level before opportunities are lost.

The Eminently Bloggable Tony Zinni

2009-09-02T11:23:00.005-04:00

I wish all speakers at DC think tank events could be as candid, dynamic, and entertaining as General (ret.) Tony Zinni. While his main point (as chronicled by Jamie Morgan, and, oddly enough, The American Conservative, as well as organizer Steve Clemons) was that the U.S. government should go about "civil affairs" or "smart power" in a totally different way, by creating a separate command committed to it (since the military "will get stuck with it anyway"). (Zinni was also promoting his new book.) It would be interesting to get Zinni and O'Hanlon in a room to discuss their visions for civil affairs.

Along the way Zinni touched on quite a few other interesting subjects, including strategy. He agreed with me that we need to actually outline a strategy for Afghanistan, but went further in stating that it should flow from and be consistent with President Obama's National Security Strategy, which has yet to be released. (Apparently an NSS is due within the first 150 days of an administration, which never happens. The Bush Administration's NSS wasn't released until2002; one small section talked about preemption, yet that became the centerpiece of the "Bush Doctrine.") That's certainly true, and a point I hadn't fully considered.

Other "Zinni Zingers:"

Zinni wondered what someone would think if they had been put in a coma right after 9/11, woke up yesterday, and you had to explain our response. (I'm paraphrasing here): "We were attacked by al Qaeda. We're in Iraq? And we're in Afghanistan, but fighting the Taliban? Al Qaeda is in Pakistan? We're helping Pakistan, but they're fighting the Taliban too? ...?"
"We shouldn't talk about 'smart power' as if we have it."
"Special envoys are useless!" (Zinni was the Bush Administration's special envoy to Israel and Palestine).
"You know where Osama bin Ladin is? Great! I don't know where bin Ladin is. He's on K Street, he's a lobbyist!"
"Shock and awe turned into aw, shucks."
"I'm tired of all this 'graveyard of empires' nonsense. The difference is we want to leave Afghanistan, we don't want it as part of an empire."

Aaaaand, We’re Going With the 80% Solution. Again.

2009-09-01T17:33:00.003-04:00

Editor's Note: The following is a guest post by Jamie Morgan. The views expressed are her own.

“Smart power,” “the 3Ds”: Everyone seems to have an answer to the national security crisis facing our country. How do we realign our governmental infrastructure to address new and non-traditional security threats? General (ret.) Tony Zinni took a good stab at it today with a funny, thoughtful presentation at the New America Foundation. Yet despite a brilliant analysis of the problem, General Zinni stopped short of pushing the 100% solution. And I don’t think one can approach such sweeping problems with 80% solutions.

General Zinni suggested building a Civil Affairs Command, run by DOD, which would house the requisite capabilities for addressing the social, economic, political, and security efforts involved in post-conflict reconstruction.

With all due respect to General Zinni’s analysis and expertise, here are my problems with his proposed solution:

Low likelihood of full State and USAID participation. The likelihood of getting full participation, cooperation, and integration of personnel from State and USAID is unlikely if a new Civil Affairs Command is under DoD. Look at AFRICOM: The Command had the initial goal of upwards of 100 personnel from State, and after nearly a full year since being stood up, it currently houses 4. The reasons State officials cite for this range from a lack of available personnel to not wanting to send personnel over to make a DoD agency look good (this is of course, not the publically given answer). Regardless, State and AID are not going to come running with personnel and resources for a DoD run venture.

Leaves organizational culture issues unaddressed. While many elements of the culture of DoD are valuable and worth carrying into future organizations (such as the tireless determination to plan), some elements of DoD culture* would not be ideal for post-conflict reconstruction (such as the rigid adherence to organizational rules and models). Building a Civil Affairs Command under DoD rather than an inter-agency organization would not build on the positive cultural elements that State and AID have to offer, and would retain some of the organizational modus operandi that hinder it from being truly effective in post-conflict reconstruction.

Just is not the sweeping reform that is needed. Such an organization would not impart the message of sweeping reform among personnel – which is at the heart of the issue. In order for State, AID, and DoD personnel to really begin to consider the security, developmental, and political issues involved in post-conflict reconstruction, they will need to change the way they think and operate on a day-to-day basis. That type of change is hard for people to make. It takes pushing from on top, and pulling from a few determined soles within. Moving a few boxes on the organizational chart is not going to do that.

The Metrics Are Coming, the Metrics Are Coming!

2009-08-31T09:59:00.003-04:00

...er, sort of. At least we have some idea what they are going to be. And hopefully we'll have them ready to report to Congress by the September 24th deadline. Of course the White House is doing a "test run" (to make sure the numbers aren't too bad?) before releasing the list. If the Washington Post has seen the full list they are either choosing to dole information out a little at a time, or the metrics are nothing new, "including newly trained Afghan army recruits, Pakistani counterinsurgency missions and on-time delivery of promised U.S. resource." I'll provide analysis once more information comes out.

Meanwhile, General McChrystal is apparently delivering his review to the Pentagon and NATO as I write. We shall see what it actually says, and if it is more useful than the previous five reviews. We know it doesn't contain a direct request for more troops. And the metrics are separate. So what does it have? A strategic rationale? A desired end-state? A strategy for achieving it? As Joshua Foust has repeatedly pointed out, most of McChrystal's initiatives were simply extensions of McKiernan's ideas executed better due to increased political support. This is McChrystal's chance to really suggest a new path and show that the change in leadership was justified.

India Wants Attention!

2009-08-28T10:11:00.003-04:00

What with the elections, violence, reviews, and strategic discussions in Afghanistan, drone and ground attacks in Pakistan, visits by senators to Burma, and even remembrances of how Ted Kennedy helped found Bangladesh, India is the odd South Asian country out in terms of news coverage lately.

What's a poor second-largest-country-on-Earth to do to get back in the headlines?

You could try having a well-respected former External Afairs minister, Jaswant Singh, get kicked out of his party for simply suggesting in a book that Pakistan's founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, wasn't the worst person ever. The BJP party, India's leading opposition, is now in turmoil as different factions support or oppose Singh.

If that's not enough, try scrambling a fighter jet to intercept a civilian airliner that had the wrong radio identifier.

Or you could make everyone nervous by re-hashing old battles about nuclear weapons tests, including having hard-liners suggest that more nuclear tests are necessary. Those always help with regional stability. Indian nuclear scientist K. Santhanam declared that India's 1998 nuclear tests were intended to have a much larger yield. The H-bomb test especially, was a "fizzle." He was, of course, refuted by former President A. P. J. Abdul Kalam, of the BJP, as well as the current defense ministry. As Arms Control Wonk points out, it's pretty common knowledge among the nuclear nerd community that the H-bomb test fizzled, so why bring it up again now? Apparently Santhanam is worried that India might sign the Comprehensive nuclear Test Ban Treaty and didn't want that to happen.

Of course Pakistan didn't want to be outdone in the nuclear crazy department, so they responded by releasing nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan, who ran a nuclear smuggling ring selling Pakistani knowledge and technology all over the world, from even his previous minimal house arrest.

South Asia has plenty of problems folks. Is a little restraint and common sense on nuclear issues really too much to ask?

Intelligence and Social Networking

2009-08-27T09:36:00.003-04:00

The Washington Post has a great article this morning on Intellipedia, the intelligence community (IC)'s wiki. It seems like an extremely valuable tool for helping to destroy some of the "stovepipes" that plague the IC. People in the intelligence business are naturally suspicious people, so they tend not to trust even other intelligence agencies. Combining the intelligence from multiple analysts and multiple agencies can yield far better results.

The IC needs younger, more technologically savvy people who embrace new forms of communication like wikis, blogging, Twitter, and whatever comes next, or the IC will cease to be relevant. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Twitters (@thejointstaff), and I've heard that he read about Israel entering Gaza within seconds, yet it took the IC over a day to confirm it. I had a former colleague who was denied a job with the IC because when asked if he had ever done something illegal he replied that he had downloaded music from the Internet before that was considered illegal. Isn't that exactly the kind of person on the cutting edge of technological innovations who we should want in the IC? Of course Osama bin Ladin doesn't Tweet (at least not the real one), but more and more open source information is out there if you know how and where to look, and the IC ignores that at their own peril.

None of my IC friends Tweet (that I know of), although most of them are on Facebook. Of course open source can work both ways; you wouldn't want someone to Tweet "off to Yemen to infiltrate a jihadi group," but the IC should encourage both old and new employees to become familiar with social networking/Web 2.0 tools. Imagine how effective Intellipedia could be if everyone in the IC actually used it.

Call of Duty: Counterinsurgency? How 'Bout Them Metrics?

2009-08-26T16:40:00.004-04:00

I was watching a friend of mine play the realistic video game Call of Duty: Modern Warfare, and as he piloted an AC-130 gunship providing air support to his team of retreating commandos he also enjoyed shooting his various weapons at additional random buildings to see if they would blow up. I joked that if this were really modern warfare he would lose points, since he had just created hundreds of additional insurgents.

Which brings us to General McChrystal's statement that success in Afghanistan is judged not by insurgents killed but by the number of people protected. Could you duplicate that in a video game (Modern Warfare 2, due this November?)? Would it be any fun?

And more importantly, will McChrystal's upcoming review actually contain the long-awaited metrics? All signs point to McChrystal being given 12-18 months to show progress. We know the metrics we're using in the absence of better ones (troops killed, insurgents killed, civilians killed, number of bombs, etc) will go down this winter due to the weather. Hopefully McChrystal will have something better in place by then both in terms of a strategy and a way to measure success.

If Afghanistan Was Vietnam, We'd Be Winning

2009-08-26T16:18:00.001-04:00

The internet has recently blossomed with commentary saying Afghanistan is today's Vietnam, or that the United States is now in the place of the Soviet Union. Don't believe a word of it.

Let's look first at the local population. As Robert Kagan points out (I can't believe I'm linking positively to the Weekly Standard), in Afghanistan the Soviet Union was supporting a puppet state it helped install against the will of the vast majority of the local population. The same thing was true for the United States in Vietnam. In modern Afghanistan the population supported the U.S.-led invasion by a wide margin, and still supports U.S. efforts by a healthy majority.

Both the Soviet Union and the United States in Vietnam were fighting for, or against, an ideology, rather than for their security. The local populations did not embrace their goals, and were fighting for their own security. We want Afghanistan to become a stable, secure nation, and our primary aim is security and freedom for the people. Afghanistan just had an election, and the United States was and is prepared to live with whoever wins.

At its peak we had over 500,000 troops in Vietnam. We currently have around 68,000 in Afghanistan, where the Soviets had two to three times that number. It helps that we're not fighting against the entire population the way they were, but we're still far below the Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual's recommended twenty troops per 1,000 residents ratio. 500,000 doesn't even get us to that ratio (though it surpasses it for just the areas where the insurgency is strong). I'm not calling for half a million troops or anything like it, but we do need to note that disparity in commitment. We have just enough troops now to tread water. If we had as many troops as we committed to Vietnam--or even the troops we stupidly sent to Iraq instead--Afghanistan would have been stable long ago.

One final similarity between the U.S. loss in Vietnam and the Soviet failure in Afghanistan is the massive amounts of external support each insurgency received. We should know, we helped provide it to the mujaheddin. The Taliban enjoy some support from fringe elements in Pakistan and some funding from a few rich extremists in the Gulf, but as far as I know no major foreign power is hoping to defeat the United States in Afghanistan.

Success in Afghanistan, even minimal success, will require additional troops and the time to let them work. However, it will also require better goals and actual strategies. We didn't fail in Vietnam for lack of resources, we failed because we were opposed by the population, fighting against an ideology not an actual enemy, and didn't have the correct strategy to accomplish our goals. In Afghanistan we need the resources and an actual strategy to accomplish defined and limited goals. Hopefully President Obama can balance his guns and butter well enough to maintain support, and hopefully General McChrystal's imminent review had enough good ideas that we don't miss our window of opportunity.

Wilkerson Steals My "Armed Peace Corps" Headline

2009-08-25T11:25:00.002-04:00

Michael Wilkerson at FP's Passport blog has a very similar argument to my post from two weeks ago refuting O'Hanlon's op-ed. Thanks for the thoughts Michael, I'm glad you agree. But would a link to my ideas posted a week before yours be out of line?

Walt's "Safe Haven" Update

2009-08-20T17:01:00.002-04:00

Professor Walt nicely posted his own response to Bergen's critique just a few minutes after my own. He reiterates his scepticism that the Taliban would actually regain control of Afghanistan, and discusses how useful a base Afghanistan actually would make for al-Qaeda. I still think he should discuss the existing safe haven in the tribal areas along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, but no matter, he makes similar points as I do. I think the questions deserve to be asked, but the answer is not a cut-and-dry "withdraw" as Walt seems to be arguing.

Wading into the "Safe Haven" Debate

2009-08-20T16:41:00.001-04:00

I am not a part of the 51 percent of Americans who apparently no longer think the war in Afghanistan is not worth fighting. Then again the public also approves of President Obama's handling of the war to date; I find myself in the minority of both groups. I believe that we should be in Afghanistan, but only if we develop a realistic and achievable desired end state and a strategy to accomplish that mission.

Over the last few days several foreign policy blogs have been discussing a line from President Obama's speech to the VFW, “If left unchecked, the Taliban insurgency will mean an even larger safe haven from which al Qaeda would plot to kill more Americans." Realist scholar Stephen Walt argued in six points that leaving Afghanistan (presumably immediately) would not create more of a safe haven for terrorists bent on attacking the United States, that it is not fundamental to our survival as a nation, and thus that Afghanistan is not a "war of necessity." He was then "slammed" by, among others, Peter Bergen, Paul Cruickshank, and Spencer Ackerman.

The thing is, while I don't agree with everything he is saying, Walt has a valid point. Would leaving Afghanistan create a safe haven for al-Qaeda? Probably, because either the Taliban would take over or Afghanistan would be come what is referred to as an "ungoverned space."

The first problem is, al-Qaeda already have a safe haven: the ungoverned space on the Pakistan side of the border. Has any analyst or policymaker been so bold as to propose that either the United States or Pakistan will be able to tame and rule the mountainous tribal areas? No power in history has been up to the task. Functioning countries on both sides of the border along with continued drone flights would contain the problem, and that is a valid, and hopefully achievable, goal, but totally eliminating a mountainous maze as a safe haven won't happen. Bergen points out that the 2005 London subway bombings, the 2006 liquid bombs on planes plot, and others were plotted in Pakistan, all while surrounded by thousands of U.S. and allied troops. Eliminating every nook and cranny along the Durand Line is just as difficult as eliminating every nook where a cockroach could be hiding in your house.

A second problem, which some of the commenters acknowledge and then ignore, is that many other ungoverned spaces exist, including Somalia and Yemen, that can and do serve just as well as terrorist bases and training areas. And in a modern, globalized, interconnected world safe havens in ungoverned or welcoming countries aren't necessary. Sure several of the 9/11 hijackers trained in Afghanistan, but they also spent significant time plotting, training, and waiting in Hamburg, Cairo, and Florida (is Florida an ungoverned space? It's easy to get and practice with guns and other weapons there, and parts of it certainly have religious fanatics...).

I don't believe we should withdraw from Afghanistan, although without a real strategy we are simply treading water. We need to set a realistic and achievable goal and figure out a plan to achieve it. The President is right, leaving now would result in an "even larger safe haven" (italics mine), but staying won't eliminate one completely, nor should that be the goal. I don't agree with Walt that we should leave, but he should not be attacked for pointing out that the idea of "safe havens" is not enough of a reason to stay.

I Think This Is an Emergency, Or So It Has Been

2009-08-20T11:54:00.002-04:00

Guest Post: Michael Rohrs is a counterterrorism intelligence analyst and consultant with BAE Systems. He is a member of Young Professionals in Foreign Policy and an occasional blogger on national security and foreign policy issues. The views expressed are his own.

I participate in a discussion group on international terrorism. The topic of tonight’s discussion is: the Office of Foreign Assets Control's (OFAC) ability to designate U.S.-based entities as ‘specially designated global terrorists.’ One of the preparation questions posed in advance (admittedly not one at the true heart of this debate) asks, “Eight years after 9-11, are we still in the midst of a ‘national emergency’ which is necessary to invoke the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)?”

The IEEPA, as defined by Adam J. Szubin in particularly lucid testimony,

…grants the President a broad spectrum of powers to deal ‘with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat.’ The President typically exercises these IEEPA powers through Executive Orders that declare a national emergency and impose economic sanctions to address the emergency.

On September 23, 2001, President Bush issued E.O. 13224 which has been renewed every year since—including 2009. What should happen in 2010?

Regarding the above question, here are my preliminary thoughts on the issue as prepared for discussion:

I think we can all agree that in the years immediately following 9-11, the country was well within the designation of a state of national emergency; and as with DHS, emergency measures were hastily but necessarily taken to mitigate extreme circumstances. That said, the threat of a terrorist act being committed on U.S. soil—be it from without or originating within—has not, and in my opinion is not going away. Even further, if you believe Philip Bobbitt, this is only the leading edge of the inevitable. In that sense we are undoubtedly facing a threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, and rightfully in a national state of emergency.

The same flag, however, can justifiably be waved from the opposite shore; it is precisely the perpetual state of threat that nebulous, transnational terrorism poses—not only to the United States but also to Americans abroad and the democratic international community writ large—that negates “state of national emergency” designation. If you believe threats of irregular attack with intent to incite terror in the United States are imminent, indefinite, adaptive, and ongoing (regardless of whether you believe we are actually “at war” with terrorists or on terrorism) then the IEEPA as a designation reserved for unusual and extraordinary circumstances—which includes the implication that they’re temporary—no longer applies.

Adopting this conclusion, as I do, requires a fundamental revision of thinking. It’s no secret that bureaucracy in general and American bureaucracy specifically has difficulty reconstructing paradigms. No paradigm is more deeply ingrained in the United States and about which Americans are more sensitive, than individual—and by extension national—security. However, in order for the IEEPA label to be lifted, U.S. lawmakers with the CT, HS, MI, and Intelligence communities need to redefine the state of the union as it regards the (sober and realistic) threat of terror, and redraft sensible and timely legislation to deal with a changing threat environment; an environment in which combating terror financing is an essential part. Until the paradigm is redrawn and national attitude is adjusted accordingly, however, it is unwise, unsafe, and unacceptable to scale back our counterterrorism intelligence practices at the risk of the American people.

Finally, consider this question: Does the IEEPA extend beyond mitigating risks of the U.S. homeland and its citizens abroad to ensuring that the US is not in any way facilitating (unwittingly!) the financing of terrorist organizations and their operations anywhere in the world? Let us assume the target of a given terrorist organization is something other than Americans and/or American interests. If U.S.-based charities are serving as an avenue (be it merely a canal or as a hub), it remains our responsibility (especially ours!) to paralyze, penetrate, and prosecute these conduits of terrorism. The question remains, however, whether circumstances renders the IEEPA specifically applicable. If not, does a suitable and sustainable (remember the IEEPA is for extraordinary temporary circumstances) alternative statute exist? If not, are we not morally and axiomatically responsible to implement one?

Yes Afghanistan Can?

2009-08-20T09:23:00.005-04:00

We're still waiting on results from today's election in Afghanistan, but things seem to have gone quite well today, despite fairly low turnout. The Afghan police did a good job in stopping several potential incidents intended to disrupt the voting. As other people have pointed out, the process of the election, including the much-publicized donkey transportation for some ballots, is more important than the actual outcome.

That being said, Karzai is overwhelmingly favored to be re-elected. Andrew Exum speculated earlier this week that the Taliban would prefer to have Karzai in office (since his platform seems to be pro-corruption, pro-warlord, and pro-drug), and thus would reduce violence in the south, Karzai's stronghold. That doesn't seem to be the case; turnout has been lower in the south due to violence and higher in the relatively peaceful northern parts of the country. Will that be enough to keep Karzai under 50 percent and avoid a runoff? We shall see how hard the anti-incumbent tide swings.

Getting Schooled on Afghanistan

2009-08-18T16:46:00.004-04:00

I sometimes feel like a school teacher handing out homework when writing this blog. As you sit around waiting for results from Thursday's election, here are some reading suggestions. We can discuss them in tomorrow's class.

Read yesterday's Washington Post article about how General McKiernan got fired in large part because he didn't know Washington or play politics well enough (while at the same time not being offered the same power or resources as McChrystal already enjoys). Read Andrew Exum's post where he finally (almost) admits to being too close to a tactic (counterinsurgency) and unable to objectively examine the strategic realities in Afghanistan (if you have a hammer every problem looks like a nail). Read the Times op-ed talking about how ethnic divisions in Afghanistan (like almost everywhere) complicate the process of creating a government. As always, read Steve Coll's take on the strategic debate over Afghanistan, which he says will heat up even more. And if you haven't yet done so read Rory Stewart's lengthy skeptical article in the London Review of Books asking, just as I have been for some time, what our strategic objectives are and taking specific umbrage with the tautological idea of counterinsurgency as a one-size-fits-all solution.

Some of my favorite Stewart quotes:

Policymakers perceive Afghanistan through the categories of counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, state-building and economic development. These categories are so closely linked that you can put them in almost any sequence or combination. You need to defeat the Taliban to build a state and you need to build a state to defeat the Taliban. There cannot be security without development, or development without security. If you have the Taliban you have terrorists, if you don’t have development you have terrorists, and as Obama informed the New Yorker, ‘If you have ungoverned spaces, they become havens for terrorists.’
....
The Afghan national army is reasonably effective. Pakistan is not in a position to support the Taliban as it did before. It would require far fewer international troops and planes than we have today to make it very difficult for the Taliban to gather a conventional army as they did in 1996 and drive tanks and artillery up the main road to Kabul.
....
Counter-insurgency is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for state-building. You could create a stable legitimate state without winning a counter-insurgency campaign (India, which is far more stable and legitimate than Afghanistan, is still fighting several long counter-insurgency campaigns from Assam to Kashmir). You could win a counter-insurgency campaign without creating a stable state (if such a state also required the rule of law and a legitimate domestic economy).
....
But Osama bin Laden is still in Pakistan, not Afghanistan. He chooses to be there precisely because Pakistan can be more assertive in its state sovereignty than Afghanistan and restricts US operations. From a narrow (and harsh) US national security perspective, a poor failed state could be easier to handle than a more developed one: Yemen is less threatening than Iran, Somalia than Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan than Pakistan.
....
This is not a plan: it is a description of what we have not got. Our approach is short-term; it has struggled to develop Afghan capacity, resolve regional issues or overcome civilian-military divisions; it has struggled to respect Afghan sovereignty or local values; it has failed to implement international standards of democracy, government and human rights; and it has failed to set clear and realistic objectives with clear metrics of success. Why do we believe that describing what we do not have should constitute a plan on how to get it? (Similarly, we do not notice the tautology in claiming to ‘overcome corruption through transparent, predictable and accountable financial processes’.)

O'Hanlon Calls For an Armed Peace Corps

2009-08-14T10:38:00.005-04:00

We've all heard how once a high percentage of Ivy League graduates served in the military, but now few liberal, well-off, and elite-educated (service academies aside) students want to or are willing to serve. Truman Project Fellow and Brooking Institute Senior Fellow Michael O'Hanlon may have come up with a solution (although he doesn't identify it as such) in a Washington Post op-ed: essentially a militarized Peace Corps.

O'Hanlon describes the current situation in the Congo and compares it to Darfur, where many in the United States wanted to do something and the best humanitarian assistance might have been troops on the ground providing security, but with the military stretched thin as it is by extended deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan even considering it was impossible.

He proposes creating a "peace operations division" of 15,000 soldiers, of which 3-4,000 or so would be deployed at any one time. The troops would be specifically recruited for this humanitarian division, would only serve two years, and would have more experienced officers and NCOs, including those driven away by the stupidity of "don't ask, don't tell." A more lovable, more liberal, military. The Peace Corps with guns.

It's an interesting concept, and I think encouraging a broader spectrum of young people to serve our country would benefit both the individuals and the military, but I also see some major flaws. Having a "special" force liberal interventionist troops with many gay leaders, and you want them to be less well trained and go on softer missions? Wouldn't that just reinforce stereotypes? Instead create specific training for humanitarian/peacekeeping/nation building missions for our current troops. Undertake those types of missions if they make sense to our national interest. Use various methods, including touting those missions, to recruit from a broader spectrum of young Americans. And repeal DADT. But don't create an alternative, wimpier, military for liberals and gays.

Natural Security: the Next Big Security Issue

2009-08-13T11:46:00.004-04:00

Anyone still living in New Orleans doesn't have to be told that natural disasters can be as big a threat to their lives and well being as an attack by terrorists or another enemy. And you don't have to tell the president of the the island nation of the Maldives, who is saving a significant portion his country's tax revenue so that they can buy land elsewhere and relocate the country when it is covered by the rising sea. The journal Nature reports that this is the highest level of hurricanes in the Atlantic in the past 1,000 years.

Stephen Walt may be his usual contrarian self and say natural security is not a real threat, but the government disagrees, including climate change in the National Intelligence Council's "Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World" report on future threats.

Several organizations are noticing as well. Truman Project-affiliated Operation Free is working to promote understanding and action on climate change as a national security imperative. CNAS has launched their own natural security project as well. The Center for Naval Analysis has been rolling out lots of retired stars (admirals and generals) promoting their own report. Friend Of The Blog Nat Skinner writes frequently about the intersection of "Energy, Environment, and Security."

I'm quite convinced that natural security is an important component of the security threat debate. But I have yet to hear any significant answers from these groups. The CNA group talked about how DoD needs to become more energy efficient, but none of them seem to have done anything to make it happen when they were actually serving. What is it we should do? Is it just high level policy changes, and if so which ones? If we passed a cap-and-trade bill with some teeth would that do the trick? I'm convinced we have a problem, I'm still waiting for someone to think hard and come up with real solutions.

Obama and McChrystal Need to Watch "The Wire"

2009-08-12T16:49:00.003-04:00

President Obama and General McChrystal should schedule a few evenings to sit down and watch a few episodes--or seasons--of The Wire. They would learn that killing drug lords--or warlords--is only a temporary solution. Every time you capture or kill an Avon Barksdale, Stringer Bell will take his place, and Proposition Joe, and Marlo Standfield after them.

Like the Baltimore "po-lice" we can keep treading water in Afghanistan, going after the top 50 drug kingpins and tribal leaders, but they will always be replaced by other ambitious and talented leaders driven by anger, violence, and need. Sure, sometimes the succession can get bloody, and we will cheer and even help out as different sides battle each other, but nothing will change without a long term plan.

The United States, like Baltimore, has to make a strategic choice. The best solution in the long run is to pump lots of outside money in (from the United States/the state of Maryland) and improve conditions for the population to the point that conditions are no longer ripe for drug trafficking, violence, and terrorism.

Alternatively you can define more limited goals, like the reduction of the crime and violence that goes along with drug trafficking, and reducing the negative impact on the surrounding community. In Season 3 Major Bunny Colvin set up "Hamsterdam" in his district, a free zone where drug dealers and users could go without penalty, greatly reducing crime and violence in the rest of the community. I'm not suggesting that the United States should allow Afghanistan to collapse into a den of drugs and terrorism, since the goal of both those activities is to spread worldwide. I'm simply saying that limited objectives can also be successful if they are clearly defined and the trade-offs are acknowledged.

Invading Afghanistan accomplished its initial goals--the terrorist leaders are no longer in Afghanistan, they are in Pakistan, and could soon flee to Somalia, Yemen, or other "ungoverned spaces." We have to make a strategic choice in Afghanistan and decide if we are trying to make it into a Central Asian Valhalla, or if we should adopt more limited goals.

Holbrooke on Success in Afghanistan: Like Pornography "We'll Know It When We See It"

2009-08-12T11:18:00.006-04:00

At a Center for American Progress event today with almost his whole barrel-of-monkeys interagency team, Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke had the astounding quote regarding success in Afghanistan that "We'll know it when we see it." Wow. That's almost certain to be the quote of the event. No wonder we can't come up with metrics. These are the supposed experts? It's an impressive list of names, but between them they can't come up with a strategy or a way to gauge success?

We shall see if anything useful comes out of this event. But gatherings like these seem to show that rather than "Rumsfelding" Afghanistan we are taking the opposite approach: over thinking everything and not coming to any decisions. I'm glad discussions are going on now, but the experts on Holbrooke's team so far are just increasing my pessimism about the mission in Afghanistan.

The Times' Afghanistan Round-Up

2009-08-11T09:30:00.002-04:00

Once again the New York Times decided to follow my lead, this time doing a review of "is Afghanistan worth it" stories. Check it out, if only for comparison's sake.

Picking Up Bits of Baitullah

2009-08-10T23:03:00.004-04:00

Ask and ye shall receive. I wondered how we would a) gain enough material from the Baitullah Mehsud hit to do a DNA study and become more than 90 percent sure we killed him, and b) how we had other DNA of his to compare it to, and BBC News answered at least part b: Pakistani intelligence services apparently have a sample from his brother.

Of course now we (or more likely the Pakistani services) still have to send someone into the lovely neighborhood of South Waziristan to scrape some charred remains off of the rocks around where the house used to be and hope it was from Mehsud and not one of the other people killed in the attack. Easier said than done. But at least I got my question answered!

Is Afghanistan Worth It? A (Limited) Roundup of Opinions

2009-08-10T22:29:00.001-04:00

What to do when three of your favorite bloggers decide to take significant portions of August off? Luckily we have plenty of opinions to discuss on "should we be in Afghanistan?" front.

The Wall Street Journal proclaimed that General McChrystal stated the Taliban are winning (although the Pentagon is now protesting that he didn't really say that). David Rothkopf gave the Obama Administration a six-month grade of D for Afghanistan and Pakistan policy, saying "The best we can hope for is to get some bad guys and get out, hand the problems over to locals and forge a partnership with the other great powers in the region, notably India and China to contain the spillage from a place that is likely to be an open wound on the world for decades to come." Of course having India involved in Afghanistan would only add to the problems with Pakistan, but no matter. Seth Jones does his usual shtick of repeating platitudes and recycled ideas--this time how to "win" in Afghanistan without defining what winning means--and somehow getting published.

Lee Hamilton is asking the questions. The counterinsurgency crew (and hangers on) are providing their answer. CNAS' Andrew Exum has even provided a forum on his blog compiling people's answers to the strategic questions.

The overall feeling seems to be turning more pessimistic about the chances of our success in Afghanistan. As for me, I still think we can succeed, depending on how we define success. We will never pacify or control the tribal regions completely, and it would be crazy to even try. We can, however, give Afghanistan a fighting chance at having a stable central government that controls most of the country--on their own terms--but it will require long-term aid as well. The U.S. military is capable of almost anything, but the civilian policy makers need to define what limited goals they want accomplished and then allow the military to do its job. The longer we fail to have a real defined strategy the more pessimistic I will become.

Notes on a Post-Mehsud Afghanistan and Pakistan

2009-08-10T17:15:00.005-04:00

After a weekend of thinking about it, it looks like we really did get Baitullah Mehsud. Hurray! And now his deputies are fighting each other over who gets to be leader of the club now. Double hurray! That saves us the trouble. Various analysts have speculated that whereas Mehsud focused his attacks more on Pakistan, which ever deputy ends up leading his group is likely to focus more on attacking U.S. forces in Afghanistan. That's both good news and bad news. Our troops will get attacked more, but they will be in Afghanistan, where we can fight back, not across the invisible line into Pakistan where we can only use drones.

The "successful" drone strike (it took us many attempts, and the strike that killed Mehsud may not have even been targeting him) means we will likely use drones even more readily. That's not necessarily a good thing, as we have a poor track record of killing the people we want to (terrorists and insurgents) and not the ones we don't (civilians).

On the drug front, we have decided to spend time and energy hunting down drug lords in Afghanistan. I wonder if we're going to include the drug lords who are some of Karzai's biggest supporters. Sure, extra heroin in the world is a bad thing, but we didn't invade Afghanistan to control drugs. Michael Cohen has been keeping an "Afghanistan Mission Creep Watch" going for awhile. Looks like he has some job security!

We are currently spending at least $60 billion per year in Afghanistan. That's roughly six times more (conservatively) than if we simply decided to buy everything Afghanistan produced (drugs included) every year. We're likely committed to spending at least $4 billion a year for quite a few years after we leave (whenever that may be) just to pay for the Afghan army and police forces, since their tax base cannot support it. What are we getting? Is this really the best strategy? Is there a strategy?

Baitullah Mehsud Dead? Now For My Second Wish... Actual Afghanistan Metrics!

2009-08-06T22:18:00.010-04:00

I recently wished I would wake up and find out we had hit our exact target with a drone-fired missile in Pakistan. This evening I "awoke" from a Twitter slumber (a cybersecurity warning sign?) to find we actually did kill Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud with a drone strike yesterday--maybe. It seems we won't know for sure until we get in to South Waziristan to collect a DNA sample (quick side note: how do we possibly have another DNA sample to compare it to?), far easier said than done, since we can't do it by drone.

If we did get Mehsud that's great news of course, but before we get too cocky we should take note that militant groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and Mehsud's in particular, are like the hydra, and Mehsud apparently has several able deputies willing to step up and take his place.

So for my second wish, I'd like the Obama Administration to come up with actual metrics for success in Afghanistan (and Pakistan). Apparently Congress wants the same thing. After the first (or was it third) "AfPak" review the White House released a white paper promising metrics for success--and has failed not only to announce how we're doing, but what the metrics are. As I've argued repeatedly, you can't measure progress toward a goal you haven't established.

So far the White House has been better at determining what metrics not to use: enemy killed, miles of roads built, bombs defused, tips gathered, etc. Those are helpful steps, but if, according to the Times, we already have "nine broad objectives for metrics to guide the administration’s policy on Afghanistan and Pakistan" why can't we develop metrics now? We need another month or two to continue studying them? Is this a cooking-the-books plan where by the time the actual metrics are up it will be winter and things will look good because fighting is difficult for the militants?

We do need to get the metrics right, but metrics should measure progress toward a goal. Firmly and clearly state the goal, and and tell the social scientist metric creation team to get their academic butts in gear. We've wasted enough time.

Unstable Countries: Will We Ever Get Ahead of the Curve?

2009-08-06T12:54:00.004-04:00

Editor's Note: The following is a guest post by Jamie Morgan. The views expressed are her own.

There has been much talk on the media waves about whether the Islamist sect Boko Harem is Nigeria’s version of the Taliban. “Will the next attack come from Nigeria??” In my opinion, the answer to that question is a moot point. The real question is, what is the United States doing to ensure that the Nigerian government begins to address the source of these problems – the lack of infrastructure and services for its people? And how long will the Obama administration’s attention span last?

Washington seems to have what I call the Terrorism Test. Violence erupts in a new country. Is the group connected with a known terrorist group? If Yes, we care. If No, we don’t. Secretary Clinton met this morning with the President of Somalia’s floundering Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and pledged additional military support – in the form of 40 tons of weapons – to the government forces. The support to the TFG’s security forces is the right course of action. Thus far the security situation on the ground in the areas held by Al-Shabaab has been so bad that many of the aid workers implementing the touted $150 million in U.S. assistance have been forced to relocate to the north – where the aid is much less needed.

Yet the attention to Somalia comes, again, once the crisis has already erupted. This type of reactionary policy-making will never get us ahead of the curve on the threats to U.S. national security – terrorism or otherwise. One never knows what the next big threat will be, or from where the next terrorist group will emerge. The nuanced factors that turn a population frustrated with its government into one that channels its outrage towards Western world are many, and we have yet to fully understand them. Thus, let’s start giving focused attention and proper resources to unstable regions from the start, not waiting until they turn into full-scale crises.

On the Brink of Becoming a Failed State (On the Eve of its 62nd Birthday)

2009-08-05T15:37:00.004-04:00

Editor's Note: the following is a guest post from Haley Gallagher, who served in the Peace Corps in Bangladesh. The views expressed are her own.

Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the “father of Pakistan” had a vision that his country would be that of a modern, moderate, secular society. Much has changed since August 14, 1947. There is a growing force of Islam-loving people throughout Pakistan yearning for the implementation of Islamic law. Rather than fighting the Taliban, this group of people believes the current military operation is counter-productive and that the state should be engaging the Taliban.

While the debate continues, many agree that Pakistan consistently fails to provide sufficient resources to its citizens. Under already inadequate education and infrastructure systems, the poor suffer the most during wartime conditions. Moreover and somewhat disconcerting, the country has a moderate youth bulge; the average age is 21 and over 37% of Pakistanis are under the age of 15. Given the current economic downturn and rising unemployment rate, many of these youths sit idle with nothing to do. This presents opportunities for the Taliban to recruit and train, yes, even children to be suicide bombers. As Pakistanis’ patience wanes the risk of violence increases and everyday access to social services such as education suffer (six Christians were burnt to death this week following allegations that they had desecrated a Koran).

Pakistan is currently a very volatile society and its citizens are stuck between a rock and a hard place in terms of whom to trust, be it Americans or the Taliban. Given their vulnerability, America should seize this opportunity to increase development aid and resources to Pakistan in an effort to regain their loyalty. The Peace Corps is the most powerful symbol of non-military service in our history. Both President Obama and former Republican President George W. Bush called for expanding the Peace Corps and their funding was increased to $373.4M this year, the largest percentage increase since 1993. While many would argue against sending the Peace Corps back into Pakistan, especially now, there are those willing to serve for a greater collective good.

Every overseas assignment presents risks and perhaps tapping into the Peace Corps’ Crisis Corps would be a better option. When John F. Kennedy called on young Americans to serve, it wasn’t during times of peace. The ‘60s were tumultuous and those willing to volunteer embraced the responsibility. Re-entering Pakistan in this capacity could present challenges. However, this is not a new endeavor for the United States. Navigating the political system is clearly the biggest obstacle. In the meantime, as the Peace Corps continues to double its efforts globally, Pakistan will have to rely on those local organizations that focus their efforts on bringing good governance and sustainable development to the people directly. There is a sense of urgency, however, to partner with those on the right side of governance and honor the vision that Jinnah worked so hard to create.

Read C.J. Chivers on Afghanistan

2009-08-04T15:36:00.003-04:00

I finally got around to reading C.J. Chivers' excellent article in Esquire about a 40-hour patrol along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. I know I should have read it earlier, since he authored the series of articles for the New York Times earlier this year that almost redeemed the concept of embedding reporters with military units. I recommend reading the whole thing, since he interweaves a story about one group of soldiers with observations that illustrate the challenges facing us in Afghanistan.

He discusses the four primary missions troops may be undertaking in Afghanistan: "It is hunting for, and hoping to capture or kill, the top-tier Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders and their coteries.... [W]orking with foreign governments, non government organizations, and American agencies to build a nation where ten years ago a nation existed principally in name....creat[ing] foundations for indigenous security," and fighting insurgents. All of these are tactics, and what we desperately need in Afghanistan is an end goal and a strategy to get there. "The problem with the United States' multiple missions is not that any of them is without merit, although each has had its mix-ups and flaws. The problem lies in the relationship of missions to one another."

Go read the whole article, but I think these few longer quotes stand ably on their own.

It is easier to be descriptive in Afghanistan than prescriptive, though there is no shortage of thoughtful voices prescribing solutions: more soft-shoe counterinsurgency tactics, more conventional troops to provide security (read: show up and fight) in areas where there is little security now, more troops to train and mentor Afghan soldiers and cops, more soldiers on the Afghan — Pakistan border to plug infiltration routes, more political engagement and security collaboration with Pakistan. Some advice is interlocking and neat and aligns with the invigorated war effort being pursued by the United States. Other advice is contradictory: The United States should conduct fewer Predator and Reaper strikes against insurgent leadership in Pakistan, or maybe it should conduct more. The United States should eradicate poppy fields, or perhaps it should encourage putting the crop to legal medicinal use. And some advice points to options that are easy to imagine but hard to execute, both politically and practically, including deciding which insurgents can be negotiated with and how....
The insurgency in the valley is on one level remarkably simple, though complicated by several factors. The simple distillation is that it is a revolt against outsiders that has been fueled by economic grievances. Most of the fighters are local Korangalis, and many have been displaced from work by the American-backed Afghan government, which banned most logging. Company B's outpost is on the grounds of the sawmill that Haji Matin had been dispossessed of — a symbol of jobs lost by loggers and mill workers and truck drivers and everyone else who lived off harvesting the forests in which Company B now sat. Later, as the war here escalated, Haji Matin's house was destroyed by an air strike, which extinguished hopes that he might be peacefully convinced to set aside his guns. Instead, Haji Matin and the displaced workers fight. Lieutenant Colonel Brett Jenkinson, Captain Howell's intense battalion commander, had summed up an underlying dynamic: The insurgency drew manpower from a pool of jobless laborers to create a guerrilla force without many other ways to eat....
Even among those with experience on the ground, the military, institutionally, has yet to resolve a central question faced by democracies fighting counterinsurgency war: how to balance the practical role of violence (raw, deliberate, and unblinking) against the constant risk that the same violence (raw, accidental, and reduced to euphemism) will miss its mark and erode support from civilians caught between competing sides.

Lords and Vassals in Modern Pakistan

2009-08-03T15:51:00.003-04:00

Nicholas Kristof has one of the best, and shortest, summaries of one of the major problems facing Pakistan today: feudal lords. I recommend reading it in its entirety, and even some of the comments (especially those from Pakistanis) if you have time. Of the three power centers in the country--the government, the military, and feudal lords--the government has the least influence. Both major political parties, the PPP and the PML-N, are linked to feudal lords and families. Pakistan's leadership has mostly been alternating between members of the Bhutto clan (Zulfikar Ali, Benazir, and now her husband Zardari holding the position until the chosen one, their son Bilawal, is ready) alternating with military dictators, with a few other random leaders thrown in just to shake things up.

I've met some of these feudal lords at various events around the world. Some are truly Falstafian characters, quaffing whole bottles of Johnny Walker Black (for some reason South Asians tend to prefer blended whisky to single malt), devouring large quantities of meat, telling loud and crazy stories, and enjoying literally and figuratively throwing their weight around. They are great people to know and have as your friends, but I would hate to have one as a boss or landlord. We in the West are used to a strong central government, but in places like Pakistan the politics of any given region are much more complicated, with each area also belonging to a lord or tribe.

Kristof wonders if land reform is the solution. In an ideal world yes; India had fairly successful land reforms in the 1950s and '60s that created much of the middle class today (though of course poverty is still rampant). I have a hard time envisioning a process that would get us to land reform from the current situation, especially given Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and the need to avoid even more chaos. Care should be taken to prevent aid from further enriching these feudal lords and making sure it actually gets to the population, but confronting the feudal system directly would be doomed to failure.

Eikenberry Throws Stones From His Glass House

2009-08-03T12:02:00.005-04:00

Karl Eikenberry, the current U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan and former military commander there, has an op-ed in today's Washington Post arguing that Afghanis have a choice coming up about the future direction of their country in the August 20th election. No doubt that's true. As he says,

"Five years ago, with guidance from the international community, Afghanistan held its first elections and began the process of building a new state -- a complex and difficult effort following 25 years of invasion, civil war, oppression and foreign-inspired terrorism. This time, Afghan authorities bear the full responsibility for fulfilling their people's right to choose their leaders, with the international community assisting, not leading. But none of this will matter unless the voters have a real choice and know what each candidate stands for. There must be a serious debate among the candidates and by the Afghan people."

But equally important is the debate, or lack of debate, here in the United States about what to do in Afghanistan. We don't have a real strategy, for staying or going, in Afghanistan. We don't know how long we plan to be there. We don't know if the Afghani government will survive without massive support from U.S. and NATO troops and civilians; almost certainly it and the Afghan National Army cannot survive without continuing massive amounts of foreign aid. All the reviews in the world haven't given us answers or even multiple possible solutions or futures to choose from. General McCrystal's review seems unlikely to change that, especially since his team contained no experts on Afghanistan or Pakistan, just military historians and strategists (Exum did serve in Afghanistan, but his academic work is on counterinsurgency elsewhere).

Equally disturbing to me is Eikenberry's between-the-lines endorsement of re-election for Karzai. Despite his talk of "We stand with absolute impartiality regarding who should be president of Afghanistan" parts of his article sound almost like a politician on the stump, talking about the future versus the past, progress or stagnation, and reforming society. All this while Karzai's brother has become the richest man in Afghanistan. I wish viable alternatives existed in the presidential election in Afghanistan, if only to strengthen the debate and force the candidates to be more honest.

U.S. policy makers need to be equally honest with themselves and with the American public. We need actual strategic options and policy decisions in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Until then progress will be impossible.

Another Afghanistan Review? Let's Make a Decision, People

2009-07-31T14:49:00.006-04:00

We are in the midst of, by my count, the fifth review of our Afghanistan (or Afghanistan and Pakistan) strategy this year alone, this one directed by General McChrystal, and featuring some of the top counterinsurgency experts from inside the Beltway. Have any of them resulted in an actual new strategy? Not killing civilians is a good idea, but it's not a strategy. Counterinsurgency isn't even a strategy, it's an approach to accomplishing a strategy.

The problem with all these reviews is that they don't start in the right place: the top. The president, with the help of his top advisers needs to articulate a vision for Afghanistan, and then his advisers can decide how best to accomplish that goal. Is the goal killing or capturing al-Qaeda's top leaders? Preventing the Taliban from regaining control of the country? Establishing Afghanistan as a market-driven democracy?

Many of the advisers who participated in the most recent review are fairly pessimistic. Andrew Exum states that "winning in Afghanistan will be really, really difficult." No doubt that's true, but it become a lot easier if we define winning first. Stephen Biddle asks if the whole endeavor is worth it. Judah Grunstein (who was not involved in the review) does him one better, asking if we would enter Afghanistan now to accomplish those goals if we were not already there. Anthony Cordesman was one of the first to report that McChrystal needs more troops in Afghanistan. That may be the case, but what will he do with them, and what will they be trying to accomplish?

The President has a lot on his plate right now, but Afghanistan is a situation where leadership is desperately needed from the top. As the many reviews and many reviewers have shown and argued, we can go in several different directions. The President needs to pick one before any of the reviews will mean anything, otherwise we're all just treading water.

Clarification on India's Nuclear Submarine

2009-07-29T21:13:00.005-04:00

I've received comments from both friends and strangers about my post on India's new nuclear submarine, so allow me to clarify a few points.

First, I am totally in favor of India's right to defend itself. Whether this third leg of its nuclear triad is aimed at deterring Pakistan or China, it is clearly intended as a second-strike capability, especially given India's proclaimed no-first-use nuclear doctrine.

My argument is that launching its nuclear submarine now, with great fanfare, has the potential to make India less secure, since Pakistan will clearly become even more nervous and paranoid (Pakistan said the Indian sub is "detrimental to regional peace and security" you say?) and be less likely to focus on the biggest threat to both Pakistan and India at the moment, the militants. If any bystander were asked to come up with India's enemy she would name Pakistan, so how is calling a submarine the "destroyer of enemies" supposed to sound to Pakistan? Why not the INS Peacemaker? The INS Gandhi? Although it is intended as a second strike, it can hit from 700 km away with either conventional or nuclear K-15 missiles. It's not a zero-sum game; Indians need to think how they would react if they were Pakistan, and make decisions accordingly.

Second, I too applaud India's restraint in (not) responding to the Mumbai attacks. Previous Indian administrations would have had, at a minimum, massive military build-ups, and some of my friends and colleagues could have written a trilogy of books on India-Pakistan crises (together with the 1999 Kargil crisis and the 2001-2 standoff). Again, my point was to call for more restraint, and the wisdom that should help facilitate a peaceful rise to India's place as a great regional and someday world power. Acting like an 800-pound gorilla, as some previous U.S. administrations have demonstrated, only makes everyone go bananas. Far better to remain wise, prudent, and restrained, and increase your power and capabilities softly, humbly, and with carefully calculated timing.

India Launches a "Non-Aggressive" Nuclear Submarine

2009-07-27T15:54:00.005-04:00

Over the weekend India launched its first domestically-built nuclear-powered submarine, one capable of carrying K-15 ballistic missiles with a range of at least 700km.

Certainly the INS Arihant (or "Destroyer of Enemies") represents a technological breakthrough for India, but why launch it now, just as peace talks with Pakistan are resuming over Kashmir? Pakistanis are paranoid enough about India; one Pakistani journalist, Ahmed Quraishi, commented on one of my posts that India was paying Baitullah Mehsud to attack Pakistani nuclear facilities so that they would look vulnerable and the United States would pressure Pakistan to get rid of them. Following the old rule that if you go out of your way to say what something is not, it usually is that ("it's not your father's Oldsmobile"), Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated that "We don't have any aggressive designs nor do we seek to threaten anyone."

India needs to be smart as it seeks to become a great power. The capability to build nuclear-powered submarines puts it in a league with the United States, Russia, France, Great Britain, and China. It is a rising power both in the region and the world, but its inferiority complex regarding Pakistan is holding it back and making it look petty. Just as Pakistan needs to acknowledge that its biggest threat is the militants, India needs to recognize that the only thing it has to fear from Pakistan are Mumbai-style attacks from militants, and the more it threatens Pakistan the less resources Pakistan will be willing to spend on fighting those same militants, be they LeT or Taliban.

Part of being a great power is showing restraint, wisdom, and timing. Those are lessons India has yet to learn.

Seth Jones' Book: It's All Been Said Before

2009-07-24T09:49:00.004-04:00

Editor's Note: the following is a guest post from my colleague, Haley Gallagher on an event for Seth Jones' new book In the Graveyard of Empires. The views expressed are her own.

After attending Seth Jones’ presentation of his new book, In the Graveyard of Empires, I wouldn’t quite give him the glowing praise supported by the Times.

For one thing, Jones didn’t illuminate anything that we South Asianists haven’t pondered before. You mean the U.S. should address the massive corruption, decentralization of Afghani politics, and engagement of the Pakistani military and civilian leaders? You don’t say.

To his first point, corruption at the national and local levels exists throughout all of South Asia. We have to ask ourselves why it’s so entrenched in these societies and how we work to minimize it? It seems to me that it’s due to the lack of revenue, resources and the law. If the United States can work at the grassroots level to promote real economic development and access to social services that is better than what the insurgents or foreign Islamic Aid agencies are providing, we’ll hopefully rebuild our trust and reputation among the Afghani people.

To his second point, most development and South Asia policy experts are aware of the level of decentralization that exists throughout Afghanistan. We all realize the importance, historical relevance and complexity of the clan and tribal structure within Afghanistan’s political system. We know that to win a war, we must foster strong tribal relationships and win their support. This cannot be done from the compound in Kabul, however. Nor should the United States rely solely on police, military or intelligence forces to win hearts and minds. The United States needs to promote good governance at the grassroots level within an Afghan context and their existing political structures. In addition to grassroots diplomacy, the United States should actively engage and support civil society and NGOs working throughout Afghanistan.

To Jones’ third point, no one has thought about Afghanistan in isolation from the rest of the region. We all know that Pakistan and India are other big players who can serve a vital role in finding and snuffing out militant groups. The geopolitics at play, however, are of great consequence. Many of Washington’s challenges in Pakistan and Afghanistan are linked, and so it is correct and overdue that the United States should formulate a strategy to address the region as a whole.

Back in April, the Council on Foreign Relations released a policy paper response to the new U.S. Strategy for South Asia, “From AfPak to PakAf.” In it, Daniel Markey suggests that “a policy of inducement—through financial, technical and diplomatic assistance—is the best means to shift the strategic calculations of influential Pakistanis and bolster moderates who share basic U.S. interests.” He also suggests that the United States should support long-term development assistance in Afghanistan, with the capacity and mandate to support and expand local, community-based development projects. I couldn’t agree more. As we’ve recently witnessed with the Iranian election, change oftentimes begins from the bottom up.

Too Dumb to Quit Reading Tom Friedman

2009-07-22T09:33:00.003-04:00

Long-time readers will know I don't habitually read Thomas Friedman's columns, but enough Twitter comments ("@joshuafoust Is Tom Friedman contractually obligated to write like a 6 year old?") convinced me it was not one of his five normal recycled subjects and made me go read it. He does use the usual Friedman literary device of taking one snapshot event and extrapolating broadly about the world based on that. In this case, he sucks up to the troops in Afghanistan (commandment 7 of Walt's ten commandments for policy wonks) and talks about how much combat experience they have and expertise in the Middle East (I guess Afghanistan is the Middle East now in Friedman's eyes) they have. Despite all this he says we are overextended in Afghanistan and the mission may ultimately be unachievable.

This comes on the same day the Times has a front page article "Pakistan Objects to U.S. Plan for Afghan War." This is not the usual objections Pakistan raises in public after drone attacks to placate their people while secretly asking the United States for more drone strikes, but rather concerns that an increased level of U.S. and NATO troops and actions in Afghanistan will drive more Taliban and other militants into Pakistan, especially Baluchistan, and that Pakistan won't have enough troops to fight the militants in multiple locations and deal with their "main" threat, India.

Which brings us to the Times' recent glowing review of Seth Jones' new book In the Graveyard of Empires. (note, I haven't read the book yet, but will be attending a book release event tomorrow. I'll provide an update if my opinion changes). Jones is a good scholar who has always made good points and interesting presentations at conferences I've attended, but I wouldn't classify the recommendations in the book the way the Times does as "useful." Our window for success was 2006? So what do we do now? We have to persuade Pakistan that the militants are a bigger threat to them than India? Wow, thanks. We should fight corruption in Afghanistan and learn to understand the decentralized nature of Afghani government, politics, and culture? You don't say.

Which brings us full circle to Friedman. He says our military is experienced, but overstretched; the column was published the same week as Secretary Gates announced he was further increasing the size of the Army. Some of our officers may have done six deployments, and therefore presumably know both Jones' lessons and Friedman's extrapolated tactical maxims, but I quickly learned at the Naval Postgraduate School that when a student started off a question with "When I was leading a company of Marines in Fallujah..." it meant he hadn't done the reading for the class. The real questions are strategic, and our civilian leaders have decided on a full counterinsurgency campaign. Time and effort continue to be needed for success, but our top decision makers do need to make the strategic decisions on how long to stay.

Drinking From the Fire Hose: U.S.-India 3.0

2009-07-20T10:57:00.004-04:00

Secretary of State Clinton is in India this week and announced, as expected, that relations with India are a priority and are going to be ramped up and become less formal; "U.S-India 3.0" is how Clinton described it.

MORE attention? That's great, but U.S. policymakers need to move more slowly. Perhaps the less formal relations will improve the process, but India, despite a huge population, has a limited number of bureaucrats and can make progress on only so many issues at a time. The agenda for Clinton's trip included everything from climate change (where India pushed back), education, food security, nuclear energy, and space cooperation. Wow. No wonder a deal on end-use monitoring is still being negotiated at the last minute--South Block (the equivalent of India's State Department/Foggy Bottom) must have been working day and night just to read the briefings and proposals on all the other issues. The trip and the deals have barely made news here in the States, whereas in India they are front page news. The United States needs a little patience. It's not easy to drink from the Foggy Bottom fire hose.

123 AND 126? Mrs. Clinton Goes to Delhi

2009-07-16T15:24:00.004-04:00

As I've acknowledged before, one of the few major foreign policy successes the Bush Administration can be given credit for is having taken the ball they were given by President Clinton's visit to India in 2000 and running with it, fast. The Bush Administration pushed the U.S.-India relationship far and fast, and now Secretary of State Clinton is headed to India to put the cherry on top of potentially two big agreements.

One of the key quotes from a participant at my 2007 U.S.-India track-two dialogue was "after 123 comes 126," meaning after the 123 nuclear waiver would come the potential sale of 126 F-16's to India. Now the Obama Administration is in a place to push both pieces over the goal line. The 123 waiver actually passed last year, but rumor has it that during this visit India will announce at least two nuclear power plant sites reserved for U.S. energy companies. That is big news, since both French and Russian companies already have deals in place.

The second big piece is the possible announcement of an end-use monitoring agreement, allowing the United States to start selling higher technology military equipment, like F-16's, to India. If they have come up with an agreement that would be quite a coup.

Work remains to be done. The United States and India need to get closer together on climate change, the Proliferation Security Initiative, potentially Kashmir, and nonproliferation discussions for next year. The Obama Administration should be thankful it was set up for success, proud of itself for completing the agreements, and not rest on its laurels.

CIA's Assassination Squads

2009-07-16T14:15:00.003-04:00

I think the headline of this LA Times article on the CIA's recently-scrapped attempt to form a team to assassinate terrorist leaders says it all: "CIA was a long way from Jason Bourne." More details are still coming out, but this article has the best summary I've read so far.

According to current and former U.S. intelligence officials, the CIA spent seven years trying to assemble teams capable of killing the world's most wanted terrorists but could never find a formula that worked.

This is yet another example of the intelligence community focusing too much on technology and not enough on people. This applies not just to hit squads but also to intelligence gathering. Technology is great, and making some forms of intelligence gathering obselete (I've heard the story that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff heard that Israel had entered the Gaza Strip via Twitter within five minutes, and it took military intelligence over a day to confirm it), but it can never tell you what somebody is thinking, or be able to stand right next to them in a cave in Waziristan. The intelligence community needs to accelerate the process of hiring more people capable of going around the world and blending in, with good language and cultural skills.

Catch-Up Thoughts

2009-07-14T15:58:00.004-04:00

Those of you following me on Twitter will know I was out in California for a few days and not posting, so here are my brief thoughts on some of the recent events. I know you all missed my commentary.

The CIA developed an assassination squad to go after al-Qaeda leadership... and it failed to have any successes that we know about and proved far more difficult than in James Bond movies. Neither of those facts is surprising. In fact I would be shocked if the CIA didn't still have a similar squad with similar goals. As other commenters have pointed out, the difference between firing missiles from drones and potentially firing bullets from sniper teams is mostly semantic, except that the drones seem to have a lot more collateral damage--that and the drones have actually been used. Nor is it shocking that Darth Cheney kept the program a secret from Congress. That fact bothers me more. Congress, or the Intelligence committees or the Gang of Eight at a bare minimum, should be kept appraised of all programs, especially the controversial ones. That's why we have checks and balances in our government.
Secretary of State Clinton has ordered the first Quadrennial Development and Diplomacy Review (QDDR). Great! We need to know what we are doing, and giving, have a better idea of what is going where and why, and hopefully some oversight. I'll give you a preview of the report: 1) we need a director for USAID, 2) we don't have enough civilian experts on hand to plan much less execute a "civilian surge" in a place like Afghanistan. In the Pentagon the QDR sets the tone and direction for the Department of Defense; we'll see if the QDDR has the same weight and budget power for State and the other agencies involved with foreign aid and development.
President Obama and Russian President Medvedev signed a Joint Understanding to a new START arms control treaty. The Joint Understanding is good progress, but it is really laying a foundation for more hard work to be done between now and December. By then hopefully the Nuclear Posture Review will be complete, satisfying certain Republican Senators, and real arms reductions can be made, hopefully down to the 1000-1200 range, although I would like to see us get even lower.

Predator Drone Groundhog Day

2009-07-08T09:34:00.004-04:00

Just once I'd like to wake up, open the Washington Post, and read "Predator drone hits what it was aiming at in Pakistan." Today a drone fired six missiles into a South Waziristan militant training camp in an effort to kill Baitullah Mehsud, but killing six militants. Yesterday a drone fired two missiles and killed 12-16 militants in a training camp in South Waziristan in an effort to kill Mehsud. Sound familiar? For those keeping score at home, that's three drone strikes in four days, and at least the 26th of the year. Who taught us how to shoot, the evil henchmen from a James Bond movie?

Not that I'm at all arguing against striking terrorist camps. But the Pakistani military is doing just fine with both its air and ground campaigns. Training camps are fairly stationary and provide good targets for the Pakistani Air Force. We should be far more selective with our drone strikes in order to actually hit high value targets like Mehsud, not places where he might be or just was.

Clear-Hold...Build?

2009-07-06T09:47:00.002-04:00

If John Nagl had a nickel for every time a news story mentioned the counterinsurgency concept of clear and hold, I suspect the news on Thursday of U.S. Marines making a "major push" into the Southern Afghanistan province of Helmand would have financed CNAS for quite some time. Now how about the third part of the counterinsurgency triad, build? Various experts have acknowledged that the much-hyped "civilian surge" won't be coming to Afghanistan, since the experts needed to staff it do not exist. Will that piece simply be forgotten? Improvised by the military? I'd like to hear more about that part of the strategy.

The same thing can be asked on the other side of the border. Pakistani troops have done a fairly good job on the clear stage in Swat, and are hoping the hold stage takes care of itself as it moves on to South Waziristan. Clear is the "fun" part for militaries (or as much fun as counterinsurgency can be); fighting an enemy, however elusive, is what the military signed up to do. Hold is less fun, since it is difficult and defensive, sitting there as targets for guerrilla attacks. Pakistan seems to be assuming that the United States, and $1.5 billion a year or more, will take care of the build phase in Swat and, presumably, South Waziristan. Given the plans for Helmand province, I'll believe it when I see it.